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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concentrated on enriching and complimenting The Theory o f  
Communicative Action by Jurgen Habermas with the burgeoning field of Visual Culture 
Studies. In taking up the theoretical work of Habermas, the manner in which individuals 
are communicatively persuaded to perform certain actions according to the contents of 
their utterances is recognized. There is identified a linguistic bias in Habermas’s theory 
that does not take into account the communicative capabilities of the visual imagetext. It 
is argued that the imagetext is inextricably imbued and saturated with language. Thus, the 
synaesthetic qualities of the imagetext, which admit an always already codependent 
relationship between the visual and the linguistic, allow it to be examined in light of the 
intricate theory offered by Habermas. By referencing the imagetexts that were a catalyst 
to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq, and subjecting them to the stringent 
requirements of Habermasian theory, it is concluded that the imagetext is capable of 
coordinating the actions of individuals along parallel lines as the linguistically biased 
theory of communicative action. In focusing on the still, photographic imagetext, it is 
hoped that the conclusions offered here provide a solid, theoretically sound foundation to 
furthering the investigation into what happens, and what emerges, when the individual is 
put in relation to an imagetext.
Keywords:
Visual Culture Studies -  Jurgen Habermas -  The Theory of Communicative Action -  
Coordination of Action -  G.H. Mead -  Photography -  Imagetext -  Image-Event -  
Synaesthetics -  Objective Intentionality -  Abu Ghraib
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Chapter 1: Picture This...
[1.1] Mapping the Terrain
The communicative theory of Jurgen Habermas is an exhaustively detailed, 
procedural, and pragmatic account of the manner in which individuals are rationally 
motivated, via linguistic means, to harmonize their plans of action, consensually achieve 
agreement on constative issues, and discursively reach an understanding between 
speaking individuals. This is accomplished by dialogically testing three claims to validity 
against three corresponding world relations and allowing the force of the better argument 
in a linguistic contest of opinion to determine which course of action should be taken by 
those who are, or could possibly be, affected by the decisions in question. Habermas 
believes that the modem age has developed the unique ability to make more rational 
decisions based on facts and reasons that are free of the dogmatic teachings of a deity 
and/or the unfounded assumptions of previous times. He is not claiming that the use of 
strategic/instrumental rationality has disappeared from the modem age. In fact, his 
communicative theory should be regarded as a cautionary appeal to a more rational 
alternative than the instrumental and strategic forms of rationality that persist in the 
present day. Hermeneutically, the theory of communicative action is a precise and well 
defended argument that allows the rational capabilities of speaking and acting individuals 
to flourish. It is, though, not without its oversights. The main omission that this paper 
addresses is the linguistically biased nature of Habermasian theory. The Theory o f  
Communicative Action, first published in English in two volumes in 1984 and 1987, is 
dated. It does not take into account the current cultural climate that the present day
1
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individual finds him/herself. Present day culture is one that has been characterized as 
being saturated with an overabundance of imagistic communication. It is a culture where 
words have been effectively exchanged for images. Image is, as the slogan goes, 
everything.
Visual culture studies is an attempt to analyze, theorize, and come to terms with 
the never-ending stream of imagetexts that fleetingly pass before the individual’s eyes. 
Distinguishing itself from traditional art history, visual culture studies reopens the canon 
of imagetexts, breaks down and reassesses the fragments of its fortified boundaries, 
contemplates the inclusion of previously excluded imagetexts, and allows for a more 
complete consideration of the effect that this never-ending sequence of images has on the 
individual, and, on culture at large. One of the most important contributions that visual 
culture studies has made to the academy, is it’s insistence on the inseparable nature of the 
linguistic from the imagistic. An imagetext, as the nomenclature suggests, is one that 
synaesthetically combines the visual and the linguistic in a complex web of an internally 
related and reciprocally commensurable relationship. The imagetext is always already 
invaded by language. One does not exist without the other and the understanding of an 
imagetext would be incomplete if the linguistic elements contained within it were 
ignored.
This thesis attempts to compliment and enrich Habermasian theory by 
contemplating the ability of the imagetext to coordinate action along the same, although 
linguistically biased, lines as the theory of communicative action. This thesis will begin 
by investigating the main tenets of the theory of communicative action developed by 
Habermas, then focus on the contribution that visual culture studies has made to the
2
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academy, posit that the linguistic elements contained within an imagetext are 
commensurable with Habermasian theory by drawing on the recently released images of 
torture that took place at the notorious Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq, and answer 
the following questions. Can specific imagetexts satisfy the exhaustive presuppositional 
requirements that Habermas has theorized in The Theory o f  Communicative Action? If so, 
what is it about certain imagetexts that enable them to rationally coordinate action along 
these same lines? If not, what stands in their way? Do imagetexts communicate an 
understandable message to an individual that is put in relation to them? Can the imagetext 
make, and support, claims to validity? Does the availability of imagetexts, that depict 
situations that have been previously described linguistically, fundamentally alter the 
reaction of individuals to circumstances around the globe? If so, why are certain contexts 
central to the collective consciousness and others relegated to the peripherary of 
collective contemplation or not considered at all? All of these questions will be addressed 
in what follows by first contemplating the ability of the imagetext to satisfy the rigorous 
presuppositional requirements of the theory of communicative action. In Chapter 4, the 
commensurability with which imagistic communication parallels linguistic 
communication, through the raising and redeeming of validity claims, will begin the 
investigation by drawing on George Herbert Mead’s influence on Habermasian theory. 
The ability of the imagetext to further ensure that all those that are, or could possibly be, 
affected by the outcome of a debate to participate in the contest of opinion, even if they 
are physically not present in the debate, will follow. The thesis will conclude by 
considering the effects of the now iconic photographs of prisoner torture at the Abu 
Ghraib detention facility in Iraq as an example of the manner in which images are able to
3
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coordinate the actions of individuals along the same lines as, and in certain 
circumstances, better than, language.
[1.2] Introducing Habermas
Published in English in two volumes in 1984 and 1987 respectively, The Theory 
o f Communicative Action, by Jurgen Habermas, is a meticulously detailed account of the 
manner in which individuals are rationally motivated through linguistic means to 
coordinate their actions. An individual’s actions may be linguistically coordinated by the 
binding (or bonding) effect that is brought about through the raising and redeeming of 
claims to validity that inhere in the content of an Elocutionary speech act. The hearer of a 
speech act either accepts or rejects the contents of the utterance based on the claims to 
validity that a speaker raises. If accepted, the hearer is bound, by the coordinating effect 
of the acceptance of the speaker’s utterance, to act according to the agreement that is 
reached through the content of the utterance. The act of raising and redeeming claims to 
validity is dependent on the possibility of the hearer to question, to seek explanation for, 
the contents of a speech act. It is, thus, ultimately a dialogical or discursive practice that 
takes place between at least two people in communication. The linguistic/discursive 
elements of The Theory o f  Communicative Action will play a tremendously significant 
role in the argument being developed in this proposal and ultimately in the thesis that will 
follow it.
If action is to be more rationally coordinated via linguistic means, the theoretical 
exclusion of certain types of speech acts, those that do not fulfill the requirements of 
linguistically-based rationality, is necessary. Habermas identifies this foundational 
segmentation by referencing the work of Austin and his division of speech acts into
4
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locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary utterances (1984, p. 288). These three 
concepts identified by Austin and taken on by Habermas are dependent on the type of 
action orientation that is undertaken when a speaker says something to a hearer. Action 
oriented toward reaching understanding and that oriented toward strategic or instrumental 
action are two of the possible orientations that a speaker may take when making an 
utterance. It should be noted that they sometimes overlap and cross the theoretical 
boundaries that Habermas draws around them (1984, p. 288 and p. 305). The action 
orientation of the speaker is addressed very briefly here to identify the importance of 
these concepts and to identify their interrelated nature to the type of speech act that is 
made between two speaking individuals. The qualifier of ‘speaking’ individuals is one of 
the issues that will be ultimately important in the portion of the thesis that attempts to 
enrich Habermas’s theory of communicative action with elements of visual culture.
The locutionary speech act is the foundational element of the propositional 
sentence that predicates the illocutionary and the perlocutionary speech act. “Through 
locutionary acts the speaker expresses states of affairs; he says something” (Habermas, 
1984, p. 288, emphasis in original). The illocutionary act builds on the propositional 
content of the locutionary act by introducing an action orientation into the theoretical 
categorization. “Through illocutionary acts the speaker performs an action in saying 
something” (Habermas, 1984, p. 289). The type of action that is performed through the 
illocutionary speech act is directly related to an action orientation that is aimed at 
reaching understanding. The perlocutionary speech act does not aim at reaching 
understanding, but, instead, at coercion and/or manipulation in the communicative 
exchange between two speaking individuals. With perlocutionary acts “the speaker
5
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produces an effect upon the hearer. By carrying out a speech act he brings about 
something in the world” (Habermas, 1984, p. 289). This type of speech act is related to 
the action orientation of the speaker that is strategically motivated to ego’s success and 
not mutual understanding. Perlocutionary acts are often characterized as speech acts that 
motivate action in the hearer by either threatening punishment or promising reward and 
for this reason are distinguished from communicative action which is aimed at reaching 
an understanding. Succumbing to a threat or being persuaded by a reward are not 
communicatively motivated sequences of action that take place between ego and alter and 
are, therefore, paradigmatically not addressed in light of the theory raised by Habermas. 
The complex notion of what makes a speech act valid or invalid in relation to three 
claims to validity will be addressed below.
A speaker performs an illocutionary speech act when he/she is solely interested in 
transparently communicating the meaning of the contents of the speech act to his/her 
interlocutor. The end effect of the illocutionary speech act is one that is exclusively 
concerned with clarity and comprehension; any teleological effect upon the hearer other 
than that which is concerned with reaching understanding is, by definition, excluded from 
the illocutionary statement. “The term ‘reaching understanding’ [ Verstandigung] means, 
at the minimum, that at least two speaking and acting subjects understand a linguistic 
expression in the same way. (...) And to understand what a speaker wants to say with 
such an act, the hearer has to know the conditions under which it can be accepted” 
(Habermas, 1984, p. 307). If the hearer understands the conditions under which the 
speech act can be accepted and he/she accepts the claim to validity that the speaker raises 
as valid, then he/she enters into a quasi-contractual obligation to act according to the
6
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agreement reached through the communicative exchange. This is not the case with the 
perlocutionary speech act. The perlocutionary speech act of the speaker aims at 
motivating action in the hearer by means of strategic or instrumental action that is 
oriented to success, not to mutual understanding. This type of speech act produces an 
effect on the hearer that extends beyond the content of the utterance itself. In this fashion, 
the perlocutionary speech act is manipulative and/or coercive and thus not aimed at 
reaching understanding, nor of motivating action communicatively, through the rationally 
binding (or bonding) effect that is achieved when an utterance is deemed to be valid or 
invalid according to the criteria of the claims to validity mentioned above. It is 
Habermas’s opinion that only those speech acts that satisfy the possibility of a 
communicatively achieved binding (or bonding) effect can be counted as communicative 
action. Therefore, the only category of speech acts that satisfy these requirements is the 
illocutionary speech act which is concerned solely with reaching understanding through 
transparent communication. “Thus I count as communicative action those linguistically 
mediated interactions in which all participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only 
illocutionary aims, with their mediating acts of communication” (1984, p. 295).
Habermas’s theory states that action can be motivated communicatively through 
the raising and redeeming of validity claims which are accepted or rejected based on their 
agreement or disagreement with three specific world relations. Leaving all perlocution 
aside, a claim is deemed to be valid if the speaker is able to provide evidence that proves 
the claim is ‘true’ in the objective world, ‘right’ in the social/contextual world and 
‘truthful’ or ‘sincere’ in the subjective world. The hearer understands under which 
conditions the utterance can be accepted or rejected if he/she is able to take a ‘yes’, ‘no’,
7
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or ‘undecided’ position on the claim being made. In other words, the three claims to 
validity are:
1. That the statement made is true (or that the existential presuppositions of 
the propositional content mentioned are in fact satisfied);
2. That the speech act is right with respect to the existing normative context 
(or the normative context that is supposed to satisfy itself is legitimate); 
and
3. That the manifest intention of the speaker is meant as it is expressed. 
(Habermas, p. 99)
The three claims to validity can be summarized as follows: i) the claim to truth, ii) the 
claim to rightness, and iii) the claim to truthfulness or sincerity. It is against these three 
claims to validity that an utterance is redeemed or unredeemed. If the utterance is 
redeemed by the hearer, he/she understands the conditions that must be met in order for 
the speech act to be accepted and action is thus coordinated. If the utterance goes 
unredeemed by the hearer, further explanation or clarification on the part of the speaker is 
necessary. The possibility on the part of the hearer to criticize the claim to validity made 
by the speaker is an integral part in the coordination of action and one that must not be 
glossed over. “(O)nly those speech acts with which a speaker connects a criticizable 
validity claim can move a hearer to accept an offer independently of external forces. In 
this way they can be effective as a mechanism for coordinating action” (1984, p. 305).
The point that Habermas raises here is a vital one. The ability of the hearer to ask for 
clarification or to seek further explanation from the speaker -  to ask the speaker to 
redeem his claim to validity -  in an attempt to take a yes, no, or undecided position on the
8
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claim being raised is not possible with action aimed at strategic success or instrumental 
goals. If the speaker is to redeem the claim to validity that is being raised, the only way in 
which action can be coordinated free of external forces and, thus, communicatively, is by 
giving the hearer the opportunity to ask the speaker to redeem the content of the 
utterance. If this act of redemption on the part of the speaker is not fulfilled, “the binding 
(or bonding) force of good reasons (...) remains unexploited” (1984, p. 305). When the 
hearer of a speech act rejects the claim to validity being made with a ‘no’ or ‘maybe’ 
position, he/she does not understand, or disagrees with, the conditions under which it can 
be accepted. In other words, the hearer requires further clarification or explanation for the 
claim to validity being raised by the speaker in his/her utterance. It must be noted at this 
juncture that all three claims to validity are not considered in strict isolation from each 
other, but are evaluated hierarchically according to the congruence of the speech act to 
one of the three world relations discussed below. This does not omit the other two claims 
from playing a part in the redemption of the overall claim to validity, but gives them a 
secondary, or background, role in the acceptance or rejection of the utterance. This point 
will be made much more clearly when the world relations of the three claims to validity 
are examined in light of their fidelity or infidelity to those three distinct world relations.
As stated above, when a speaker raises one of the three claims to validity its 
acceptance or rejection is judged against three distinctive and corresponding world 
relations.
“Communicatively achieved agreement is measured against exactly three 
criticizable validity claims; in coming to an understanding about 
something with one another and thus making themselves understandable, 
actors cannot avoid embedding their speech acts in precisely three world 
relations and claiming validity for them under these three aspects” (1984, 
p. 308).
9
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In an attempt to make this pivotal point clear the three claims to validity will be restated 
along with their corresponding world relations by using an illocutionary statement to lend 
supporting evidence to the concepts proposed by Habermas. Let us use the utterance “It is 
raining outside” as our example.
The first validity claim is that of truth. The claim to truth is redeemed if it 
correctly corresponds to the objective world that the speaker is referring to and that the 
hearer can verify by his involvement in the objective world. This particular speech act is 
redeemed if the hearer can look out the window and see rain falling from the sky. The 
visual verification of the objective truth claim will be focused on in the coming pages.
The claim is rejected or is not redeemed if the hearer of the statement cannot look 
outside, perhaps due to a lack of windows, or if he/she looks outside and sees the sun 
shining with no perceivable rain.
The second validity claim is the claim to normative rightness. Such a claim is 
judged to be valid or invalid against the social, interpersonal, normative and, contextual 
world relations in which the utterance is made. If we are to take the same statement from 
the above example and subject it to the claim to rightness, the social, the contextual, the 
interpersonal, and the normative world relations of the two speaking individuals would 
determine the validity of the claim being made. For example, “communications are 
sometimes ‘inappropriate,’ reports ‘out of place,’ confessions ‘awkward,’ disclosures 
‘offensive’” (Habermas, 1984, p. 311). The claim to normative rightness in the utterance 
“It is raining outside” would be invalid if the social and contextual world relations are 
such that the statement does not directly address the conversation that is taking place 
between at least two speaking individuals. This means that if a conversation is taking
10
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place in an academic institution, for example, and it is dealing with the intricate nature of 
a theory of communicative action and one of the participants in the conversation blurts 
out “It is raining outside”, this utterance will be judged as invalid in terms of the 
standards of normative ‘rightness’ which address the social context of the conversation 
that is taking place. On the other hand, the statement would be judged as ‘right’, and 
therefore valid, if there is a conversation taking place between two individuals that is 
referring to a baseball game that is happening outdoors on the day of the exchange. The 
claim to rightness is contingent on the social and contextual world relations of the 
speaker and the hearer and the degree to which the statement is appropriate in relation to 
those social and contextual criterions.
The third and last validity claim that Habermas identifies is the claim to sincerity 
or truthfulness. There have been ample objections, recognized and defended by 
Habermas (1984, p. 314), regarding the distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘truthfulness’.
The differences between the two claims to validity are clear given Habermas’s 
explanation. When an utterance is subjected to scrutiny according to the requirements of 
the claim to sincerity or truthfulness, the disposition of the subjectivity of the speaker 
him/herself is taken into consideration. With ‘truth’, the objective world is the standard 
by which an utterance is judged to be valid or invalid; in the subjective realm of 
truthfulness the objective world does not bear as much influence. When a speaker says 
something that is related to his/her personal experience he/she is referring to something to 
which he/she has “privileged access” (1984, p. 309). The claim to truthfulness is an 
expressive speech act of subjective belief to which the hearer is invited to scrutinize and 
judge whether or not the utterance is sincere. If the hearer of an utterance based on
11
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truthfulness decides to reject the claim to validity that is raised in the speech act, he/she is 
taking issue with the sincerity of the speaker, or, the truthfulness of the claim being made. 
The usefulness of the previous example “It is raining outside” is no longer an appropriate 
utterance in terms of the claim to sincerity or truthfulness. As mentioned and being 
consistent with Habermasian theory, claims to validity are evaluated hierarchically 
against exactly three world relations. The claim “It is raining outside” refers to the 
objective world and/or the normative, social world easily, but its usefulness is limited in 
relation to the subjective world that the speaker has privileged access to. An archetypal 
example of an utterance that refers to the subjective world is “I love you”. This claim is 
scrutinized by the hearer in relation to its sincerity or truthfulness. If the speaker and the 
hearer have been family members, good friends, or partners for a period of time the claim 
to truthfulness would be accepted readily and easily. On the other hand, if the speaker has 
a history of infidelity or if  the two interlocutors have just met, the hearer may be 
suspicious of the sincerity of the claim to truthfulness and may request further 
clarification or explanation. With claims to truthfulness or sincerity the ‘undecided’ 
response of the hearer is a likely outcome. It is possible that the claim to truthfulness may 
in fact never be redeemed. Due to the personal and subjective nature of the utterance of 
which the hearer has no direct access, the ‘undecided’ position may persist indefinitely or 
permanently. The linguistic, discursive, and dialogical nature of Habermas’s Theory o f  
Communicative Action and the potential of the image to ‘fit into’ this paradigm will be 
one of the main points of interest in the following.
12
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[1.3] Visual Culture Studies:
Visual culture studies is at an embryonic stage of development when the traditions 
of other established disciplines are considered. There is a lot of debate taking place in the 
pages of scholarly journals and in the class rooms and hallways of the academy regarding 
the exact position or status of visual culture studies. These debates often recede into 
defensive, territorial arguments between disciplines regarding the actual need for a new 
area of research called visual culture studies. The questions that abound in the present 
moment are concerned with whether or not visual studies should be developed into a 
proper discipline unto itself or whether it should be considered a trans-disciplinary, inter­
disciplinary, or multi-disciplinary field that uses relevant methodologies and theories 
from a variety of other disciplines with which it is highly interconnected. The 
pedagogical issue of whether or not visual studies will develop into a self-contained 
discipline with all of the textbooks, manuals, infrastructure and funding of other 
disciplines is a tremendously interesting and intriguing debate, but is also one that does 
not directly apply to the proposed research. It is mentioned here to identify one of the 
main concerns in the recent literature of visual culture studies and to acknowledge the 
importance of this debate within the developing area of research called ‘Visual Culture 
Studies’.
In trying to mark its territory within the academy, theorists of visual culture 
studies have had to confront one o f the most elementary questions that needs to be 
answered when defining their proposed field of research. The question revolves around 
the actual object of investigation in visual cultural terms and how it makes up for some of 
the shortcomings or oversights of art history and aesthetic theory. If visual culture is to be
13
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part of the disciplined study that takes place in academic institutions the world over, it 
needs to define what exactly it investigates and how its proposed area of investigation 
differs from that of art history and aesthetics. This quite naturally leads to a discussion of 
the image and the way that visual culture studies differs in its interpretation of the image 
from the fields of art history and aesthetics. The object of investigation for visual culture 
studies is not an empirical, material object that exists in reality, but more of a concerted 
effort to understand “what happens when people look, and what emerges from that act?” 
(Bal, 2003, p. 9). The empirical nature of art history and aesthetics is tied to an attempt to 
factually analyze the content of an image, to date i t , and provide authorial credit to the 
correct individual and, is also where visual culture studies cuts its ties to these disciplines. 
There is no question that visual culture is also concerned with the content of the image, 
when it was made, and by whom, but it also attempts to theorize what occurs when that 
image is seen, in whatever medium it happens to appear, by an individual. The question 
of the Benjaminian concept of the ‘aura’ of the original artwork and the manner in which 
it is altered by its technological reproduction is one that has distressed the fields of art 
history and aesthetics ever since “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction” first was published (1935). Where art history and aesthetics wrestle with 
the epistemological concerns of the ‘aura’ of the artwork, this cleavage poses little 
problem to the study of visual culture studies. Poster, an historian and theorist of visual 
culture, contends that, “properly understood, the juxtaposition of an original Vermeer 
painting with a virtual copy viewed on a computer screen benefits the comprehension of 
both images” (2002, p. 68).
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Where art history is concerned solely with the form and content of a distinct and
often canonical work of art, visual culture is more concerned with the outcome of what
Buck-Morss calls the ‘image event’. “Hermeneutics shifts its orientation away from
historical, or cultural, or authorial intent and toward what we can call ‘the image event’;
the constantly moving perception. That is, the image as it gets released into a public
domain and circulates” (Buck-Morss, 2003, min. 59:10) and the effect of that circulation
on the image itself and the public that views it.
Bal is another theorist dealing with the intricacies of the theoretical foundations of
visual culture. She finds the very term ‘visual culture’ problematic and argues that it must
be used skillfully and carefully.
“If taken at face value, [visual culture] describes the segment of that 
culture that is visual, as if it could be isolated (for study, at least) from the 
rest of that culture. Either way, the term is predicated upon what I call here 
a kind of visual essentialism that either proclaims the visual ‘difference’ -  
read ‘purity’ -  of images, or expresses a desire to stake out the turf of 
visuality against other media or semiotic systems” (Bal, 2003, p. 6).
Her point here is that the image cannot and should not be considered in pure isolation
from other concepts, senses, or elements in culture that influence, facilitate or undermine
the possible exposure to, and the resulting reception of, the cognitive impact of the
image. To treat the image as a discrete and isolated unit of information is to discredit
what is actually occurring when people look.
“The act of looking is profoundly ‘impure’. First, sense-directed as it may 
be, hence, grounded in biology (but no more than all acts performed by 
humans), looking is inherently framed, framing, interpreting, affect-laden, 
cognitive, and intellectual. Second, this impure quality is also likely to be 
applicable to other sense-based activities: listening, reading, tasting, 
smelling. This impurity makes such activities mutually permeable, so that 
listening and reading can also have visuality to them. Hence, literature, 
sound and music are not excluded from the object of visual culture” (Bal,
2003, p. 9).
15
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In this formulation the image is essentially synaesthetic (see also Abram, 1996 and
Merleau-Ponty, 1973); that is, it activates a response in the non-visual senses that is based
on the stimulation of the sense of vision. One of the more common examples given of
synaesthesia is that of coloured hearing. The manner in which synaesthesia is
characterized by Bal extends this definition in reference to the new object of study that
visual culture has ‘found’ to focus on more than just the sensory perception and to
include the possibility of the concept of the imagetext; where the image is intimately and
always already interconnected with language. “Images are by definition riddled and
stippled with language” (Conley, 1996, p. 31). Bal reinforces this point in the following.
“Far from the photographs illustrating the text or the words ‘explicating’ 
the images, the simultaneity between the photographs and images and 
their appeal to the viewers entire body operates by means of the enigmatic 
discrepancies between these two main registers. Hence, any definition that 
attempts to distinguish visuality from, for example, language misses the 
point of the ‘new object’ entirely” (Bal, 2003, p. 10).
The concept of synaesthesia is important when considering the connection between visual
culture and The Theory o f  Communicative Action.
One of the great hopes of the initial theorization of the image was not only its
commensurable relationship with language but its ability to transcend the limitations of
language. It was theorized that the image could communicate across linguistic, cultural
and national barriers easily and without friction, unlike language that would need to be
translated from one dialect to the other if there is to be understanding. There was a belief
that the semiotic decoding of the imagetext did not require a shared language and was
therefore superior to linguistics or other methods of communication in conveying
information to a vast array of individuated cultures and peoples in potentially infinite
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
locations around the world, all speaking different languages. Empirically, this can be
demonstrated by the multi-cultural and diverse peoples, all speaking different languages,
which are able to visit the same gallery or museum, open the same book or web-page and
ponder the imagetext relatively successfully. Another example would be the successful
screening of silent films around the world in the early 20th century. These films did not
require translation or subtitles because the problems of the language barrier were averted
by the ability of the image to communicate directly to an audience without the use of
words (see Bordwell and Thompson, 1993, p. 451-9). The extra-linguistic ability of the
image to communicate across geographical and linguistic barriers has proven far too
simplistic an account for the cultural relativist position that is its antithesis, but it is worth
exploring a moment further to set up this polemical debate.
“The naturalness of the image makes it a universal means of 
communication that provides a direct, unmediated, and accurate 
representation of things, rather than an indirect, unreliable report about 
things. (...) The fact that the natural sign can be decoded by lesser beings 
(savages, children, illiterates, and animals) becomes, in this context, an 
argument for the greater epistemological power of imagery and its 
universality as a means of communication.” (Mitchell [1986] in Jay, 2002, 
p. 269)
The image as pure denotation (see Barthes, 1982, p. 198) was a concept that many 
scholars argued to be invalid when the cultural side of the visual cultural dialectic was 
explored more critically; note, though, that the very important point that images have the 
ability to communicate was not an issue . The counter-argument that was raised in 
opposition to this claim to validity was that vision and visuality, much like language, are 
a cultural construct that is a product of the individuated cultural environment of the 
person doing the looking or speaking. The position, espoused by Mitchell above, that 
argues for the unmediated communicative potential of the image across cultural and
17
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linguistic barriers and the cultural-relativist position that ascribes the power to explicate 
the contents of an image according to the cultural lens through which it is encountered 
and deciphered, represents the divisive debate that is currently taking place in the area of 
study called visual culture. The position now taken up by many theorists, such as Bal, Jay 
and recently Mitchell, and the stance that this thesis will defend, is one that is located in- 
between these two extremities. It is worth quoting Jay at length here to clarify this key 
point.
“If, however, it can be shown that no allegedly distinct and integrated 
culture is really coherent and boundaried, none able to police its borders 
successfully against pollution from without, none organized like a living 
organism, then the idea that different cultures produce incommensurable 
views of the world cannot logically hold. For no individual within such a 
porous container as culture, at least once populations begin to interact, can 
be totally determined by it. He or she is necessarily in contact with 
something ‘outside’ it that is always already ‘within’.” (Jay, 2002, p. 273).
Thus, the culturally relative and individuated decoding of an image text is an over
exaggeration of the possible number of semiotic interpretations of the image. Freud’s
famous saying: “My boy, sometimes a cigar is just a cigar” would be one example of an
argument against the cultural relativist position because of the material existence of
objects in the world. The example of Rene Magritte’s, "Treason of Images" (1928-29),
(Diagram 1 reproduced below), is another ironic example of the argument against a
cultural-relativist position.
Diagram 1:
Cea. n -eM fuu am  jdfi&. 
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This is not to say that culture does not have an impact on the way that people experience
images, or that a re-presentation of a pipe is not the physical, material pipe that exists in
reality, but that there is also something universally understood when an image is seen by
different individuals across disparate cultures and linguistic barriers. “That is, it is as
impossible to reduce natural visual experience to its cultural mediations as it is to
disentangle it entirely from them” (Jay, 2002, p. 274). Susan Buck-Morss informs this
debate with her concept of the ‘objective intentionality’ of the image. Buck-Morss agrees
that the reception of particular images are somewhat influenced by the culture in which
the individual is taught to look; although, she does take issue with the extreme cultural-
relativist position in her theorizing.
“The fact that photographic evidence is regularly manipulated and can 
often lie; the fact that we may see what we are culturally or ideologically 
predisposed to see... is not my point. False evidence is no less evidence 
than true evidence. The term refers to visibility, the ability to be seen at 
all. An image, its evidence is apparent; its adequacy is a functioning of 
that which appears regardless of whether this is an accurate reflection of 
reality. An image takes a film o ff the face o f  the world and shows it as 
meaningful. This is what I am describing as ‘objective intentionality’. 
(Buck-Morss, 2003, 24:40, emphasis added).
Once again, the manifest, denotative content of the image and its fidelity to reality and
truth are one of the concerns, but not the sole concern, of visual cultural studies. Rather,
the false image, the manipulated image, the ‘posed’ photograph along with and beside the
‘documentary’ image, the true image and the unaltered image are all equally important to
visual cultural studies. Just as the incorrect belief or opinion can be shown as invalid in
linguistic communication, the manipulated or propagandistic image could potentially be
exposed as invalid and deceitful in visual communication.
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[1.4] Visual Argumentation
The parallel between the above concept and Habermas’s discourse ethics and 
theory of communicative action is a relevant one examined in this context. According to 
Habermas, false or incorrect beliefs or opinions, which are held by individuals that 
participate in dialog, are an inevitable part of the discursive contest of opinion that takes 
place in the public sphere. These incorrect beliefs can be corrected by an open and 
transparent form of communication that is aimed at reaching understanding and 
consensus through the practice of raising and redeeming claims to validity. If the claim to 
validity cannot be redeemed then the false opinion or belief held by the individual ought 
to be altered or exchanged for the opinion or belief that stands up to the scrutiny imposed 
on the various claims by the methodological workings of the system. If the central tenets 
of Habermas’s theory can be extended to include not just linguistic communication but 
also what happens when an image is looked at and what emerges from this interaction, 
then Habermas’s linguistic theory of communicative action could be complimented and 
enriched by the aims of visual studies. The (arguably dogmatic and) irreconcilable split 
between language and images referred to in the above section detailing the impurity of 
the image and the concept of synaesthesia will help illustrate this.
In 1996, the journal Argumentation and Advocacy published a two issue, special 
installment of the journal dealing with this specific dichotomy. Papers were published 
under the titles of: “Towards A Theory O f Visual Argument (Groarke and Birdsell,
1996), “Ca« Pictures Be Arguments?”(f\e.mmg, 1996), “The Possibility And Actuality O f 
Visual Argumenf’ (Blair, 1996), “Rhetorical and Demonstrative Modes o f Visual 
Argument” (Shelley, 1996), “Image and Emotion: Analyzing Visual Thinkingr” (Langdorf,
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1996), and “77ze Naturalistic Enthymeme And Visual Argument: Photographic 
Representation in the Skull Controversy” (Finnegan, 2001). The arguments presented in 
the various papers that populate the pages of these two issues can be divided rather easily 
along the theoretical fault line that runs squarely over the relationship between language 
and image.
Fleming’s article, “Can Pictures Be Arguments?,” is emblematic of the propensity 
of some scholars to argue that there is a theoretical necessity to segregate the image from 
language and vice-versa. Supporters of this side of the argument believe that the image 
and language are incommensurable concepts that cannot coexist. Paradigmatically, the 
image and language are purified of the influence on one another that each is subjected to 
when this boundary is collapsed. Their side of the argument, which Fleming defends 
dogmatically, will be examined and then refuted by the need to see the imagetext as 
impure and non-essentialized. Fleming states his position rather clearly on this matter. “I 
define ‘picture’, then, as an artifact constructed to be iconic with the external world; and 
my question is, can such a thing, independent o f language, be an argument?” (Fleming, 
1996, p.l 1, emphasis added). The unexplained need to strictly segregate image and 
language from one another is the main weakness to the article offered by Fleming and is 
common rhetoric for those scholars that find the always already interrelated nature of the 
image with language unacceptable. Visual culture theorists argue that the picture can 
never stand in isolation to language and/or be independent of language. They are 
intimately tied to each other. By relegating the act of argumentation to the strict confines 
of the linguistic realm, Fleming, and others like him, cut short the possibility of visual 
argumentation before it is even able to be considered. He goes on to quote van Eemeren,
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Grootendorst and Kraiger: “(N)on-verbal means o f communication can never completely
replace verbal ones: argumentation without the use of language is impossible” (van
Eemeren et al., [1984] in Fleming, 1996, p. 12). At this point Fleming needs to explicitly
state what exactly he means by argumentation with the desire to “see how pictures stack
up” (Fleming, 1996, p. 12).
“An argument, in other words, involves a two part relations, one part 
(evidence, data, proof, support, reason, etc.) supporting the other (position, 
claim, assertion, conclusion, thesis, point, argument, proposition, etc.).
Second, to say that something is reasonable is to assert that it admits of 
improvement, is corrigible, refutable, accountable; it is an act or object 
which can be interrogated, criticized, and elaborated by others” (Fleming,
1996, p. 13).
By excluding the possibility of the reciprocal relationship between language and the 
picture Fleming disqualifies the image from the above definition of argument. In this way 
“whatever else a picture can do, it cannot satisfy these two criteria” (Fleming, 1996, p.
13).
The oft-cited definition of argument first put forward by O’Keefe (1982) 
reappears again in Fleming’s piece and forms the basis for his explanation of the reasons 
behind his rejection of the picture as a form of argumentation. “The belief that an 
argument has two parts ‘claim’ and ‘support’ -  is a cornerstone of Western thought” 
(Fleming, 1996, p. 13). Judging by the literature that is identified by Fleming the above 
mentioned elements of argumentation make up the vast majority of thinking regarding the 
specific elements that make up an argument. The obvious question that stems from this 
analysis is: can images satisfy the two requirements of argumentation; that is, can 
pictures make claims and/or can pictures supply support for the claims made? According 
to the analysis presented by Fleming, the picture can accomplish neither of these two
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acts. His reason is that images considered in isolation from the verbal are quite logically 
incapable of linguistically making any type of claim. “Without syntactic arrangement, 
then, the visual can express ideas but cannot state them, an act which requires a more 
restricted structure” (Fleming, 1996, p. 14).
Images, according to Fleming, lack the necessary qualities to fulfill the 
requirements set forth by the generally accepted definition of argumentation advanced by 
this side of the fault line. According to this point of view, argumentation is a linguistic 
function that is based on raising a claim and offering supporting evidence that validates 
or invalidates the claim that is being raised. This is essentially an act of negation 
according to Fleming and one that pictures cannot accomplish. “Because negation is a 
linguistic function, [it is] foreign to the concrete, analogic world of the non-verbal” 
(Fleming, 1996, p. 17). This oversight by Fleming is common among those scholars who 
do not want to grant the visual image any type of linguistic agency. As argued above, the 
imperative of visual studies does not purify or essentialize the visual component of the 
image to the detriment of its linguistic and synaesthetic qualities. The argument proposed 
by Fleming cannot be maintained in light of the theoretical contribution made by visual 
culture studies. If the image is purified of its linguistic qualities and held in isolation, 
Fleming’s argument would make sense. If, on the other hand, the imagetext is 
characterized as having a linguistic element always and already a part of it, then 
Fleming’s argument cannot stand up to interrogation. Fleming’s position represents an 
emblematic example of this school of thought, (see also Blair, 1996).
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[1.5] Framing What Follows
This brings us to the void in the literature and the lack of hermeneutic 
investigation concerning the impure, non-essentialized imagetext as a mode of 
communication that has the potential to coordinate action according to Habermas’s 
Theory o f Communicative Action. As noted, the present examination of Habermas’s 
theory and the developing theory of visual culture is a brief snapshot of the wider picture. 
The thesis itself will be organized in four main sections.
Following this introductory chapter, the first substantive section of the thesis will 
be a detailed and thorough examination of selected sections of The Theory o f  
Communicative Action that clarify the ways in which action is coordinated via linguistic 
communication. This section will provide an overview of Habermas’s theoretical 
framework and attempt to clarify the core concepts that will be used throughout the 
thesis. This section will also include and examination of the work of George Herbert 
Mead. Mead’s work lays the required foundation for the Habermasian paradigm in which 
the thesis moves.
The second substantive section of the thesis will be devoted to exploring the 
claims of visual culture studies with regard to what happens when an image is looked at 
and what emerges from this interaction. The work of the scholars listed above will be 
examined in greater depth and detail, as well as many others. This will help to set the 
stage for a more complete understanding of what visual culture studies is by defining the 
object of study. The synaesthetic, non-essentialized, and impure characterization of the 
imagetext will prove to be vital for this definition.
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The third section of the thesis will be devoted to the enrichment of the 
Habermasian hermeneutic via the consideration of the visual cultural hermeneutic. It is in 
this portion of the thesis that detailed questions of significant importance will have to be 
dealt with. For example: Does the impure nature of the synaesthetic imagetext allow it to 
be considered as a potential vehicle for reaching understanding according to the detailed 
rubric of The Theory o f Communicative Action? Is there such thing as an image that is 
able to reach understanding; if so, what does that image Took’ like and where would one 
find appropriate examples? What do non-essentialized images ‘say’ and can their 
message be understood across cultural and linguistic barriers? Can the image be 
considered a ‘subject’, capable of raising and redeeming claims to validity that aim at 
reaching understanding? These and a host of interrelated questions will have to be dealt 
with in this portion of the thesis. This section of the thesis will also offer some examples 
of the potential of the imagetext to coordinate action in a case-study format. The torture 
and abuse scandal that resulted from the publication of controversial photos of the Iraqi 
detention facility Abu Ghraib and other related examples, such as the official Pentagon 
policy of not permitting the publication of images of soldiers coffins that have been killed 
in the line of battle will be used in this section to corroborate the claims being made in 
the previous sections of the thesis. These images and the policy of censoring images that 
are damaging to the ‘war effort’ have proven to be influential in the coordination of 
action taken by state institutions and the perceived need to eliminate images that have the 
potential to influence public opinion.
In the fourth and final section of the thesis, concluding remarks about the results 
of the research will be offered.
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Chapter 2: The Theory of Communicative Action
[2.0] An Introduction to Habermas
The Theory o f Communicative Action is a procedural account of the manner in 
which individuals consensually coordinate their activities and linguistically harmonize 
their plans of action in an attempt to reach a consensus regarding constative validity 
claims. This communicative process is characterized by a transparent and exhaustive 
debate that takes place between at least two speaking individuals whose actions are 
oriented towards mutual understanding. The process of reaching an understanding 
between at least two speaking individuals categorically omits any type of communication 
that is aimed at instrumental action or strategic purposes. By omitting these types of 
action orientations, Habermas’s theory enables the communicating individuals to 
coordinate their actions in a manner that would compliment both of their interests and, 
also, to take into account the needs and wants of any other individual that could possibly 
be affected by these communicatively achieved decisions. The breadth and scope of 
Habermas’s work is, to say the least, daunting. The amount of detail and explanation 
offered by Habermas throughout his academic career makes it difficult for the reader to 
identify an appropriate point of departure that would be faithful to his exhaustive studies. 
With this in mind, the proceeding pages will be limited to a discussion of the following 
concepts. In essence, the theory of communicative action is a theory that indicates a 
dialogic, argumentative, and discursive procedure that takes place in the multiple public 
spheres that the individual participates in each and every day. In this sense it approaches 
the intricacies of intersubjective communication from above. Taking this into account, 
the present argument will be developed much in the same manner.
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The present inquiry will examine five major areas of investigation undertaken by 
Habermas throughout his academic writings. By initially focusing our lens on [2.1] The 
Theory o f  Communicative Action, the differences between action that is oriented towards 
mutual understanding and that which is oriented towards instrumental and/or strategic 
success will be clarified. This naturally involves a distinction between communicative 
rationality and strategic/instrumental rationality. In order for this clarification to be 
fruitful, the differences between the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech 
acts need to be identified. By examining these differences, it will be shown that if 
individuals are to communicatively coordinate their plans of action, they orient 
themselves towards a communicative rationality that is aimed at mutual understanding 
through the use of the illocutionary speech act. With this preliminary discussion 
completed, the [2.2] foundations that the theory of communicative action is based on will 
be explained with reference to the work of George Herbert Mead. This discussion of 
Mead will facilitate the explanation of the [2.3] principle of universalization (U). This 
explanation will argue that any monological application of Habermas’s theory is 
inaccurate, thus enabling a comprehensive examination of his thought in light of the all 
encompassing scope that it advocates. Our focus will then tighten to consider [2.4] the 
principle of discourse ethics (D). Discourse ethics is derived from (U) and is developed 
as a methodological safeguard against any kind of ideological, individualistic 
manipulation or coercion, that is oriented to strategic success, that may take place in the 
process of coming to a rationally and communicatively achieved consensus.
By examining (U) and (D) it will be shown that the individual that participates in 
argumentation has no other alternative but to accept these universal presuppositions. If
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he/she does not accept these principles there is a [2.4] performative contradiction that 
takes place that logically invalidates any objection that may arise in the application of 
these principles in moral argumentation and, argumentation in general. In bringing the 
concept of the performative contradiction out of the background and into the foreground 
of our discussion, (U) and (D) will be seen as framing principles that universally guide 
the process of argumentation and morally and ethically structure the manner in which 
individuals are able to communicatively coordinate their activities and harmonize their 
plans of action. In section [2.5] some concluding remarks on Habermasian theory will be 
offered as a segue way into the theory of visual culture studies.
[2.1] The Theory of Communicative Action
The cooperative actions of individuals that are oriented towards mutual 
understanding are based on communicative practices that are aimed at consensually 
achieving an agreement between at least two speaking persons. The manner in which this 
mutual understanding is brought about and the way in which the actions of the individual 
speaker and hearer are communicatively coordinated according to the contents of 
illocutionary utterances is the topic of the present discussion. In an attempt to 
contextualize the argument being developed the following will begin with a brief 
discussion on [2.1a] communicative rationality versus strategic/instrumental rationality 
that will further the distinction between communicative action that is oriented towards 
mutual understanding, and instrumental or teleological action that is oriented towards 
strategic success. [2.1b] The specific type of speech act that is oriented to mutual 
understanding will then be discussed in relation to that which is aimed at teleological 
success. This will naturally lead to a presentation of [2.1c] the various claims to validity
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that are used by the speaker in an attempt to communicatively coordinate his/her or the 
hearers actions according to the binding (or bonding) effect that is brought about by the 
illocutionary content of the utterances used in a communicative process aimed at reaching 
mutual understanding. The various [2.Id] world relations that are drawn upon in order to 
redeem the claims to validity will receive appropriate consideration. And finally, [2.1e] 
the manner in which individuals are motivated to coordinate their actions via the 
communicative practice of raising and redeeming claims to validity will be explained and 
offered as a conclusion to this portion of the discussion.
[2.1 .a] Communicative Rationality versus Strategic/Instrumental 
Rationality
The Theory o f  Communicative Action begins with an examination of modern 
rationality. The modern period is characterized by a heightening of the rational capacities 
of human beings to cognitively assess their world and make decisions, not according to 
the dogmatic assumptions of some form of religious or metaphysical belief, but according 
to the reasoning abilities of every speaking and acting individual. The ability to make a 
rational decision has been possible in all human societies that have had the ability to 
speak and act. What Habermas wants to make explicitly clear is that the modern form of 
communicative rationality is fundamentally different from previous forms because it is 
oriented to reaching a mutual understanding among communicating individuals through 
the raising and redeeming of claims to validity. “While Habermas believes that 
communicative action has always occurred in human societies, the specific 
communicative competencies associated with criticizable validity claims have only been 
fully developed in the modem world” (Morris, 2004, p. 7). This inherently involves the
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application and evaluation of some sort of knowledge base that forms the background
against which these claims to validity are judged. “When we use the expression ‘rational’
we suppose that there is a close relation between rationality and knowledge” (Habermas,
1984, p. 8). As opposed to this type of knowledge based rationality, strategic/instrumental
rationality is characterized as that which persuades individuals to perform certain actions
via the coordinating effect of promising the individual a reward or threatening him/her
with punishment. Individual actions can be considered rational in the communicative
sense if they base their decisions on a form of knowledge that is able to be corrected or
improved upon mutatis mutandis. Internally related to human rationality is the rational
capabilities of symbolic expressions, such as linguistic utterances. These can be evaluated
as rational if the symbolic expressions test the knowledge base in some way or another
and seek to make claims to validity much like the speaking and acting individual does.
“If we seek the grammatical subjects that go with the predicate expression 
‘rational,’ two candidates come to the fore: persons, who have knowledge, 
can be more or less rational, as can symbolic expressions -  linguistic and 
nonlinguistic, communicative or non-communicative actions -  that 
embody knowledge” (Habermas, 1984, p. 8).
This knowledge is then used to direct the actions of individuals in such a way that they
either are attempting to bring about something in the world via appropriate means for the
desired ends, as in the use of strategic/instrumental rationality, or if they want to try and
communicate their point of view with another individual by raising a claim to validity in
an attempt to convince a hearer that their previous assumptions were in fact inaccurate or
mistaken, as in communicative rationality. In both cases the individual is making
reference to the truth of states of affairs or, to the truth of certain statements that embody
knowledge. Thus, communicative rationality is defined by the practice of
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intersubjectively testing constative validity claims through a process of interrogation,
criticism, debate and discourse. A decision can only be considered rational, in the
communicative sense, if it undergoes this process of dialogic debate. It is because of this
communicative context that a statement or an action can be considered rational.
An expression satisfies the precondition for rationality if and insofar as it 
embodies fallible knowledge and therewith has a relation to the objective 
world (that is, a relation to the facts) and is open to objective judgment. A 
judgment can be objective if it is undertaken on the basis of a 
transsubjective validity claim that has the same meaning for observers and 
nonparticipants as it has for the acting subject himself. Truth and 
efficiency are claims of this kind. Thus assertions and goal-directed 
[teleological] actions are the more rational the better the claim (to 
propositional truth or to efficiency) that is connected with them can be 
defended against criticism (Habermas, 1984, p.9).
An action or an utterance can be considered more rational, in the communicative sense, if
it can stand up to the interrogative procedure that validates the relation of the utterance or
action to the factual, objective world. That is, an utterance is valid if its claim to validity
can be redeemed by the speaker in discursive debate with a hearer. This is a
communicative practice, and one that is unique to the modern age, which relies on speech
acts to clarify what is true and what is false. Habermas wants to focus his attentions on
the ability of individuals to act more rationally via communicative means that
presuppositionally exclude all forms of strategic/instrumental rationality or action aimed
at strategic/instrumental success. The strategic/instrumental form of rationality is, without
question, able to motivate individuals to perform certain actions through the promise of a
reward or the threat of punishment or sanction. An individual behaves rationally when
confronted, for instance, with a threat to their personal safety, they decide to coordinate
their actions so as not to suffer the consequences promised in the threat. Habermas
acknowledges that this type of action coordination is indeed rational, but sees in the
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modern age an alternative way in which human beings have developed the capacity to 
cooperate and coordinate their actions free of such coercion and manipulation; that is, 
through the raising and redeeming of claims to validity identified in the concept of 
communicative rationality. Both types of action orientations are considered rational but, 
as argued above, Habermas believes that the orientation to communicatively achieved 
mutual understanding and cooperation through discourse is more rational and therefore 
the one that merits investigation if the promises offered in the rationalized, modern period 
are to be fulfilled. “Thus all arguments, ... require the same basic form of organization, 
which subordinates the eristic means to the end of developing intersubjective conviction 
by the force of the better argument” (Habermas, 1984, p. 36).
In sum, Habermas devotes his energies to the communicative rationality of 
linguistic discourse. This is done in an attempt to explain the manner in which individuals 
are rationally motivated to perform certain actions free of instrumental reason or strategic 
manipulation in the aim of reaching an understanding through the raising and redeeming 
of claims to validity. Individuals that employ communicative rationality thus coordinate 
their actions according to the binding/bonding content of their illocutionary utterances, 
and not according to the perlocutionary effect of a threat or the strategic promise of a 
reward that characterizes strategic/instrumental rationality.
[2.1 .b] Locution, lllocution, Perlocution, and the Action Orientation of 
Each
In order to understand how Habermas is able to defend this point of view it is 
necessary to begin our examination with the smallest unit in communicative rationality in 
an attempt to reconstruct his theory from the bottom up. Following Austin and Searle,
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Habermas distinguishes between three types of speech acts: the locutionary, the
illocutionary, and the perlocutionary.
Through locutionary acts the speaker expresses states of affairs; he says 
something. Through illocutionary acts the speaker performs an action in 
saying something. The illocutionary role establishes the mode of a 
sentence (‘Mp’) employed as a statement, promise, command, avowal or 
the like. ... Finally, through perlocutionary acts the speaker produces an 
effect upon the hearer. By carrying out a speech act he brings about 
something in the world (Habermas, 1984, p. 289).
Habermas argues that the illocutionary utterance is the only type of speech act that is
oriented towards reaching mutual understanding and that it alone can be employed to
motivate certain actions in other individuals in a communicative fashion. The differences
between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary speech acts have generated quite a
debate. Following are the four major points of differentiation between the illocutionary
and the perlocutionary speech acts.
(a) The illocutionary speech act is, by definition, transparent. It simply wants to present a 
point of view with the sole aim of making its manifest content understandable to the 
hearer. “[The speakers] communicative intent does not go beyond wanting the hearer to 
understand the manifest content of the speech act” (Habermas, 1984, p. 290).
(b) The perlocutionary speech act, on the other hand, does exactly the opposite. “Into the 
description of perlocutions ... there enter results that go beyond the meaning of what is 
said and thus beyond what an addressee could understand” (Habermas, 1984, p.290). In 
this fashion, perlocutions aim to bring about something in the world that is not explicitly 
contained in the manifest content of the speech act. Thus, these kinds of speech acts do 
not fulfill one of the main theoretical requirements of communicative action. Individuals
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can be more rationally motivated to perform certain actions according the force of the 
better argument and not through the manipulative or coercive intentions of a speaker.
(c) The third difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts refers to the 
effect of the speech act itself. In the illocutionary statement when a hearer accepts the 
contents of the speech act (takes a ‘yes’ position on the claim being made) as faithfully 
relating to truth, rightness or truthfulness, he/she implicitly binds his/her actions to the 
contents of the utterance. This is not the case with perlocutionary effects. It may transpire 
that the perlocutionary desires of the speaker do not actually occur and therefore are not 
internally related to the contents of the utterance like illocutionary speech acts. Thus the 
perlocutionary statement does not bind the action of the hearer to the propositional 
content of the utterance. “(I)llocutioanry results stand in a conventionally regulated or 
internal connection with speech acts, whereas perlocutionary effects remain external to 
the meaning of what is said. The possible perlocutionary effects of a speech act depend 
on fortuitous contexts and are not fixed by conventions” (Habermas, 1984, p. 291-292). 
The outcome of a perlocutionary speech act is an unknown variable that cannot be 
controlled by the speaker. Sometimes his/her desires, aims, or plans will work, sometimes 
they will not. With the transparent, communicative intent of the illocutionary act, the 
hearer understands exactly what the speaker wants him/her to understand and by taking a 
position on the statement the resulting action is able to be predicted and/or guaranteed. 
This is not the case with perlocutionary speech acts that depend on ‘fortuitous contexts’ 
that do not bind the speaker and hearer to the contents of the speech act.
(d) The fourth distinction between these two types of speech acts explicitly refers to the 
action orientation of the speaker. It is at this point that the development of a theory of
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communicative action takes its first important steps. “A speaker, if he wants to be 
successful, may not let his perlocutionary aims be known, whereas, illocutionary aims 
can be achieved only through being expressed. Illocutions are expressed openly; 
perlocutions may not be ‘admitted’ as such” (Habermas, 1984, p. 292). The fourth 
distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts involves an orientation 
either to reaching mutual understanding, as in the case of illocutionary statements, or at 
strategic and instrumental success, as in the case of perlocutionary statements. The action 
orientation of the speaker is one of the demarcation points that separates communicative 
action from strategic or instrumental action. Habermas again refers to the natural aims of 
language as that of being an attempt to achieve consensus through the process of reaching 
understanding. “Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech” 
(Habermas, 1984, p. 287). He operationally defines his theory of communicative action 
through exclusive consideration of the illocutionary utterance and by considering only 
action that is aimed at reaching an understanding between at least two speaking 
individuals.
Thus I count as communicative action those linguistically mediated 
interactions in which all participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only 
illocutionary aims, with their mediating acts of communication. On the 
other hand, I regard as linguistically mediated strategic action those 
interactions in which at least one of the participants wants with his speech 
acts to produce perlocutionary effects on his opposite number (Habermas,
1984, p. 295).
Although he admits that action can indeed be motivated by force, this is not the original 
mode of language use, nor should it be the way in which rational, modern human beings 
attempt to harmonize their plans and coordinate their actions.
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Processes of reaching understanding aim at agreement that meets the 
conditions of rationally motivated assent [Zustimmung] to the content of 
an utterance. A communicatively achieved agreement has a rational basis; 
it cannot be imposed by either party, whether instrumentally through 
intervention in the situation directly or strategically through influencing 
the decisions of opponents. Agreement can indeed be objectively obtained 
by force; but what comes to pass manifestly through outside influence or 
the use of violence cannot count subjectively as agreement (Habermas,
1984, p. 287).
In identifying the foundational differences between action oriented to reaching mutual 
understanding and action aimed at strategic success via the differences between the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary utterances, we are now in a position to examine exactly 
what the illocutionary statement does and how it is able to communicatively coordinate 
the actions of individuals the world over. The next section will deal with the manner in 
which illocutionary statements make three claims to validity in reference to three 
corresponding world relations and the manner in which, when redeemed through 
discourse, these claims to validity bind (or bond) the speaker’s and/or hearer’s actions to 
the contents of their utterances.
[2.1 .c] Validity Claims
The interrelated nature of communicative rationality and knowledge needs to be 
further explained if it is to become one of the guiding principles of the unfinished project 
of modernity, as Habermas claims. The central presupposition of a rational statement, in 
the communicative sense, is that it can be defended against criticism (Habermas, 1984, p. 
16). Implicit in this formulation is the argumentative practice of raising and redeeming 
claims to validity. “We use the term argumentation for that type of speech act in which 
participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them
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through arguments” (Habermas, 1984, p. 18). A claim to validity is deemed rational if it 
is able to be raised in a fashion that the hearer understands the manifest content of the 
claim being made, that he/she is able to seek clarification, ask questions and in general 
demand that the speaker redeem the claim being made so that the hearer is able to take a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ position. From this sequence of communicative interaction there develops 
certain obligations on the part of the speaker and/or the hearer, the details of which will 
be discussed shortly. It should be noted that validity claims should not be considered as 
truth, right or truthful from the outset. This will be determined communicatively via the 
intersubjective contest of opinion that is initiated by the raising of the claim itself. The 
validity claim simply has to be offered by a speaker in an attempt to come to an 
understanding between him/her and at least one interlocutor. “In virtue of their 
criticizability, rational expressions [validity claims] also admit of improvement; we can 
correct failed attempts if we can successfully identify our mistakes” (Habermas, 1984, p. 
18). These mistakes are identified and corrected by intersubjectively, argumentatively, 
and communicatively raising three claims to validity, and then judging them against three 
corresponding world relations.
To begin with the three claims to validity are:
i. That the statement made is true (or that the existential presuppositions 
of the propositional content mentioned are in fact satisfied);
ii. That the speech act is right with respect to the existing normative 
context (or that the normative context that it is supposed to satisfy is 
itself legitimate); and
iii. That the manifest intention of the speaker is meant as it is expressed. 
(Habermas, 1984, p. 99)
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When a speaker raises a claim to validity it necessarily involves one of the above 
relations to truth, normative rightness, and/or sincerity and truthfulness.
[2.1.d] World Relations
The claim to validity is evaluated against three corresponding world relations. 
With the claim to truth, the objective world of existing states of affairs is the referent; 
with the claim to normative rightness, the social world of interpersonal relationships is 
the referent; and with the claim to truthfulness, the subjective world that the speaker 
alone has privileged access to is the referent. In formal-pragmatic terms, when referring 
one of three claims to validity to one of the three corresponding world relations the 
speaker is asking the hearer of the illocutionary statement to take a ‘yes’, ‘no’, or 
‘maybe’ position on the claim being made. In order for the hearer to take such a position 
certain preliminary conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, the hearer must understand the 
manifest content of the validity claim being made. If he/she does not understand the 
manifest content of the claim being made the sequence of interaction that was initiated by 
the speaker is halted before it is allowed to proceed. “We understand a speech act when 
we know what makes it acceptable” (Habermas, 1984, p. 297). If the hearer does not 
understand the claim being made, he/she requests further explanation, clarification, or 
elucidation from the speaker to be able to take a position on the claim. Secondly, when 
the speaker understands the claim, he/she is able to take a position on the claim. If the 
hearer responds to the claim with a ‘no’ there arises a discursive contest of opinion in 
which the speaker and hearer exchange points of view until one of them is convinced by 
the force of the better argument of the others opinion. This leads one of the interlocutors 
into eventually taking a ‘yes’ position on the disputed claim. Thirdly, “in consequence of
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an achieved agreement, the hearer directs his action according to conventionally fixed
obligations” (Habermas, 1984, p. 297) that reflect the conditions agreed upon in the
inter subjective contest of opinion.
In order to ground the above discussion of three validity claims, and their
interrelated nature to the three corresponding world relations, an example of each relation
will be offered. A cautionary note is required here. The three claims to validity are
evaluated hierarchically according to their congruence to the corresponding world
relations. It is not the case that the claim to validity is evaluated in an isolated,
substantive manner, simply that the claim to validity is naturally predisposed to ‘fit’ into
one of the world relations better than the others.
Although speech acts oriented to reaching understanding are always 
involved in this way in a complex net of world relations, the illocutionary 
role -  under standard conditions, the meaning of the illocutionary 
component -  determines the aspect of validity under which the speaker 
wants his utterance to be understood first and foremost (Habermas, 1984, 
p. 308).
This does not preclude the claim being made from, theoretically, drawing upon the other 
two world relations in order to be redeemed, just that it accurately refers to one of them 
better than the others. “It is the actors themselves who seek consensus and measure it 
against truth, rightness, and sincerity, that is, against the ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ between the 
speech act, on the one hand, and the three worlds to which the actor takes up relations 
with his utterance, on the other” (Habermas, 1984, p. 100). Keeping this in mind, the 
following examples of illocutionary statements will attempt to clarify the complex nature 
of the three claims to validity and their corresponding world relations.
1. ‘It is raining outside’;
2. ‘One ought not to kill another’; and,
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3. ‘I love you’.
When a speaker utters ‘It is raining outside’ he/she is relating the truth of the 
statement to the objective world that we all participate and live in on a daily basis. The 
hearer accepts this position if he/she can verify that there is precipitation falling from the 
sky. If the hearer takes a ‘no’ position, the validity of the utterance that makes reference 
to the objective world is being called into question. At this point, the speaker may ask the 
hearer to look out the window and if there is in fact rain falling, his claim to truth is 
redeemed. The visual nature of the claim to truth will be focused on in chapter 4 which 
deals with the potential of the image to coordinate action along the same lines as 
illocutionary utterances. By referring his/her truth claim to the objective world the 
speaker is asking the hearer to take a position in relation to the sum total of existing states 
of affairs and not the normatively regulated social world, or the subjective world of inner 
experience. This is not the case with utterance (2).
With the utterance ‘One ought not to kill another’, the speaker is relating his/her 
claim to the inter subjective social world of normatively regulated action. If the hearer 
takes a ‘no’ position on the utterance he/she is calling into question the normative 
rightness of the claim to validity. In an attempt to redeem the regulative utterance, the 
speaker has at his/her disposal a common background of previously acknowledged social 
mores, or taken for granted ethical assumptions, that forms the background for these 
positions and guides these types of moral decisions. Procedurally, this, of course, does 
not disallow objection or questioning of these mores or assumptions. This questioning of 
normative validity will be focused on in the discussion of the work of G. H. Mead below. 
The hearer of a claim to normative rightness is required, if taking a ‘no’ position, to
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question, ask for clarification, or argue against the claim being made. As will be shown 
below, in the section dealing with the performative contradiction [2.5], this discursive 
requirement on the part of the hearer involves him/her in a complex and unavoidable 
relationship with the speaker that forms an implicitly acknowledged, foundational 
structure of argumentative discourse. It is mentioned here in an attempt to identify the 
importance and unavoidable nature of the dialogic contest of opinion that is taking place 
in argumentative speech. As well, the speaker is able to appeal to the rational faculties of 
the hearer by explaining that if one was allowed to kill another, there would be nothing 
stopping someone else from killing him/her. If the speaker is able to redeem the claim to 
validity being made, the hearer is convinced by the force of the better argument that the 
established social norm is legitimate, should, therefore, be respected, and his/her actions 
are coordinated to reflect the agreement achieved through this discursive exchange. There 
is no recourse to previously acknowledged social standards when the claim to sincerity or 
truthfulness is examined in relation to the subjective world of personal experience.
When an individual speaker utters ‘I love you,’ he/she is not making reference to 
the objective world of facts, nor to the social world of regulative norms, but to the 
subjective world of personal experience to which he/she has privileged and exclusive 
access. The claim to sincerity is a problematic one because it often cannot be redeemed 
through linguistic means alone. For instance, if a speaker is addressing the above claim to 
validity to his/her spouse of some substantial period of time, the hearer of the statement 
will predictably take a ‘yes’ position on the claim being made and will accept the claim 
without objection or need for amplification. The uniqueness of the claim to sincerity or 
truthfulness lies in the fact that it can often only be redeemed through the consistent
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behaviour of the speaker and not solely through the linguistic explanation of the 
utterance. Habermas states that in the case of the claim to truthfulness or sincerity, “a 
speaker means what he says can be made credible only in the consistency of what he does 
and not through providing grounds” (Habermas, 1984, p. 303). The observational, and 
hence visual, redemption of the claim to sincerity will provide an interesting point of 
discussion when the possibility of the visual coordination of action is argued for below. 
For now, it would be fruitful to examine what a negative position on the above claim to 
sincerity or truthfulness would Took’ like. If a speaker was walking down the street one 
day and was to pass another individual, stop that individual and say to him/her ‘I love 
you’, the sincerity or truthfulness of the illocutionary statement would, save all irrational 
notions of ‘love at first sight,’ be called into question by the hearer of the utterance. The 
speaker may plead with the hearer that his/her feelings are sincere or truthful but would 
be unable to redeem the claim to validity, strictly, through the use of language. “The 
sincerity of expressions cannot be grounded but only shown; insincerity can be revealed 
by the lack of consistency between an utterance and the past or future actions internally 
connected with it” (Habermas, 1984, p. 41). The consistent behaviour of the speaker is 
the only manner in which he/she can redeem the claim to validity, convince the hearer 
that he/she does in fact love him/her, and that the initial illocutionary utterance was 
truthful and sincere.
If the above description of the three claims to validity, the three corresponding 
world relations, and the manner in which illocutionary claims to validity are able to 
rationally and linguistically persuade a hearer, through the force of the better argument,
42
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to accept the claim to validity, it still needs to be theoretically proven how this acceptance 
is related to the action coordinating potential of the illocutionary statement.
[2.1.e] The Communicative Coordination of Action
The following explanation of the manner in which action is coordinated through
the raising and redeeming of validity claims has been implicitly alluded to throughout the
body of the above text. It is now time to make these connections explicit and, in making
them evident, round out the admittedly limited discussion of Habermasian theory that the
present space allows.
When a speaker utters an illocutionary statement, with the aim of achieving
mutual understanding between him/herself and at least one other interlocutor, he/she
raises a claim to validity that can be redeemed through discursive argumentation. In this
fashion, the actions of the speaker and the hearer are coordinated, or harmonized, to
reflect the terms of the achieved agreement. If the hearer of an illocutionary statement
asks that the speaker redeem his claim to validity, which makes reference to one of the
three world relations identified above, and if the speaker is successful in redeeming the
claim, there arises certain ‘conventionally fixed obligations’ that are a result of the
discursive debate that just took place. The binding (or bonding: bindende) force of the
illocutionary utterance, that is aimed at reaching understanding, is not a product of the
validity of the illocutionary statement in isolation, but a product of the obligation on the
part of the speaker to redeem his/her claim to validity if asked to do so. To make this
tremendously important and theoretically pivotal point clear, Habermas states that
a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept his speech act offer 
because -  on the basis of an internal connection between validity, validity 
claim, and redemption of validity claim -  he can assume the warranty
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[Gewahr] for providing, if necessary, convincing reasons that would stand 
up to a hearer’s criticism of the validity claim. Thus a speaker owes the 
binding (or bonding: bindende) force of his illocutionary act not to the 
validity of what is said but to the coordinating effect o f the warranty that 
he offers: namely to redeem, if necessary, the validity claim raised with 
his speech act (Habermas, 1984, p. 302).
Time and again Habermas emphasizes the inter subjective nature of his theory. It is not
the grammatical or semantic contents of a statement that make it acceptable, but the
process of argumentative discourse that pragmatically tests these objective truths, moral
norms, and subjective beliefs for truth, rightness, or sincerity. It is not the isolated,
rhetorical speaker that uses coercive and manipulative language that is able to rationally
convince a hearer of the better argument, but the intersubjective, discursive process of
openly debating the issue with all those that can, or could potentially be, affected that
finally does the convincing. And here again, it is not the validity of an illocutionary
utterance that binds the action of a speaker and a hearer of a statement to reflect the
achieved agreement, but the warranty that the speaker offers to redeem his/her claim to
validity, that ensures the sequence of action will take place according to the
understanding that was agreed upon through a process of exhaustive debate.
Consistently throughout his work, Habermas emphatically reiterates the
participatory and intersubjective need, if the promises of the project of modernity are to
be realized, to communally seek more accurate truths, to cooperatively define universally
acceptable, socially regulated norms, and to coordinate our subjective experiences in a
manner that benefits the whole as opposed to advancing the egocentric desires of
individual actors. In other words,
I call interactions communicative when the participants coordinate their 
plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point 
being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity
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claims. In cases where agreement is reached through explicit linguistic 
processes, the actors make three different claims to validity in their speech 
acts as they come to an agreement with one another about something.
Those claims are claims to truth, claims to rightness, and claims to 
truthfulness, according to whether the speaker refers to something in the 
objective world (as the totality of existing states of affairs), to something 
in the shared social world (as the totality of the legitimately regulated 
interpersonal relationships of a social group), or to something in his own 
subjective world (as the totality of experiences to which one has privileged 
access). Further, I distinguish between communicative and strategic 
action. Whereas in strategic action one actor seeks to influence the 
behaviour of another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of 
gratification in order to cause the interaction to continue as the first actor 
desires, in communicative action one actor seeks rationally to motivate 
another by relying on the illocutionary binding/bonding effect 
(Bindungseffekf) of the offer contained in the speech act (Habermas, 2001, 
p. 58).
The unfinished project of modernity is reliant upon individual actors coming to 
more and more rational decisions based on the intersubjective contest of opinion that 
frees society from the dogmatic, and less rational, traditions of strategic/instrumental 
rationality. We are now in a position to coordinate ours plans of action communicatively, 
according to the force of the better argument, which raises three claims to validity, that 
are either accepted or rejected according to the fidelity with which they correspond to 
three world relations. The warranty that the speaker offers the hearer to redeem his/her 
claim to validity, if  necessary, is the manner in which individuals are rationally motivated 
to perform certain actions free of instrumental and strategic aims. By binding, or bonding, 
a speaker and a hearer to the contents of their speech acts, the individual’s action is 
coordinated according to the content of their utterances and not according to the 
strategic/instrumental desires or aims of the individual.
Theoretically, modem, communicative rationality has freed us from blindly 
obeying the commands of a deity or monarch that owed their ability to coordinate the
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actions of their followers or subjects via the strategic/instrumental promise of a threat or a 
reward. It is obvious that these forms of strategic/instrumental action coordination have 
not, and could never permanently, disappear from present day society. But this is not the 
point that Habermas is trying to make. He simply wants to identify a more rational 
alternative to these forms of action coordination. That more rational alternative is 
procedurally explained throughout The Theory o f Communicative Action by elucidating 
the possibility of coming to a consensual decision and coordinating our actions in a 
manner that is free of manipulative and coercive power relations.
[2.2] Mead’s Foundation to the Theory of Communicative Action: 
an introduction
In the work of George Herbert Mead, Habermas finds the incomplete foundations 
for the theory he is advancing regarding the communicative coordination of action. 
Habermas treats the communication theory of Mead as a general account of the manner in 
which organisms are able to develop their communicative capacities. This is a three step 
process that, along the way from a conversation of gestures to a propositionally 
differentiated language, the individual is able to assert his autonomy due to his/her 
membership within a community. First, organisms are capable of responding to the 
gestures of another organism through instinctual reactions. Second, this conversation of 
gestures leads to a symbolic, signal language that orients the individuals to 
communicative ends. And third, this signal language is the simplistic precursor to a 
propositionally differentiated form of speech that permits the individuals to orient their 
linguistic utterances, via the raising and redeeming of validity claims, to reaching mutual 
understanding. The ability of the human organism to develop the capacity of
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propositionally differentiated speech is a process of, first, gaining self-consciousness by 
taking the attitude of the other, second, socializing him/herself into a group or community 
through the more advanced process of taking the attitude of the generalized other, and 
finally, morally guiding their normatively regulated actions through the procedural steps 
of the communicative processes aimed at reaching understanding.
Habermas is more than sympathetic to the theory offered by Mead. In the first 
chapter of volume two of The Theory o f Communicative Action, Habermas offers not so 
much a critique of Mead, but an improvement and embellishment of the core theory that 
Mead posited. He finds in Mead’s theory the cognitive foundations for the linguistic 
coordination of action that was detailed in volume one of The Theory o f Communicative 
Action. Mead’s concepts of a conversation mediated by gestures that, in the human 
organism, naturally leads to a signal language, that then gets propositionally 
differentiated in the growing child through the process of taking the attitude of the 
generalized other, and the place that ‘play’ and ‘game’ have in the genesis of this 
‘generalized other’ will be specifically dealt with. Habermas’s improvements on these 
inadequately developed concepts will be offered as foundational arguments that permit a 
better understanding of, not only Habermasian theory, but, a more complete 
understanding of the argument being developed in the course of this paper regarding the 
ability of the imagetext to coordinate individual action.
[2.2.a] The Conversation of Gestures
The model that Mead uses to develop his theory of social behaviourism begins 
with an account of animal behaviour to explain the manner in which non-human 
organisms are able to communicate via a conversation of significant gestures. It should be
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noted that the term ‘conversation’ implies a vocal exchange of subjectivities. This is a 
misleading use of the term ‘conversation.’ In Mead’s sense, the conversation of gestures 
does not take place vocally, but only involves instinctual gestures, and, the resulting 
instinctual reactions to these gestures. The conversation of significant gestures is an 
instinctual and causal process that takes place between all sorts of animal species. Mating 
rituals, feeding patterns, and social rituals, such as ‘play’, of animal species all revolve 
around a conversation of gestures that takes place between at least two organisms. A 
significant gesture is characterized as that which has the same meaning for at least two 
interacting participants. For example, when a dog charges at another dog, the significant 
gesture (charging) is understood as one that calls out a response on the part of the 
organism that is on the receiving end of this gesture. The organisms that are participating 
in this interaction are motivated to perform these distinct actions instinctually. They do 
not comprehend the action of the other as a message that is being sent with 
communicative intent, but react according to the instinctual understanding of the gesture 
of the other. In this way, the first dog calls out a response in the second dog by way of a 
conversation of gestures that begins when the two animals come into contact with one 
another.
There exists thus a field of conduct even among animals below man, 
which in its nature may be classed as gesture. It consists of the beginning 
of those actions which call out instinctive responses from other forms.
And these beginnings of acts call out responses which lead to 
readjustments of acts which have been commenced, and these 
readjustments lead to still other beginnings of response which again call 
out still other readjustments. Thus there is a conversation of gesture, a 
field of palaver within the social conduct of animals (Mead in Habermas,
1987, p. 406, footnote 9).
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This conversation of gestures is a causal relationship that does not terminate after the 
second organism responds to the gesture of the first. The response on the part of the 
second organism is also a gesture that calls out a response in the first; this response again 
calls out a response in the second organism, which, subsequently, calls out a response in 
the first, etc... This ‘conversation’ of gestures terminates when the two organisms are no 
longer in the same spatio-temporal location, thus, putting an end to the causal 
relationship.
[2.2.b] The Signal Language of Primitive Symbols
Through the causal relationship described above, there emerges an objective 
understanding, or meaning, of the conversation of gestures. In responding to the gesture 
of the first organism, the second interprets the desired end state that the first wants to 
bring about. Through understanding this desired end, even if only on the instinctual level, 
the second organism ascribes a meaning to the actions of the first. When the first dog 
initiates an attack, the second dog responds either in a defensive manner, or, with his own 
counter-attack. Regardless of whether the response is defensive or offensive, the meaning 
of the gesture of the first dog is understood by the second dog as one of aggression. In 
this way, the meaning that is ascribed to the gesture of the first organism initially holds 
only for the second. A third dog may respond with an entirely different reaction. In a 
different, yet similar, fashion this is still the case when we move from the conversation of 
gestures to a primitive signal language of symbolically mediated interaction.
“Signals or one-word utterances can be used only situation-dependently, for 
singular terms, by means of which objects could be identified relative to a situation and 
yet, context-independent, are lacking” (Habermas, 1987, p.6). These ‘primitive,’ one
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word utterances are symbolic representations that initiate a sequence of interaction much 
in the same way that the conversation of gestures described above does. The difference 
being that, the meaning of the symbol used to represent a state of affairs must be 
understood in the same way by both the actors in the sequence of interaction. “(G)estures 
are transformed into symbols through replacing meanings that exist for individual 
organisms with meanings that are the same for both participants” (Habermas, 1987, p. 9). 
The ability of symbols to be mutually understood is the major difference between the 
conversation of gestures and the signal language of symbolically mediated interaction. 
This transformation is unique to the human organism that alone has the ability to 
communicate symbolically. It is this negotiation of meaning that reorients the causal 
interaction to a communicative interaction. In the signal language of symbolically 
mediated interactions, “the behaviour of participants changes in such a way that an 
interpersonal relation between speaker and addressee replaces the causal relation between 
stimulus-response-stimulus -  in interacting with one another, participants now have a 
communicative intent” (Habermas, 1987, p.9). When the participants communicate via 
primitive symbolic expressions they learn to make a distinction between acts that are 
aimed at achieving mutual understanding and acts that are aimed at strategic success. 
More will be made of this distinction below. The transition from the conversation of 
gestures to the signal language of symbolically mediated communication is accomplished 
through this process of attempting to achieve mutual understanding.
[2.2.c] Taking the Attitude of the Other
The manner in which individuals are able to communicate via still primitive 
symbolic expressions is explained by Mead, and clarified by Habermas, as ‘taking the
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attitude of the other.’ Note that this primitive process still takes place prior to the 
development of a propositionally differentiated language. The process of taking the 
attitude of the other is one in which individual A internalizes the predicted response of 
individual B. By internalizing B 's anticipated response through the process of adopting 
his/her point of view, A is able to predict what B’s reaction to the primitive symbolic 
expression will be. In this way, Mead describes taking the attitude of the other as an inner 
dialogue that calls “out the response in himself he calls out in another” (Habermas, 1987, 
p. 12). Habermas clarifies this definition by noting that the inner dialogue that takes place 
in Mead’s account, one which predicts the response of individual B, is unable to occur if 
there were not an initial, social, communicative interaction in which A was able to 
generate and formulate these predictions. This necessarily involves an existing social 
context that furnishes these expectations with their predictive components. In other 
words, A could not predict the response of B if both individuals did not previously come 
into contact with one another. The process of taking the attitude of the other already 
presupposes that both individuals have had previous social relations with other 
individuals which enables A to predict the response of B. Otherwise the predictions would 
be the isolated expectations of A, and not of the predictive nature that Mead describes. In 
this way, A consciously internalizes the predicted response of B prior to offering the 
symbolic expression, and, thus, the resulting symbolic offering is effected by the 
expected reaction of B; it changes according to these predictive, communicative 
internalizations. Habermas clarifies this important distinction by identifying the gap 
between the primitive signal language of symbolically mediated interaction and the more 
complex process of reaching understanding via a propositionally differentiated language.
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When A formulates a symbolic expression with the desire of communicating with
B, he/she “cannot avoid making the gesture in the expectation that it will have a certain 
meaning for” (Habermas, 1987, p. 13) B. The fact that the initial symbolic offering of 
individual A is affected, or modified, by the expected reaction of individual B reorients 
the expression towards communicative ends. That is, towards individual B being able to 
take a yes/no position on the primitive signal offered by A. Habermas’s main point of 
contention with the primitive signal language of symbolic communication is that it does 
not offer any warranty that understanding will be achieved. The primitive symbolic 
expression of the signal language is too vague and allows for too much confusion to 
guarantee that the hearer of a statement will clearly understand what is meant by the 
speaker. This is due to the still primitive nature of propositionally Mil-differentiated 
language. Much in the same way that the dog on the receiving end of the aggressive 
gesture can respond defensively, or, with a counter attack, the predictive nature of taking 
the attitude of the other, initiated by the use of a primitive signal language, does not 
guarantee that the still-primitive symbolic expression will be understood in the manner 
that it was meant.
For instance, if individual A utters the primitive signal ‘Fire!’, other individuals B,
C, D ..., may interpret this call as an order to discharge their weapons on an approaching 
enemy, or, as a warning that their lodgings are being engulfed in flames and should, 
hence, evacuate the premises. Both options involve the coordination of action initiated by 
the utterance of A, but person B,C ,D ... may not understand which action A wants 
him/her/them to take. Individual A knows what he/she means when he/she utters the word 
‘Fire!,’ but the understanding on the parts of B, C, D ... may not interpret this signal in
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the manner that was predicted by A. It is, in fact, when these predictions go wrong; when 
the speaker or addressee is disappointed or surprised by the outcome of the interaction, 
that the need to develop a propositionally differentiated language arises. “In adopting 
toward themselves the critical attitude of others when the interpretation of 
communicative acts goes wrong, they develop rules for the use of symbols” (Habermas, 
1987, p. 15). These rules are the foundational components of a propositionally 
differentiated language that enables the participants to more accurately clarify, expand, 
and explain their symbolic expressions with the aim of reaching mutual understanding.
[2.2.d] Propositionally Differentiated Language and Action 
Coordination
Once he has established how individuals are able to employ a propositionally 
differentiated language to clarify and explain their utterances, Habermas sets himself to 
the task of explaining the manner in which the action of individuals is coordinated 
according to the contents of this now propositionally differentiated language. The main 
question is: “How can ego bind alter by a speech act in such a way that alter’s actions can 
be linked, without conflict, to ego’s so as to constitute a cooperative interrelation?” 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 26). Once language is propositionally differentiated, that is, once it 
is oriented to reaching mutual understanding, there arises on the part of the speaker the 
ability to make claims to validity that the hearer is able to respond to with a yes/no 
answer.
So long as in their speech acts they raise claims to the validity of what is 
being uttered, they are proceeding in the expectation that they can achieve 
a rationally motivated agreement and can coordinate their plans of action 
on this basis -  without having to influence the empirical motives of the 
others through force or the prospect of reward, as is the case with simple 
impositions and the threat of consequences. With the differentiation of the
53
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
basic modes, the linguistic medium of reaching understanding gains the 
power to bind the will of responsible actors. Ego can exercise Elocutionary 
power on alter when both are in a position to orient their actions to validity 
claims (Habermas, 1987, p. 27).
The claims to validity that were explained in [2.1c], those of truth, normative rightness
and truthfulness, correspond to three world relations. The objective world, taken as the
sum total of existing states of affairs, the social world of normatively regulated action,
and the subjective world to which the individual has privileged access, serve as
corresponding world relations against which these three claims to validity can be
redeemed. If Habermas contends that action can be coordinated via linguistic utterances,
these three world relations have to be established, or, at least, differentiated. “Only when
these worlds have been constituted, or at least differentiated, does language function as a
mechanism of coordination” (Habermas, 1987, p. 27). Habermas once again draws on the
foundational communication theory of Mead to establish these world relations.
[2.2.e] The Formation of the Objective World
The objective world, as the sum total of existing states of affairs, is initially 
encountered by the growing child as his/her immediate physical surroundings that are 
perceptible and manipulable. The objective world to the growing child is limited to the 
physical experience of his/her surroundings. “(T)he constitution of a world of objects has 
at least begun; the child must have at least a nascent ability to adopt an objectivating 
attitude toward perceptible and manipulable objects if it is to act intentionally and to 
understand imperative requests and statements of intention” (Habermas, 1987, p. 35).
This ‘nascent’ period is a limited span of time in which the child is unable to 
symbolically restructure the world that surrounds him/her with the use of language. Once
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the child is able to employ a primitive signal language, he/she is able to ‘free’ these 
objects of their immediate, physical presence through the use of symbolic formations. In 
freeing these perceptible and manipulable objects from the confines of the immediate 
physical environment through the ascription of symbolic representation, the child 
constitutes an objective world for him/herself that he/she is able to refer to when making 
claims to truth. “By means of singular terms he can refer to objects that are removed in 
space and time from the speech situation, so as to report states of affairs independent of 
context, possibly in ontic and temporal modalities” (Habermas, 1987, p. 28). In this 
manner, the objective world, as the sum total of existing states of affairs, is so 
constituted.
[2.2.f\ The Formation of the Social World
The development of a world of socially regulated norms is more complex. “Mead 
analyzes the construction of a common social world from the perspective of a growing 
child, A, who understands the announcements and imperatives of a reference person, B, 
but who has yet to acquire the competence for role behaviour that B already possesses” 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 31). The manner in which A comes to possess the competence of 
role behaviour that B already possesses is what is at issue at present. Mead conceptualizes 
the formation of the normative world of regulated action through the distinction between 
the role playing activities of a developing child, what he terms ‘play,’ and the organized 
activities of a group of children, what he terms ‘game’.
When a developing child plays, he/she is involved in an intrasubjective activity in 
which he/she continuously takes on the attitude of another individual through the 
‘playing’ of those individual subjectivities.
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He plays that he is, for instance, offering himself something, and he buys 
it; he gives a letter to himself and he takes it away; he addresses himself as 
a parent, as a teacher; he arrests himself as a policeman. He has a set of 
stimuli which call out in himself the sort of responses they call out in 
others (Mead, 1967, p. 150).
It is important to note in this process that the child is constantly shifting subjectivities.
He/She does not take on more than one role at a time and, at this stage of development, is
unable to do so. He/She simply shifts from taking the attitude of one individual to taking
the attitude of the other. In this manner, the child internalizes the normative, concrete
patterns of behaviour of a parent, a teacher, or a policeman, but is unable to generalize
that normative, concrete pattern of behaviour beyond the immediate context. He/She does
not yet realize that parents can also be teachers, policeman, or merchants. The scope of
taking the attitude of the other in the developing child is, thus, limited to “concrete
patterns of behaviour. As long as the behaviour patterns the child is practicing have not
yet been generalized socially to cover all members of a group, they are valid only for
situations in which A and B face one another (Habermas, 1987, p. 35). This is put in
contrast to the competitive, team ‘games’ that children participate in as they continue to
develop.
In the playing of ‘games,’ the developing child is able to take the role of everyone
else playing the game. In fact his/her ability to adequately perform in the game requires
that he/she adopt these multiple personalities.
The fundamental difference between the game and play is that in the latter 
the child must have the attitude of all the others involved in the game. The 
attitudes of the other players which the participant assumes organize into a 
sort of unit, and it is that organization which controls the response of the 
individual (Mead, 1967, p. 153-154).
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This is the central moment that Habermas grasps onto in the formation of the socially 
regulated, normative world of interaction. He is not satisfied with the amount of detail 
that Mead offers, but agrees with the basic concept. In taking on the attitude of the 
generalized other, the individual’s behaviour is modified to reflect the expectations that 
the other participants have of him/her, and reciprocally, the behaviour of every other 
participant is guided to reflect the expectations that are placed upon him/her by all the 
other members of the group. “It is in the form of the generalized other that the social 
process influences the behaviour of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, i.e., 
that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members; for it is 
in this form that the social process or community enters as a determining factor into the 
individuals thinking (Mead, 1967, p. 155). Habermas characterizes taking the attitude of 
the generalized other as the emergence of an outside observer or what he terms a “neuter” 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 35). This characterization on the part of Habermas will become 
tremendously important when the communicative potential of the imagetext is dealt with 
below. It is with the introduction of this outside, third person, perspective that A and B 
are able to generalize the previously concrete patterns of behaviour from the 
individualistic, context-dependent, situation to the universal. “With this taking the 
attitude of the (generalized) other, A forms the concept of a pattern of behaviour that is 
socially generalized to every member of the group, and in which the places are not 
reserved for ego and alter, but can in principle be taken by any member of their social 
group” (Habermas, 1987, p. 36). This is not to say that the normative and regulative 
expectations of the group are legitimate or valid, just, simply, that when the individual 
internalizes these expectations they serve to guide the manner in which he/she responds
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to situations. This insight, provided by Habermas (Habermas, 1987, p. 39), will be left at 
this expository stage, for the time being, in order to characterize the genesis of the 
subjective world to which the individual has privileged access. The realization of the 
subjective world of unique individual experience is only made possible if the objective 
world and the normative, social world are already in place.
[2.2.g] The Formation of the Subjective World
“The se lf ... is essentially a social structure and arises in social experiences”
(Mead in Habermas, 1987, p. 40). In this fashion the self, or the subjective world to
which the individual has privileged access, comes from without to within. It is the fact
that the individual first belongs to, and develops within, a community, that he/she is able
to internalize the socially regulated norms and, only then, be able take a ‘yes’ or ‘no’
position on their claims to validity. The dual nature of the ‘self is characterized by Mead,
and subsequently Habermas, as an internal relationship between the ‘me’ and the ‘I’.
The expression ‘me’ designates the perspective from which the child 
builds up a system of internal behaviour controls by adopting the 
expectations of the generalized other towards himself. By way of an 
internalization of social roles there gradually takes shape an integrated 
superego structure which enables the actor to orient himself to normative 
validity claims. At the same time as this superego -  the ‘me’ -  there takes 
shape an ‘I,’ a subjective world of experiences to which one has privileged 
access (Habermas, 1987, p. 40-41).
The ‘me’ is subject to the normatively regulated patterns of behaviour that are socially
sanctioned as right or correct. The ‘I,’ on the other hand, is more spontaneous and able to
interpret and judge for him/herself what he/she deems to be right or correct in light of the
personal world of subjective experience to which he/she alone has privileged access. If
the ‘I’ does not think that a socially sanctioned norm is right, the superego structure of
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the ‘me’ checks this belief by comparing the socially sanctioned behaviour to that which
the ‘I’ feels is right. It is through this comparison that the personality structure of the
socialized, yet autonomous, individual is able to develop and assert its individuality. By
checking the socially regulated norm against the subjective world of personal experience
the individual is able to assert his/her autonomy and act as an individual.
(I)n the same measure as the child cognitively assimilates the social world 
of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations, builds up a corresponding 
system of controls, and learns to orient his action to normative validity 
claims, he draws an increasingly clear boundary between an external 
world, which has consolidated into an institutional reality, and an inner 
world of spontaneous experiences, which come out not through norm- 
conforming actions but only through communicative self-presentation 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 42).
In drawing this boundary between what the social collective deems to be right and what
the individual deems to be truthful, the world of socially regulated action and the world
of subjective experience are differentiated from each other according to the congruence
with which the individual finds his/her beliefs and the beliefs of society writ large.
After clarifying the structures and manner in which each world differ, and are
distinct, from each other, Habermas spends a substantial period of time with the theory of
Emile Durkheim; using it to clarify the structure of group identities, what Durkheim calls
the ‘collective consciousness’ and to identify the authority of the generalized other in
sacred symbols. This portion of volume two of The Theory o f Communicative Action will
not be dealt with in any detail here. It is mentioned to alert the reader of its presence and
to point him/her in this direction should he/she feel it necessary to pursue.
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[2.2.h] Concluding Remarks of Mead’s Foundation
In an attempt to conclude this section on the contribution that Mead has made to 
the communicative theory of Habermas and to provide an appropriate segue into the 
section dealing with the principle of universalization (U), the main shortcoming in 
Meadian theory that Habermas has identified, and that was alluded to above, will be 
explained.
The age of modernity ushered in a shift in the rationality potential of human
beings. As opposed to the strategic/instrumental rationality that operationalizes
individuals by coercing them to perform certain actions via the coordinating effect of the
promise of a threat or a reward, communicative rationality states that the individual can
be persuaded to perform certain actions, free of these coercive and manipulative means,
through a discursive debate that relies solely on the force of the better argument to
coordinate action. It is with this linguistic turn in mind that Habermas aims to improve
the theory offered by Mead. A socially regulated, normative action should not be
accepted simply because of the fact that the society in which the individual lives
recognizes the norm as right or just.
(A) norm deserves to be valid only insofar as, in connection with some 
matter requiring regulation, it takes into account the interests of everyone 
involved, and only insofar as it embodies the will that all could form in 
common, each in his own interest, as the will of the generalized other. The 
two-sidedness is characteristic of the traditional understanding of norms 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 39).
Habermas’s point here will be further developed in the following section dealing with 
the intricacies of the principle of universalization (U). Suffice it to say, Habermas is 
advocating a communicative interrogation of de facto accepted norms that come into
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question perhaps due to a new action context. This communicative interrogation would
subject these norms to an intersubjective contest of opinion in which everyone affected
by them would have the opportunity to voice his/her concerns, vocalize his/her point of
view regarding the possible alternatives, and openly discuss the possible ramifications of
enacting the contested norm. Only in this way can the norm in question be considered
valid; only in this communicatively regulated sequence of interaction can a norm be
considered valid for all those that it affects. The fact that a specific society recognizes a
norm to be legitimate does not make it so. This traditional, dogmatic assumption can, in
fact, be quite harmful to the individual’s needs or wants. In this way, Habermas’s
improvement of Meadian theory is consistent with his criticism of the monological
approach to Kant’s categorical imperative developed below.
Subjects capable of moral judgment cannot test each for himself, alone 
whether an established or recommended norm is in the general interest and 
ought to have social force; this can only be done in common with 
everyone else involved. The mechanisms of taking the attitude of the other 
and of internalizing reach their definitive limit here. Ego can, to be sure, 
anticipate the attitude that alter will adopt toward him in the role of 
participant in argumentation; by this means the communicative actor gains 
a reflective relation to himself, as we have seen. Ego can try to imagine to 
himself the course of a moral argument in the circle of those involved; but 
he cannot predict its results with any certainty. Thus the projection of an 
ideal communication community serves as a guiding thread for setting up 
discourses that have to be carried through in fact and cannot be replaced 
by monological mock dialogue. Mead does not work out this consequence 
sharply enough because it seems trivially true to him (Habermas, 1987, p.
95).
The concept of an ideal communication community, that serves as a utopian projection of 
the only procedure which Habermas believes can take into account the needs and wants 
of all members of society to the exclusion of none, will be complimented by the potential 
of the imagetext to communicate across linguistic and geographical divides, thus, further
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facilitating the construction of such an idealistic community and setting up the discourses 
that are required if the promises of modernity are to be realized.
[2.3] The Principle of Universalization
Habermas takes as his point of departure that an individual can be rationally 
motivated to perform certain actions or respect certain regulative norms through the 
argumentative practice of raising and redeeming claims to validity. This practice takes 
place between at least two speaking individuals that are oriented towards reaching mutual 
understanding. This conceptual segmentation immediately omits certain forms of 
communication, certain types of utterances, from the paradigm of communicative action.
The three claims to validity identified above are evaluated hierarchically 
according to the congruence with which they correspond to the various world relations 
they are referring to. When the constative claim to truth and the regulative claim to 
normative rightness are examined in light of their relations to the formal-pragmatic uses 
of language, the claim to normative rightness is the most ambiguous and therefore the 
most problematic. The claim to truthfulness or sincerity is not always able to be 
redeemed through the use of language at the moment of communication. Often, as was 
explained in the above section that deals with the validity claim ‘I love you’, it is only 
able to be redeemed through the consistent behaviour of the speaker. Therefore, the 
hearer of an expressive utterance may suspend his/her judgment until such a time that 
he/she is able to be convinced that the claim has in fact been redeemed through the 
actions of the speaker. “That a speaker means what he says [that he’s being truthful] can 
be made credible only in the consistency of what he does and not through providing
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grounds” (Habermas, 1984, p. 303). The constative claim to truth can be redeemed if the 
contents of the illocutionary statement are able to be empirically verified by their factual 
occurrence in the objective world. The statement “it is raining outside” can be redeemed 
by the speaker if the hearer of this statement can verify that there is in fact precipitation 
falling from the sky. The claim to normative rightness involves the normatively guided, 
regulative mores that a society has developed over their history. The possibility that these 
regulative norms may vary historically, or across distinct societies and cultures, poses a 
peculiar problem to the theory of communicative action. Habermas addresses this 
particular problem by developing a bridging principle that theoretically unites these 
cultures across time and space. That principle is the principle of universalization (U).
The regulative claim to normative rightness that the utterance “one ought not to 
torture another human being” makes is problematic. For instance, the cultural relativistic 
point of view might point out that, throughout history, torture has often been used as a 
form of punishment for the transgressing of some other regulative norm; such as ‘one 
ought not kill another human being’ and, thus, if one does kill someone else, torture is a 
valid form of punishment. Or still, the cultural relativistic point of view might also object 
by saying that torture is, in fact, a perfectly acceptable method for eliciting information 
from a detainee that could potentially lead to the capture of other, more dangerous, 
criminals. It is clear that when normatively regulated behaviour becomes the subject of 
discursive dissonance the objective world of empirical fact does not provide a reliable 
point of reference. “While there is an internal connection between the existence of states 
of affairs and the truth of assertoric statements, there is no inner connection between the 
existence of states of affairs and the expectation, held by a certain group of people, that
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such statements can be justified” (Habermas, 2001, p. 62). Instead, there must be some 
kind of moral principle that is established to guide this type of moral judgment.
Historically, Kant’s categorical imperative is time and again used as such a 
morally guiding, bridging principle. The previous discussion of Mead should be recalled 
at this point.
Interestingly enough, in trying to identify such a moral principle, 
philosophers of diverse backgrounds always come up with principles 
whose basic idea is the same. All variants ... take their bearings from the 
basic intuition contained in Kant’s categorical imperative. ... The moral 
principle is so conceived as to exclude as invalid any norm that could not 
meet with the qualified assent of all who are or might be affected by it 
(Habermas, 2001, p. 63).
Habermas is not satisfied with the traditional Kantian formulation. This is because Kant’s
categorical imperative relies too heavily on an individuated or monological definition of
morally justifiable action. Habermas sees a danger in this because of the potential of the
monological perspective, advocated in Kant’s and Mead’s formulation, to omit the
perspective, needs or concerns of some individuals. He prefers that regulative norms, that
are meant to guide and regulate the moral action of individuals, be subject to the same
discursive contest of opinion, involving all those affected by the application of the norm
in question, that all constative validity claims are supposed to be subject to. That is, that
they are tested for validity in a discursive contest of opinion that takes place between all
those that are, or could possibly be, affected by the norm in question. To quote
Habermas:
It is not sufficient, therefore, for one person to test whether he can will the 
adoption of a contested norm after considering the consequences and side 
effects that would occur if all persons followed that norm or whether every 
other person in an identical position could will the adoption of such a 
norm. In both cases the process of judging is relative to the vantage point 
and perspective of some and not all concerned (Habermas, 2001, p. 65).
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In order for these moral guidelines to be considered universally valid, there has to be a 
bridging principle that allows all those that are, or possibly could be, affected by a 
decision to voice their concerns and make their point of view evident. The Kantian 
categorical imperative does not allow such an activity to take place. It places the onus on 
the individual to attempt to forecast in isolation what could potentially happen if a 
particular norm was enacted. There is far too much room for error or oversight, according 
to Habermas, if this is the only way that regulative norms are tested for their validity. A 
“norm cannot be considered the expression of the common interest of all who might be 
affected simply because it seems acceptable to some of them” (Habermas, 2001, p. 65). It 
is simply impossible for the solitary individual to be able to consider all of the points of 
view of everyone affected with enough detail that the consequences or side-effects of 
such a decision could be acceptable to all those that are affected by these decisions. This 
is a process that must take place through dialogue, discourse and argumentation. Only by 
allowing all those affected by a regulative norm to voice their assent or objection, only by 
allowing each individual the opportunity to take a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ position on the norm, can 
it be considered valid for all concerned. With this insight in mind Habermas formulates 
his principle of universalization (U) in the following manner. “(U) All affected can accept 
the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have 
for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those 
known alternative possibilities for regulation)” (Habermas, 2001, p. 65). The 
parenthetical portion of the above quote should not be hastily overlooked. Implicitly, if 
these consequences are preferred to the other possible alternatives there is a process by 
which the other possible alternatives are given their due attention. This process is none
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other than argumentation. Through the process of argumentation the concerns, questions, 
and reservations of everyone affected by the regulative norm are intersubjectively 
considered and each individual is able to participate in the process of generating the 
moral norm in question. The resulting norm will be considered valid only if everyone 
affected by it can assent to the illocutionary contents of the statement. By implicitly 
including the process of argumentation into (U), Habermas’s next task is to explicate the 
manner in which this process of argumentation might take place that would guarantee the 
participation of all those affected. This is accomplished by the principle of discourse 
ethics.
[2.4] Discourse Ethics
The principle of discourse ethics acts as a sub-section, or procedural guarantee, 
for the claims that were raised in (U). If (U) is to pragmatically live up to its claim to 
universality, there has to be a process in place which allows it to assert such an all 
encompassing framework. By referring to the work of Tugendhat, Habermas once again 
pleads for the validity of practical discourse, or argumentation, as a morally justifiable 
way of legitimating social norms. Tugendhat believes that argumentation is only “a 
precautionary measure” (Habermas, 2001, p. 68) and not a pragmatic procedure that 
needs to be followed if the ‘rightness’ of moral, normatively regulated utterances can be 
redeemed communicatively. In this fashion “the truth of sentences is a semantic matter. 
According to this view, the justification of sentences is a monological matter”
(Habermas, 2001, p. 69). Habermas takes issue with Tugendhat’s argument because of its 
reliance on the monological premises of Kant’s categorical imperative. When the
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rightness of a moral norm can be justified at the level of the semantic sentence there,
once again, runs the risk of oversight or omission due to the fact that all of those that
could potentially be affected by the norm are not allowed to voice their concerns or
opinions. According to Habermas, it is only through practical discourse, where all those
that are or could be affected are allowed to intersubjectively debate the illocutionary
utterance with the aim of reaching an understanding, that the regulative norm can be
considered legitimate. The monological position does not participate in this contest of
opinion but, simply, examines in isolation the truth content of the sentence. The problem
lies in the fact that the semanticist position does not subject the norm in consideration, or
the individual opinion of the norm in consideration, to the contest of opinion that
Habermas convincingly advocates.
The weaknesses in Tugendhat’s and the semanticist position in general, enables
Habermas to formulate the principle of discourse ethics in a manner that accounts for the
communicative necessity of intersubjectively testing claims to normative rightness with
the aims of validating (U). The principle of Discourse Ethics (D) states that “Only those
norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in
their capacity as participants in a practical discourse” (Habermas, 2001, p. 66). The
principle of discourse ethics safeguards against any monological, individualistic
application of a regulative norm and provides the procedural foundation necessary if (U)
is to be considered a valid, bridging principle. Because of this, Habermas suggests
reformulating Kant’s categorical imperative in the following manner.
Rather than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be 
a universal law, I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of 
discursively testing its claim to universality. The emphasis shifts away 
from what each can will without contradiction to be a general law, to what
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all can will in agreement to be a universal norm (McCarthy, 1978, p. 326,
in Habermas, 2001, p. 67).
The related principle of universalization and the principle of discourse ethics provide the 
formal-pragmatic framework for a rule of argumentation. If the procedure advocated by 
Habermas is followed, the principle of universalization is seen to be valid. With these two 
complimentary principles, regulative social norms are deemed to be acceptable to all 
those that are, or could be, affected, taking into consideration the ability of all those that 
are or could be affected to participate in the debate regarding the applicability of said 
norms. Further still, Habermas claims that if individuals agree to participate in 
argumentation aimed at reaching understanding, something he believes individuals who 
live together in a shared socio-cultural world cannot avoid, the presuppositions that guide 
this search for mutual understanding should not be considered as methodological rules of 
conduct, but as structural elements that form the always already present and unavoidable 
foundation for the processes of argumentation. He demonstrates this complex claim 
through the concept of the performative contradiction.
[2.5] The Performative Contradiction
It would be beneficial for the present discussion to revisit one of the main claims 
that Habermas makes throughout his entire work. The individual is only capable of 
forming, and subsequently asserting, his autonomy due to the intersubjective relations 
that he/she participates with, and contributes to, in society. This is something that 
Habermas continuously reminds the reader of in his work. The autonomous individual 
should never be considered in existential or semantic isolation from the shared contextual
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lifeworld that he/she is at one and the same time a participant and a product. Referring to
the autonomous, individual actor, Habermas states that
(c)ommunicative action can be understood as a circular process in which 
the actor is two things in one: an initiator who masters situations through 
actions for which he is accountable and a product of the traditions 
surrounding him, of groups whose cohesion is based on solidarity to which 
he belongs, and of processes of socialization in which he is reared. The 
actor stands face to face with that situationally relevant segment of the 
lifeworld that impinges on him as a problem, a problem he must resolve 
through his own efforts. But in another sense, the actor is carried or 
supported from behind, as it were, by a lifeworld that not only forms the 
context for the process of reaching understanding but also furnishes 
resources for it (Habermas, 2001, p. 135).
To recast the above in more appropriate terms for the discussion at hand, Habermas
argues that “the idea of autonomy is intersubjective. It takes into account that the free
actualization of the personality of one individual depends on the actualization of freedom
for all” (Habermas, 2001, p. 207). In other words, the autonomous individual is only able
to develop and assert this autonomy through a process of communicatively coming to a
shared understanding about situational problems. This is a product of the shared world
that he/she lives and moves in on a day-to-day basis with other autonomous individuals.
One is inextricably dependent on the other. The search for mutual understanding, not the
desire for instrumental or strategic success, through a process of argumentation between
autonomous, speaking individuals, which forms the core insight of The Theory o f
Communicative Action, is the foundation of society in general. This insight is of pivotal
importance if the following argument is to be accepted, and, for this reason, Habermas
will be quoted at some length to clarify his position.
The possibility of choosing between communicative and strategic action 
exists only abstractly; it exists for someone who takes the contingent 
perspective of an individual actor. From the perspective of the lifeworld to 
which the actor belongs, these modes of action are not matters of free
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choice. The symbolic structures of every lifeworld are reproduced through 
three processes: cultural tradition, social integration, and socialization. As 
I have shown elsewhere, these processes operate only in the medium of 
action oriented toward reaching understanding. There is no other, 
equivalent medium in which these functions can be fulfilled. Individuals 
acquire and sustain their identity by appropriating traditions, belonging to 
social groups, and taking part in socializing interactions. That is why they, 
as individuals, have a choice between communicative and strategic action 
only in an abstract sense, i.e., in absence from contexts of action oriented 
toward reaching understanding. That would mean regressing to the 
monadic isolation of strategic action, or schizophrenia and suicide. In the 
long run such absence is self-destructive (Habermas, 2001, p. 102).
In order to demonstrate this, Habermas develops (U) and (D). One of the main tasks of
the present discussion is to argue that (U) and (D) actually do serve as unavoidable
“presuppositions that are adopted implicitly and known intuitively” (Habermas, 2001, p.
91) by each and every individual that enters into a process of argumentation that is aimed
at reaching mutual understanding and consensus. These unavoidable presuppositions are
illustrated in a complex manner through the concept of the performative contradiction.
When individuals enter into a process of argumentation, which Habermas claims
they cannot avert, they cannot avoid certain procedural guidelines that structure the
debate about to take place. In other words, there are certain taken for granted assumptions
about argumentation aimed at reaching understanding that form the intuitive background
of such a process. Once again, the normatively regulated claims to validity are considered
the most ambiguous, problematic, and therefore, the most instructive claims that involve
these discursive debates. Habermas develops his argument on three levels. “It makes
sense to distinguish three levels of presuppositions of argumentation along the lines
suggested by Aristotle: those at the logical level of products, those at the dialectical level
of procedures and those at the rhetorical level of processes” (Habermas, 2001, p. 87). It
should be noted that these three levels are not substantive segmentations, but should be
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considered as presuppositions to argumentation that must all be met at one and the same 
time if the principle of universalization and, hence, the principle of discourse ethics is to 
be justified. In an attempt to be as clear and concise as possible these three levels that 
Habermas identifies will be summarized below.
Table 1: The Three Presuppositional Levels of Argumentation:
Level 1: The Logical-Semantic Level.
1.1 No speaker may contradict himself.
1.2 Every speaker that applies predicate F to object A must be prepared to apply F to
all other objects resembling A in all relevant aspects.
1.3 Different speakers may not use the same expression with different meanings. 
(2001, p. 87)
Level 2: The Dialectical-Procedural Level.
2.1 Every speaker may assert only what he really believes.
2.2 A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discussion must provide a 
reason for wanting to do so. (2001, p. 88)
Level 3: The Rhetorical Level.
3.1 Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in
discourse.
3.2 a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.
c) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
3.3 No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising
his rights as laid down in 3.1 and 3.2. (2001, p. 89)
The three presuppositional levels of argumentation identify the universal, always 
already present, implicitly acknowledged, intuitively assumed, rules of argumentation 
that are free of internal or external coercion and that are aimed at communicatively
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reaching mutual understanding. Without these three presuppositional levels, the process 
of argumentation in a communicative context could not take place.
If one of these presuppositional rules is broken, the interlocutor is guilty of 
committing a performative contradiction that invalidates his/her objection to the validity 
claim being raised. “A performative contradiction occurs when a constative speech act 
k(p) rests on noncontingent presuppositions whose propositional content contradicts the 
asserted propositionp ” (Habermas, 2001, p. 80). Habermas explains this contradiction by 
referring to the speech act “(a) I do not exist (here and now)” (Habermas, 2001, p, 80). 
Habermas utilizes this example of a logical contradiction to clarify the concept of the 
performative contradiction. A logical contradiction occurs because, in order for the 
speaker to state that he/she does not exist, he/she must be able to speak these words, and 
in the process of speaking the words, contradict the proposition being raised in them. In 
order to state that you do not exist, you have to exist in the first place, and thus, the 
condition of existence contradicts the statement being made. This rather simple, logical 
contradiction leads Habermas to the universal presuppositions of argumentation in 
general, and the validation of his original position that normatively regulated moral 
positions can be deemed universally acceptable only through a process of discursively 
raising and redeeming claims to validity in which (U) and (D) are derived.
There have been objections to this formulation. A skeptic, for instance, could 
challenge the position, advanced by Habermas, that there are universal presuppositions to 
argumentation, claiming that these presuppositions are exclusive to a specific time and 
place and, hence, culturally relative. By challenging the claim to validity that Habermas 
offers, the skeptic enters into a discursive contest of opinion; enters into an argumentative
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process that always already involves the taken for granted assumptions and implicitly 
acknowledged presuppositions of that argumentative process. Upon entrance he/she 
accepts the always already present universal presuppositions of argumentation, identified 
in Table 1, and in doing so proves Habermas’s point. It is mentioned here in an attempt to 
contextualize the argument presently being developed and, also, to note that the cultural 
relativistic position will surface again when the ability of the imagetext to communicate 
across geographic and linguistic boundaries is considered below. For now, more 
explanation is needed if Habermas’s contentious claim to universality is going to be 
accepted.
By drawing on the work of his close colleague, K.O. Apel, Habermas extends
these universal presuppositions beyond the normatively regulated, moral contexts of
argumentation. This is the point at which the present discussion truly takes on the
transcendental and universal qualities that have been implicitly alluded to throughout this
chapter. By extending the universal presuppositions of argumentation to the objective
world of facts, the subjective world of personal experience that the individual alone has
privileged access to, and the aforementioned social world of regulative norms,
Habermas’s argument is rounded out and made applicable to all domains of
argumentation and communicative action as such. These grandiose expectations are
understandably not met without skeptical objection, but, once again, the objections prove
the propositional content of the principles themselves.
Apel tries to meet [these] objection^] by extending presuppositional 
analysis to the preconditions of argumentative speech as such, as opposed 
to restricting it to moral argumentation. He wants to show that any subject 
capable of speech and action makes substantive normative presuppositions 
as soon as the subject engages in any discourse with the intention of 
critically examining a hypothetical claim to validity. With this
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argumentative strategy Apel reaches even the skeptic who insists on a 
metaethical treatment of questions of moral theory and consequently 
refuses to be drawn into moral argumentation. Apel wants to make this 
kind of skeptic aware that no sooner does he object (and defend his 
objection) than he commits himself to an ‘argumentation game’ and thus 
to presuppositions that entangle him in a performative contradiction 
(Habermas, 2001, p. 84-85).
By entering into this ‘argumentative game’ the skeptic implicitly acknowledges the
validity of (U) and (D) as foundational principles that must be followed if his/her
objection is to be seriously considered by his/her fellow interlocutors.
There remains one, rather desperate, course of action open to the skeptic that
poses serious theoretical problems for Habermas’s theory which is committed to the
procedural guidelines, and presuppositional universals, of argumentation. The core of all
Habermasian theory is foundationally reliant, not on the isolated, semantic sentence that
can be grammatically and deductively analyzed “m foro interno or, as Husserl put it, in
the loneliness of his soul” (Habermas, 2001, p. 203), but on the performative utterance
which is used communicatively between at least two speaking individuals. The only
recourse that the consistent skeptic has is to drop out of the debate all together; thus
halting the argumentative process before it is allowed to begin. As mentioned the
principles of universalization (U) and the principle of discourse ethics (D) require that a
debate take place. Without this debate, the Habermasian position is in danger of collapse.
“If the cognitivist persists in his analysis, he will now be talking only about the skeptic,
not with him. At this point the devoted cognitivist usually throws up his hands,
confessing he has no further remedy for this dropout posture of the skeptic. He will say
that a willingness to argue and to think about one’s actions must really be presupposed if
the whole concern of moral theory is not to become pointless” (Habermas, 2001, p. 99).
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The problem with this position is internally related to the position Habermas defends
regarding the unavoidably cooperative nature of the individual as he/she appropriates
cultural traditions, belongs to social groups, and participates in socializing activities. By
dropping out of the argumentative practice, the autonomous, silent skeptic is denying the
foundations that his/her life is built upon. In order to illustrate this absolutely pivotal
point, Habermas will once again be quoted at some length.
By refusing to argue, for instance, he cannot, even indirectly, deny that he 
moves in a shared sociocultural form of life, that he grew up in a web of 
communicative action, and that he reproduces his life in that web. In a 
word, the skeptic may reject morality, but he cannot reject the ethical 
substance (Sittlichkeit) of the life circumstances in which he spends his 
waking hours not unless he is willing to take refuge in suicide or serious 
mental illness. In other words, he cannot extricate himself from the 
communicative practice of everyday life in which he is continually forced 
to take a position by responding yes or no. As long as he is still alive at 
all, a Robinson Crusoe existence through which the skeptic demonstrates 
mutely and impressively that he has dropped out of communicative action 
is inconceivable, even as a thought experiment. ... This is why there is no 
form of sociocultural life that is not at least implicitly geared to 
maintaining communicative action by means of argument, be the actual 
form of argumentation ever so rudimentary and the institutionalization of 
discursive consensus building ever so inchoate. ... That is why the radical 
skeptic’s refusal to argue is an empty gesture (Habermas, 2001, p. 100).
It is with this in mind that Habermas’s principle of universalization, the principle of
discourse ethics, and the concept of a performative contradiction, supplant previous
attempts at reconstructing a moral principle along the insufficient lines of Kant’s
categorical imperative, and further, to explain how these concepts provide a foundation
for, guide, and structure to human communication aimed at reaching understanding in
general. (U), (D), and the performative contradiction prove that the predisposition
amongst individuals that continuously recreate their autonomous and collective identities
through a process of cooperation and, thus, communication aimed at reaching
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understanding, is not the natural predilection or culturally relative preference of some 
theorists, but rather, a philosophically justified procedural account of the manner in 
which this cooperation is initiated, sustained, and even allowed to occur in the first place.
[2.6] Concluding Remarks on Habermas
The theory of communicative action is a procedural account of the manner in 
which communicating individuals coordinate and harmonize their plans of action 
according to the illocutionary content of their speech acts. Through the raising and 
redeeming of validity claims, a speaker and hearer bind their actions to the agreed upon 
contents of their discourse. It must be noted that this is only one of the ways in which 
individuals are rationally able to coordinate their actions. The individual is constantly 
motivated through the promise of threat and/or reward to undertake certain actions that 
are not coordinated via linguistic means. Escaping this reality is an impossibility. The 
major strength of Habermasian theory is the fact that he has identified the manner in 
which we are able to cooperate and coordinate our actions free of such manipulative and 
coercive power structures. Through the process of transparent communication, which 
follows the guidelines laid out in the principle of universalization and the methodological 
safeguards contained in the principle of discourse ethics, individuals discursively and 
intersubjectively test their claims to validity. If an agreement is achieved, the speakers 
and hearers actions are coordinated, binding or bonding them to the contents of their 
speech acts. Habermasian theory is an exhaustive account of the manner in which 
individuals are able to linguistically coordinate their actions. The linguistic bias in 
Habermas’s theory of communication will prove to be very important in chapter four 
when the attributes of visual culture are related to his theory of communicative action. It
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is briefly mentioned here to alert the reader to the complimentary nature of Habermasian 
theory and that of visual culture. The present study aims to enrich Habermasian theory 
via the theoretical contribution that visual cultures studies is currently in the process of 
making. In the next chapter of the present investigation, Habermas and his theory of 
communicative action will be left for the time being in order to devote our attentions to 
the embryonic, yet rapidly developing, field of visual culture studies.
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 3 - Visual Culture
[3.1] Introducing, Framing and Focusing the Debate
Visual Culture is a rapidly burgeoning field of inquiry that attempts to fill a void 
in the academy left by the lack of serious scholarship devoted to the circumstances in 
which individuals presently find themselves. This is an age which is inundated by, 
drowning in, consumed by, and engulfed in a never-ending barrage of images. W. J. T. 
Mitchell heralded this age as one that has taken a “pictorial turn” (1994, p. 11). The fact 
that individuals are constantly being put in relation to pictorial images that lack the 
historically necessary credentials of ‘high-art’ and are often incapable of being accurately 
ascribed authorship and correctly dated is where visual culture studies stakes its claim in 
academia. The discipline of art history has vociferously defended its claim as the proper 
and exhaustive curator of the visual image. In fact, a large proportion of the recent 
debates taking place in the field of visual culture attempt to address and overcome these 
dogmatic assumptions and territorial debates. Traditionally, art history looks to the past 
for its object of study, neglecting the rich and constantly fluctuating terrain of the present. 
There is a predefined and well guarded canon of objects that merit investigation because 
of their technical expertise, ground-breaking perspectives, genre defining subject matter, 
and/or contextual place within the traditional canon of art history.
Visual culture does not deny the providence of art history, or the necessity of 
examining the historical, artistic record, but sees in this act of segregating and limiting 
the possible objects of investigation as problematic to the task of researching, analyzing, 
and theorizing the contemporary era. Where art history sees little use in examining works
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of art, images or artifacts that are not considered part of the canon, visual culture takes as 
its object of study all those images that are produced, then released into society and 
attempts to theorize the effect that they have on specific cultures and culture writ large. 
Where art history is protective, selective and, hence, reductive; visual culture studies is, 
by nature, porous, amorphous, inclusive and, therefore, inter-disciplinary or, more 
provocatively, post-disciplinary.
In his introduction to one of the anthologies that attempt to define the boundaries 
and tasks of Visual Culture, Mirzoeff explains that the “constituent element of visual 
culture’s practice is the visual event” (2002, p. 6). Elsewhere, Bal attempts to sidestep the 
problematic and distracting issue of attempting to define the object of study by reframing 
the question: “what happens when people look, and what emerges from that act?” She 
continues, “(t)he verb ‘happens’ entails the visual event as an object, and ‘emerges’ the 
visual image, but as a fleeting, fugitive, subjective image accrued to the subject. These 
two results -  the event and the experienced image -  are joined at the hip in the act of 
looking and its aftermath” (2003, p. 9). As mentioned, this visual event is not strictly 
limited to the act of interrogating and decoding elements of a canonical text (although 
this act does constitute a part of visual culture), but rather, to the task of theorizing the act 
of seeing and being seen across a diasporic array of cultures that inform and permeate 
one another inclusively.
In an attempt to limit the present discussion in a beneficial manner, a certain 
focusing is required. While fully acknowledging that the act of seeing and being seen 
incorporates multiple mediums (analog and digital photography, TV, Film, Architecture, 
etc.), individuals, and visual events, the main focus of this paper will be on the
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foundational unit that grounds the vast majority imagistic communication. The still, 
photographic image and the image-event that is its’ correlate will be the main touch stone 
for the present study. By concentrating on the image-event that is produced when an 
individual is put in relation to a still image and the effects that this event has on the 
individual, the present discussion will provide a theoretical foundation for the future 
applicability of its findings. This act of selecting the object of study is not meant to 
narrow the field of inquiry in a negative or limiting fashion. The selection of the still 
image as the object of study is meant to provide the theoretical foundation upon which 
further extrapolations of the conclusions found here may lead to a more complete 
understanding of the array of visual events that the individual is confronted with each and 
every day.
By initially clarifying the [3.2] main differences between art history and visual 
culture studies, with reference to the distinct ways in which each field deals with their 
various objects of study, a theoretical position will emerge that will facilitate the 
interrogation of [3.3] the image event. The image-event, when an individual comes into 
contact with the objective intentionality of a free-floating, de-contextualized image, will 
provide the necessary theoretical foundation to explore what it is about certain images 
that force the individual to stop and look further into and possibly outside the frame of 
the image for meaning. This will be accomplished in reference to Barthes’ notion of 
punctum [3.4], Furthermore, it will be argued in [3.5] that the ‘image’ is more accurately 
described as an ‘imagetext’; one that is intimately and inseparably tied to language. Bal’s 
concept of the synaesthetic imagetext, mentioned in chapter 1, as well as a host of other 
theorists that argue for a similar position, will be used to clarify this position. Once the
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interrelated nature of the image and language is established, some concluding remarks 
[3.6] will be offered that will set the stage for the following chapter in which the 
theoretical offerings of both Habermas and Visual Culture Studies will be brought 
together via consideration of a contemporary set of imagetexts.
[3.2] The Polycentric, Diasporic, Curious Eye
“The academy is visibly changing” (Bryson, et. al., 1994, p. xv). This descriptive 
statement opens the introduction to an anthology dealing with the rapidly developing 
field of visual culture studies and sets the stage for one of the most contentious issues 
surrounding this field of inquiry. The discipline of art history has traditionally held a 
privileged position in the academy regarding the contemplation and theorization of the 
visual image. The long history of the discipline has ossified the reading of certain, often 
Eurocentric, texts into taken for granted assumptions regarding the place, role and 
function of art in culture. It has established and fortified the boundaries around what 
should be considered ‘art’ and what should not. This is done, more often than not, with a 
strict attention devoted to the past and not the present or the future, as the term ‘art 
history’ implies. “The practical history of art is in large part a history of selection and 
relative valuation within a remarkably persistent professional tradition, as succeeding 
artistic communities choose, discard, and transform the components of an inherited 
repertoire” (Crow, 1996, p. 35). In other words, “in traditional art history the study of 
different forms and the art of different geographical areas depended on the 
hierarchization of social interests, so that, for example, only those objects invested with 
aesthetic values recognized by the elite were considered worthy of study” (Moxey, 1996, 
p. 58). By limiting itself to the contemplation of a previously established, elitist canon, art
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history neglects the current cultural climate in which the individual now finds 
him/herself. This is a climate characterized by a constant, yet often unrelated, series of 
flowing images that, when one dips his/her foot in the proverbial stream, is never the 
same as it was before. Where art history dogmatically polices its boundaries regarding 
what is worthy of study and inspection, visual culture studies takes as its point of 
departure the inclusion and examination of those images and visual events that do not fall 
within those predefined enclaves and the manner in which the individual relates to his/her 
amorphous visual cultural environment.
In an interesting essay that argues that the traditional boundaries of art history are, 
and have always been, contaminated from without by the various artistic practices of 
individuals and cultures that are not traditionally included in the canon, Shohat and Stam 
(2002) claim that visual culture needs to adopt a systems theoretic point of view in which 
no culture can be considered hermetically sealed unto itself. Jay agrees with this 
assessment, “(t)here is also something unconvincing about the assumption that cultures 
can be isolated and studied as if they were watertight entities, entirely immanent, with no 
overlap with other cultures or internal contradictions of their own” (1996, p. 44). There 
is, in other words, always a give and take between cultures that the discipline of art 
history neglects to acknowledge. Images, then, are produced and examined, not in 
isolation from other cultures and traditions, but, in relation to the constantly shifting and 
porous membrane that is culture. This porous container is one in which images circulate 
in and out of without any predetermined beginning or end-point. In this way they propose 
that visual culture studies, if it is to live up to its desired expectations of freeing itself
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from the limiting, elitist confines of art history, should reformulate its nomenclature to
take into account a visual, polycentric multi-culture.
Western art, then, has always been indebted to and transformed by non- 
Western art. The movement of aesthetic ideas has been (at least) two-way 
... While a Euro-diffusionist narrative makes Europe a perpetual fountain 
of artistic innovation, we would argue for a multidirectional flow of 
aesthetic ideas, with intersecting, criss-crossing ripples and eddies. Indeed, 
it could be argued that many of the highpoints of Western creativity -  the 
Renaissance, modernism -  have been those moments when Europe loses 
its sealed-off and self-sufficient character; moments when its art was most 
hybridized, most traversed by currents from elsewhere (Shohat and Stam,
2002, p. 39-40).
By identifying the polycentric nature of even the most canonical works of art, the authors 
point to a fissure in the fortified boundaries of traditional art history, and, in identifying 
this weakness, posit an entrance strategy for visual culture into the previously closed-off, 
heavily guarded domain of the contemplation of the image.
Art history has traditionally fostered, encouraged, and rewarded its practioners 
who have developed what has been unfortunately termed the ‘good eye.’ It is assumed 
that with patience and practice one can develop a ‘good eye’ that is able to identify in the 
work of art the universal value that has been previously assigned to it. This means that 
the ‘good eye’ is one that is able to identify what has been traditionally defined as 
valuable and worthwhile within the artwork. The present usage of the term ‘valuable’ and 
its correlates does not signify any type of monetary value. It is used here to denote that 
which has been traditionally deemed important in the art work. If the individual’s 
interpretation of the work is inconsistent with the previously established interpretation of 
the text, he/she has not developed his/her ‘eye’ satisfactorily. By looking hard and long 
enough, the amateur or untrained, art historian is able to develop his/her skills of looking 
from an ignorant ‘bad eye’ perspective to an educated ‘good eye’ perspective which is
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consistent with the ‘good eyes’ of those that have been deemed experts. Visual culture 
identifies the elitist concept of the ‘good eye’ as one which is far too restrictive to take 
into account the value of the multifarious and legitimate interpretations of an image that 
do not accord with the notion of a ‘good eye.’ With this in mind, Rogoff posits the 
concept of the ‘curious eye’ as visual culture’s response to art history’s limiting concept 
of the ‘good eye.’
I have settled on the notion of the ‘curious eye’ to counter the ‘good eye’ 
of connoisseurship. Curiosity implies a certain unsettling; a notion of 
things outside the realm of the known, of things not yet quite known or 
articulated; the pleasures of the forbidden or the hidden or the unthought; 
the optimism of finding out something one had not known or been able to 
conceive of before” (Rogoff, 2002, p. 28).
By taking into account the possibility of adding to, supplementing, enriching and/or
improving upon concretized value interpretations that the ‘good eye’ of art historical
investigation encourages, the ‘curious eye’ reassesses previously taken for granted
assumptions, leaving the values present in a particular image or work of art a question
that is open for debate. In this opening up of interpretation, and assessment of value, lies
one of the main points of contention that art history rightfully warns visual culture studies
about.
According to the art historical perspective, if all texts are open to an individual’s 
subjective interpretation of value, the possibility of coming to any kind of consensus on 
their values or attributes is lost in the cacophony of points of view arguing for their 
particular position. The argument against the culturally relative reading of a text or an 
utterance surfaced in the discussion of Habermas’s principle of universalization and here, 
once again, shows its face to the crowd. According to art history, if anybody’s point of 
view is admissible and at least partially correct there can be no consensus regarding the
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particular merits of a work of art. This would, in the opinion of territorial art historians, 
lead to a deskilling of academics and ultimately to the impoverishment of the highly 
specialized knowledge base of the academy as a whole. “To surrender a history of art to a 
history of images will indeed mean a deskilling of interpretation, an inevitable 
misrecognition and misrepresentation of profound human endeavor (Crow, 1996, p. 36). 
This is certainly not the case when the position of Shohat and Stam is taken into 
consideration. “The point is not to embrace completely the other perspective but at least 
to recognize it, acknowledge it, take it into account, be ready to be transformed by it. By 
counterpointing embodied cultural perspectives, we cut across the monocular and 
monocultural field” (2002, p. 56).
Furthermore, if the Habermasian principle of discourse ethics and the principle of 
universalization are recalled here, the fear of a deskilling of the academy is an attempt to 
once again police the purified boundaries of art history from the contaminating effects of 
visual culture. A Habermasian reading of this policing activity would immediately 
identify the weaknesses in this position. According to Habermas’s linguistic theory, it is 
presuppositionally required that all points of view that are, or could be, affected by the 
interpretation of a text are given their due consideration in the contest of opinion that 
must take place if the decisions reached are to be considered more rational. In other 
words, the inclusion of all subjective perspectives is a requirement if the reading of a text 
is to be considered rational, valid, and legitimate for all those that are or could be affected 
by it. Therefore, the concern that the consideration of more than one point of view might 
lead to a deskilling of the academy is, not only a defensive concern but, one that 
impoverishes the overall interpretation of a text and hence the entire field as a whole. Art
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history’s claim to fostering and developing the use of the ‘good eye’ is an elitist attempt
to limit the possible reading of texts in a confined, preordained fashion. If an individual’s
reading is inconsistent with that of the traditional reading, his or her point of view is
relegated to the confines of the uniformed or the amateurish and not evaluated according
to the rightness or truthfulness of its interpretation.
It should be noted, however, that this defensive posture does not represent the
entire academy. The sanctioned and elitist interpretation of works of art is not embraced
by all those that devote their intellectual energies to the visual image. “What those of us
who study visual representations need right now -  if we are going to continue to produce
new and unsettling questions rather than just tacitly reproduce canonized knowledge -  is
the disorderliness of spaces in conflict, the mayhem of the unknown, even if the resulting
intellectual fracas sometimes feels like hell” (Holly, 1996, p. 41). It has become a
question of policing the boundaries of art history from the contaminating effects of visual
culture. Consistent with the argument developed in the Shohat and Stam essay regarding
the impossibility of treating visual representations as hermetically sealed products of a
distinct and unified culture, Mitchell, in one of the most insightful distinctions regarding
the debate surrounding visual culture studies’ position in reference to art history, asserts
that “one can study a boundary without policing it” (2003, p. 250). Bal, in a response to
Mitchell’s article, takes this distinction one step further.
I even think that we can safely replace ‘can’ with ‘must’. I think Mitchell 
would agree with this stronger formulation, which intimates that studying 
a boundary and policing are incompatible activities. When you police a 
boundary you believe in it, in the self-evident necessity of maintaining it; 
it is no more open to questioning than the law is to the police. By contrast, 
when you study a boundary, it is put at risk, denaturalized, perhaps 
modified, perhaps maintained for strategic, not essentializing, reasons 
(2003, p. 264).
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This interpretation of visual culture studies’ place within the academy is consistent with 
the Habermasian argument that normatively regulated actions should not be considered 
valid simply because they are naturalized and historically accepted. All normative 
interpretations must be subjected to the contest of opinion that, by definition, includes all 
those that are, or could be, affected by the norm in question. By omitting the point of 
view of visual culture studies, art history is limiting the possible participants in the 
discussion to those that are consistent with its canonized interpretation. What visual 
culture studies is attempting to do is to reexamine the elitist boundaries of the canon, 
rethink and requestion its de facto accepted knowledge base, introduce new objects of 
study, reevaluate the historical record for possible omission or exclusion, and, in general, 
study the boundaries of what the image does and how it is able to move in-between, over 
and through these boundaries almost without friction. “While in everyday life the 
experience of the image has been one of exponential increase and multiplication, the 
experience of the image within art history has been one of relative stasis” (Bryson, 2003, 
p. 231). The field of visual culture studies is an attempt to come to terms with this 
‘exponential increase’ of images that circulate the globe. Visual culture, as a field, is not 
a sealed container filled with archival items whose boundaries are being policed by a 
protective few, but a porous membrane in which the image moves in and out of, 
permitting all those that come into contact with it a chance to comment on and enrich its 
interpretation and, at the same time, theorize the impact that the polycentric image has on 
the individual that is put in direct, visual relation to it. It must be noted here, again, that 
visual culture studies is not a complete disavowal of the complex intellectual history, rich 
and insightful academic labour that has taken place in art history. “No new field emerges
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full-blown without debts to what proceeded it” (Jay, 2002a, p. 89). Visual culture studies 
simply sees the closed and uncontested foundations of art history’s canon as problematic 
in dealing with the current cultural climate that is anything but constant and consistent.
What is needed then, as opposed to the preordained and closed reading of an 
image by the ‘good eye’, is the concept of a polycentric, diasporically aware, curious eye. 
The curious eye which, when put in relation to an image, acknowledges that there is not a 
single, monocular perspective that is ‘naturally’ more correct than all the others, but that 
there can, and for the good of everyone concerned, must be multiple interpretations of 
images, is something that Mirzoeff calls the “multiple viewpoint” (2002, p. 208). Only 
through a process of reaching an understanding amongst participating individuals, can the 
multiple viewpoints come to a fallible consensus regarding the text in question. The 
multiple viewpoint, which is a product of the diasporic, globalized culture “cannot by its 
very nature be fully known, seen or quantified, even -  or especially -  by its own 
members. The notion of diaspora and visual culture embodies this paradox. A diaspora 
cannot be seen in any traditional sense and it certainly cannot be represented from the 
viewpoint of one-point perspective” (Mirzoeff, 2002, p. 205). Seen in this light and 
consistent with Habermasian theory, there are no universal, permanent answers. There 
are, however, universal presuppositions to the procedure in which these temporary 
answers can be achieved, as was discussed in chapter 2. A diasporically curious, 
polycentric eye, that is increasingly coming into contact with others from without, and 
acknowledging the multi-cultural traditions within, is one that should not, and cannot, be 
characterized by a Eurocentric, elitist ‘good eye’ perspective, but one that must take into
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account the various points of view, opinions and cultural values that are constantly
traversing the boundaries of an always already ‘contaminated’ national culture with ease.
Within a polycentric approach, the world of visual culture has many 
dynamic locations, many possible vantage points. The emphasis in 
‘polycentrism’ is not on spatial or primary points of origins or on a finite 
list of centres but rather on a systematic principle of differentiation, 
relationality, and linkage. No single community or part of the world, 
whatever its economic or political power, should be epistemologically 
privileged (Shohat and Stam, 2002, p. 56).
Shohat and Stam’s notion of the systematic relations between cultures, and therefore the 
artifacts that these cultures produce, addresses one of the most persistent questions 
regarding the troubling concerns of relativism and the deskilling of the academy that art 
history rightfully challenges visual culture studies with.
When a canonical visual text is read according to the ‘good eye’ perspective, this 
perspective does not consider the systematic links to other cultures that have had an 
influence on the production of the canonical text itself. These other cultures are often not 
allowed admission into the Eurocentric canon of traditional art history, but are without 
question systematically linked and related to the culture in which the canonical text 
originated. The canonical text is influenced from without by the systematic relations that 
naturally occur in and between cultures. “Western art, then, has always been indebted to 
and transformed by non-Western art. The movement of ideas has been (at least) two 
ways” (Shohat and Stam, 2002, p. 39-40). By refusing to acknowledge these intrinsic 
links, art history is neglecting the polycentric, dynamic locations that are naturally related 
to, and have influenced the production of, the canonical text in the first place. In this 
neglect, art history is guilty of privileging the culture of the person that produced the 
canonical text and of ignoring the various cultures that have had an unavoidable influence
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on its production. Read in this fashion, the claim that the academy will suffer from a 
deskilling if the polycentric approach to visual culture studies is allowed to exert its 
influence on art historical criticism is entirely problematic. By acknowledging the 
relational, systematic influence of other cultures and the resulting cultural artifacts that do 
not fall within the policed boundaries of the canon, the understanding and interpretation 
of the canonical text is further enriched and the fear that the academy will be 
impoverished through the admission of these perspectives is unfounded.
[3.3] The Image Event
“Millions and millions and millions o f images... that’s what I  eat. ”
-William S. Burroughs
Art historical investigation of the image considers it an end point. The ‘text’ is 
hung on a wall or is projected on a screen and is analyzed as a fixed object that 
transparently emits all of its information from the surface of the object or the screen to 
the looker. The fact that most works of art are studied by art historians, not in their 
original state or location within the politicized confines of a museum or gallery, but, as 
slides or pictures of the original, an original that is irreparably modified through this 
technological reproduction, is an oft mentioned shortcoming of treating the object of art 
historical investigation as an end in itself. “(T)he history of art has long been a visual 
study of images more often than actual art objects. Hence the challenge of visual studies 
is that it exposes the study of art as having been visual studies all along” (Buck-Morss, 
2004, min. 19). Berger reinforces this notion when he contends that “(w)hen the camera
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reproduces a painting it destroys the uniqueness of its image. As a result it’s meaning 
changes. Or, more exactly, its meaning multiplies and fragments into many meanings” 
(1972, p. 19). According to visual culture studies, the image, in either its original or its 
reproduced format, is the starting point that allows for the further investigation of “what 
‘happens’ when people look and what ‘emerges’ from that act? The verb ‘happens’ 
entails the visual event as an object, and ‘emerges’ the visual image, but as a fleeting, 
fugitive, subjective image accrued to the subject” (Bal, 2003, p. 9). Bal’s ‘visual event’ 
and her formulation of the image as restless and ‘fugitive’ is closely paralleled by the 
recent work of Buck-Morss that attempts to define the object of study in visual culture as 
the ‘image-event’. Bal asserts more forcefully that “(i)t is the possibility of performing 
acts of seeing, not the materiality of the object seen, that decides whether an artifact can 
be considered from the perspective of visual culture studies” (2003, p. 11). As opposed to 
the confining space of the gallery, the museum, or the screen in a class room, which is the 
traditional and naturalized context of art historical investigation, the image, according to 
visual culture studies, has been set loose upon the world; free of context and historical 
lineage.
(T)he fact about images is that they do float in isolation; moving in and 
out of context, freed from their origins and the history of their providence.
The superficiality of the image, its transferability, its accessibility... all of 
these qualities render the providence of the image ambiguous, if not 
irrelevant. An image is stumbled upon, found without being lost, arguably 
most at home when it knocks around the world. An image is promiscuous 
by nature (Buck-Morss, 2004, min. 39).
The fugitive and promiscuous nature of the image dislodges it from the fixed position,
and dogmatic assessment of value, that it once occupied and solicited. This is, quite
obviously, where the technological reproduction of the image asserts its influence. The
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image ‘floats in isolation,’ but each and every time it temporarily comes to rest on the
screen of a home computer, or passes before the eyes of an individual on a subway, it
becomes a piece or a detail of the whole, a starting point, not the whole in itself and an
endpoint. “(V)isual culture studies considers the object as a detail in itself, of a whole that
is, by definition, only provisionally and strategically delimited” (Bal, 2003, p. 24).
Whereas art history attempts to ground the image historically and provide authorial
credit, visual culture studies acknowledges the promiscuous nature of the image, allowing
it the freedom to move according the predilections or whims of individuals the world
over that call, or stumble, upon it.
The freedom with which the image is able to cross national and cultural
boundaries is a product of its technological reproduction.
Electronic reproduction enhanced the velocity of images, shortened their 
half-life, and rendered them weightless and decontextualized, radically 
detached from whatever place they had originally been made. This 
entailed a historical and intercultural implosion in which -  no matter 
where on the globe you stood -  images from outside the culture and from 
even remote periods now streamed and coalesced with imagery from 
within the culture, merging and combining in unprecedented forms 
(Bryson, 2003, p. 230).
In art history the reproducibility of the image is problematic. In visual culture studies, a
field that treats all images as a starting point, it is not. “By the standards of the art object,
the digital copy is irrevocably impoverished and degraded. But if this matters (and I think
it should matter) for art history, for visual studies, it really does not. Benjamin applauded
Baudelaire who, when confronted with the loss of the aura of the artwork, was content to
let it go (Buck-Morss, 2004, min. 44). The promiscuous, fugitive, transient, and
constantly moving image has no proper home. In fact, “the force of the image occurs
when it is dislodged from context” (Buck-Morss, 2004, min. 50). It constantly circulates
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the globe in decentred patterns of movement that permit an infinite number of individuals 
to come into contact with it and, hence, to call out or generate an infinite number of 
interpretations. With each moment of contact an image-event is initiated. “Hermeneutics 
shifts its orientation away from historical, or cultural, or authorial intent, toward what you 
can call ‘the image-event;’ the constantly moving perception. That is, the image as it gets 
released into a public domain and circulates” (Buck-Morss, 2004, min. 59). The 
perpetually in-motion and circulating image is constantly being ‘found’ by individuals. 
When it is found, the question becomes not one of origins but one of effect. The concept 
of the image-event is an important one because it encapsulates the systematically 
promiscuous and polycentric nature of the image. When culture is considered a porous 
membrane, in and through which images travel without friction, propelled by the 
technological reproducibility and transferability of images, the image-event is that 
moment that the individual ‘finds’ the circulating image and is allowed to contemplate its 
contents through this moment of systemic relationality.
Important to the understanding of the image-event is Buck-Morss’ concept of the 
‘objective intentionality’ of an image. She offers an example of surrealist art, which she 
accurately likens to the surreal aspects of the present day and age, to demonstrate her 
point. Taking Buniiel and Dali’s film, Un Chien Andalou (1929) as a parallel example of 
the manner in which the contemporary individual is put in relation to an infinite array of 
promiscuous images, she offers the following explanation. Referring to the disorienting 
and unexplainable nature of the film, she asserts that: “The point is that the viewer 
quickly gives up the attempt at seeing the film as a representation of characters, or of 
actions, or a place. ... These images appear to us as full of meaning. While at the same
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time, as unmotivated by any subjective intent. Their meaningfulness, their intentionality 
is objective, not subjective” (Buck-Morss, 2004, min. 30). This surrealist work allows the 
individual to construct his/her own narrative according to the predilections of the viewer. 
These are subjective predilections that are generated by the objective intentionality of that 
which is seen. In this way, the surreal image and the fugitive image present themselves to 
the individual as an ahistorical, objective ‘film lifted off the face of the world’ that is 
ascribed meaning by the individual that invests it with subjective significance. The image 
itself is full of meaning but does not impose a predetermined interpretation of value on 
the viewer. The objective intentionality of the image, thus, calls out, or generates, a 
subjective response in the individual that, when the image is freed of the normalized and 
ideological interpretations sanctioned by the dominant narratives of society, enables the 
individual to come to his/her own conclusions regarding what the image is 
communicating. Buck-Morss is arguing that, in the present cultural climate, one which is 
saturated by an over-abundance of free-floating images, the individual’s perception of 
these images is analogous to the impact of surrealist art. Andre Bazin, an influential film 
theorist agrees with this conception of the surreal nature of the image culture. “Every 
image is to be seen as an object and every object an image. Hence, photography ranks 
high in the order of surrealist creativity because it produces an image that is a reality of 
nature, an hallucination that is also a fact” (Bazin, in Trachtenberg, 1980, p. 243). By 
releasing the image from its historical and/or contextual referents, by letting it circulate, 
the image is free to move in and out of culture in an unpredictable and uncontrollable 
fashion. It is found or stumbled upon and, hence, freed of any historically imposed and 
overtly ideological intentions.
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The complaint that images are taken out of context; cultural context, 
artistic intention... previous contexts of any sort, is not valid. To struggle 
to bind them again to their source is not only impossible, as it actually 
produces a new meaning, it is to miss what is powerful about them; 
namely their capacity to generate meaning and not merely the capacity to 
transmit it (Buck-Morss, 2004, min. 57).
In this way, the curious individual is encouraged to see in the objective intentionality of
the image what he/she wants to see, not what somebody else’s ‘good eye’ has already
seen and, hence, historically imposed that reading onto the surface of the image .
Comparably, Bal suggests that “visual culture studies should take as its primary
objects of critical analysis the master narratives that are presented as natural, universal,
true and inevitable, and dislodge them so that alternative narratives can become visible”
(2003, p. 22). Buck-Morss sees in the present age of imagistic overload, the surrealist
inclinations of the image-event. The individual’s interpretation of the image may be
guided by his/her previous background, or socio-cultural knowledge, but is not
determined by it. “The fact that we may see what we are culturally or ideologically
predisposed to see is not my point. ... An image takes a film off the face of the world and
shows it as meaningful” (Buck-Morss, 2004, min. 24). The promiscuous and fugitive
image may have cultural, historic, and palimpsestic traces of Bal’s master narratives, but
only if one is willing and able to dig deep enough into its origins. In the free floating
context of a succession of image-events, the individual is often not able to devote the
required time to do this, and, consequently, the image does not impose these traces on its
objective surface. It is historically and culturally dislodged from these master narratives.
The image-event, operationalized here as the moment in which an individual is put in
relation to an image, an image that has been freed of its historical, cultural confines, and
which is allowed to objectively communicate and leave its mark on the subjective
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individual; emotionally and/or cognitively. The image-event must be understood as that 
moment in which a message is objectively communicated to the individual that prompts 
him/her to generate his/her own subjective interpretation of what is significant within it. 
This is also where visual culture studies begins its investigation of the impact of the 
image-event on the individual.
The free floating, surreal-like, image, which is the catalyst to the image-event, is 
one that is incapable of being instantly and accurately located in time and space. The 
inability on the part of the individual to ground or ‘fix’ the image does not diminish the 
communicative capabilities of the image itself. In fact, it opens up the communicative 
possibilities that are inherent within it. The objective intentionality of the image calls out 
an immediate response in the individual. The image-event occurs instantly and the 
objective intentionality of the image is communicated without the historical baggage of 
the dogmatic ‘good eye’ perspective. Before he/she has had the opportunity, or develops 
the inclination, to locate its historical origins and read a subjective interpretation of the 
image, it has already called out a response in the individual and, more often than not, has 
already been replaced by another image-event. The cycle continues at a frantic pace. The 
individual is assaulted by a continuous flow of images that do not allow accurate 
authorial or historical ascription. Drawing parallels between the surrealistic nature of the 
present day Buck-Morss states that, “(t)he point is that the viewer quickly gives up trying 
to see the film as the representation of characters, or actions, or a place.” (2004, min. 
29:40). The communicative act, therefore, has already taken place. Seen in this light, 
Berger’s assertion that “(s)eeing comes before words. The child looks and recognizes 
before it can speak” (1972, p. 7), is theoretically accurate.
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What Buck-Morss and Bal fail to adequately grasp, or, at the very least, 
sufficiently explain, is that image-events often, due to their perpetual and successive 
occurrence, go unnoticed and slip away into the unconscious realm of individual 
affectation. The objective intentionality of an image is often not arresting enough to halt 
the procession of images long enough so that a subjective interpretation can be generated. 
What is significant then, is the ability of certain images to arrest the attention of the 
viewer long enough to make the individual stop and allow the image-event to leave an 
impression on the cognitive workings of the individual. If images are capable of 
coordinating action along the same lines as linguistic speech, the qualities of an image 
that has the ability to stand out, arrest the attention of the individual, and 
communicatively transmit a message to the individual needs to be further investigated.
[3.4] Punctuating the Visual
The sheer number of images that pass before an individual’s eyes every moment 
of every day makes the present experience of image culture analogous to the disorienting 
effects of surrealist art. The individual ‘finds’ and is put in relation to an over abundance 
of images throughout the course of his/her life, making it impossible to accurately recall 
each and every one of them. There are, quite simply, too many of them. There is a certain 
numbing effect that takes place where the individual does not have the time or the energy 
to sufficiently contemplate each and every image. But it must be admitted that there are 
also certain images that stand out. Images that in their objective intentionality are more 
arresting or meaningful than others stop the individual and force him/her to invest the 
required time and energy into subjectively interpreting what they are objectively 
communicating. If the image-event is to be a guiding principle that structures the study of
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visual culture, the ability on the part of certain images to arrest the attention of certain 
individuals and allow this event to make a cognitive impact needs to be further explored 
and explicated.
In Camera Lucida (1981), Roland Barthes offers the concepts of studium and 
punctum to do just that. The two concepts co-exist simultaneously within an image but 
are distinguished from each other by the naturalized reading that studium evokes and the 
ability of punctum to arrest the attention of the subjective individual and possibly disturb 
this reading. Barthes spends very little time on the concept of studium, one he considers 
quite obvious, deciding to devote his energies to the more dynamic and unpredictable 
nature of the punctum in a photograph to make his point. In line with art history, the 
‘studium’ of an image is the intention of the photographer, the message that is being 
overtly sent. This side of the image is the average, common understanding of what the 
image is trying to communicate. “What I feel about these photographs derives from an 
average affect, almost from a certain training” (Barthes, 1981, p. 26). Studium is the 
intentional and normatively regulated cultural, ethical, and political message that a 
photograph sends to the viewer. “To recognize the studium is inevitably to encounter the 
photographer’s intentions, to enter into harmony with them, to approve or disapprove of 
them, but always to understand them ... The studium is a kind of education” (Barthes, 
1981, p. 28). As well as being consistent with Habermasian nomenclature, Barthes 
intonates that the studium is the sw&jective intentionality of the photographer, one that 
encourages a reading of the image that is consistent with the normatively accepted 
reading, much like the ‘good eye’ perspective of art history.
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The punctum, on the other hand, is that detail within the objective intentionality
of the image that pricks or bruises the individual and forces him/her to take another look.
Referring to the penetrating qualities of punctum, Barthes will be quoted at length to
distinguish between these two very important concepts.
(I)t is this element that rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, 
and pierces me. A Latin word exists to designate this wound, this prick, 
this mark made by a pointed instrument: the word suits me all the better in 
that it also refers to the notion of punctuation, and because the 
photographs I am speaking of are in effect punctuated, sometimes even 
speckled with these sensitive points; precisely these marks, these wounds 
are so many points. This second element which will disturb the studium I 
shall therefore call punctum-, for punctum is also: sting, speck, cut, little 
hole ... A photographs punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also 
bruises me, is poignant to me) (Barthes, 1981, p. 26-27).
The punctum is that element in a ‘film lifted off the face of the world and shown as 
meaningful’ that disturbs the traditional, and often unnoticed, socio-culturally informed, 
reading of the image. It is that element within the image that arrests the attention of the 
viewer and forces him/her to stop, take notice of the image-event as it unfolds, allowing it 
to leave a cognitive impression, and prompting the individual to look further into the 
image for possible meaning. The punctum of an image, then, much like a comma, semi­
colon, period, or exclamation mark stops the viewer and forces him/her to pause, to look 
further, to investigate, and, hence, to take notice of the image-event as it occurs, not 
letting it slip away into the unconscious experience. Barthes further explores this notion 
of punctum drawing on a variety of images that have subjectively pricked him. But it is 
the differences he draws out between the pornographic image and the erotic image that 
demonstrate the concept of punctum most clearly.
(F)or me, there is no punctum in the pornographic image; at most it
amuses me (and even then, boredom follows quickly). The erotic
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photograph, on the contrary (and this is its very condition), does not make 
the sexual organs into a central object; it may very well not show them at 
all; it takes the spectator outside its frame, and it is there that I animate this 
photograph and that it animates me. The punctum, then, is a kind of subtle 
beyond (Barthes, 1981, p. 59).
This is the central moment in which the individual is taken out of the normative reading
imposed on him/her by the studium of the image and is subjectively prompted to take
notice of the image-event as it occurs, enabling him/her to move beyond the frame of the
image and animate it, and, at one and the same time, him/herself. It is this ‘beyond’ that
the punctum of the objective intentionality of an image initiates. The punctum of certain
images characterize the cognitive impact of certain image-events and the forgettable
nature of others. It must be recalled here that in visual culture studies this ‘beyond’ is not
an attempt to date and provide authorial credit to the image, but an action that is aimed at
reaching an understanding between the objective intentionality of the image and the
subjective interpretation of this intentionality prompted by the punctuating elements
present within it.
Barthes was writing in an era when the technological reproducibility of an image 
was possible, but before the instantaneous, global proliferation of images was a reality 
made possible by the invention and dissemination of information technologies. In the 
present day and age, with the constant stream of images in the individual’s daily 
experience, the punctum is still an element in the objective intentionality of an image that 
pricks or bruises the individual, forcing him/her to take notice of the image-event and try 
to understand the message that the image is sending. But the effect of these information 
technologies is that these image-events have become near constant. Sontag tries to 
account for this new reality. “Memory freeze-frames; its basic unit is the single image. In
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an era of information overload, the photograph provides a quick way of apprehending 
something and a compact form of memorizing it. The photograph is like a quotation, or a 
maxim or proverb” (2003, p. 22). The problem with this formulation is not its relation to 
language (this is actually a positive attribute), the problem lies in that some images are 
frozen in memory, and others pass unnoticed through the mind, like water under a bridge. 
Sontag does not emphasize strongly enough the impact of the ‘information overload’ on 
the individuals. The image may conceptualize and freeze complex issues, but not all 
images are able to accomplish this function and transform the unnoticed image-event into 
a cognitively significant one. It is the ability of specific images to assert their presence in 
a culture of ‘information overload’ that is of importance, not the conceptualizing effect of 
the visual message. The elements of punctum that are present within the objective 
intentionality of an image promote the remembering, or freezing, of specific image- 
events and the discarding, or forgetting, of others.
If Buck-Morss’ and Bal’s argument that images have been freed of their historical 
and contextual confines by their infinite reproducibility and surrealistic over abundance is 
accepted. It follows that the ever present succession of images which are found or 
stumbled upon by the viewer have the power to affect the individual in an original and 
unique fashion, one that is lacking the historicized baggage of the ‘good eye’ perspective. 
The concept of an image’s punctum further informs what it is about specific images that 
engage the individual in a significant communicative exchange. The image-event is 
essentially an undetermined communicative exchange between the objective 
intentionality of an image ‘that is lifted off the face of the world,’ and the possibility that 
the individual devotes the required time and energy to contemplate the surface of the
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image. The concept of punctum is essential in arresting the individual’s attention long 
enough to allow this communicative exchange to, first, noticeably take place, and, 
second, to have an effect.
The previous presentation of the concepts of the image-event, the objective 
intentionality of an image, the studium, and the punctum of images were intentionally 
undertaken without reference to any specific images. This is because of the fact that what 
strikes or pricks individual A in the objective intentionality of an image by definition may 
not be what pierces or arrests individual B. These are subjective interpretations that were 
generated by the objective intentionality of an image that has been freed from the 
historical, master narratives that shackle its interpretation and, therefore, its effect. It is 
when these punctuating elements within an image tend to coalesce and generate the same 
meaning across a broad range of individual viewers, making the image-event cognitively 
significant to a plethora of individuals the world over, that the power of the image to 
coordinate action along the same lines as Habermas’s linguistic theory is finally realized.
[3.5] The Synaesthetic, Non-Captioned, Speaking Imagetext
If the visual image can be considered and imagQtext, one that is able to 
communicate with the individual along the same lines as indicated in Habermas’s 
linguistic theory, the dogmatic assumption that the image is a mute object, incapable of 
linguistic communication, has to be dispelled. As mentioned in the introductory chapter 
to this thesis, the traditional conception of the image has been one that does not grant it 
linguistic capabilities. Those that hold this position have not considered the ample 
evidence that argues against their interpretation. Even with a cursory examination of the 
literature surrounding the communicative capabilities of the image, this position cannot
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be granted any kind of serious consideration. With this debate in mind, both sides of the 
debate will be given their due attention and then some cursory concluding remarks in 
support of the latter position will be made.
The traditional conception of a linguistic argument, offered most clearly by 
O’Keefe (1982), is a two part linguistic relation. The first being a claim to validity and 
the second being support for the validity claim being made. If the claim can be redeemed 
by offering an adequate amount of supporting evidence, the propositional elements in the 
claim are accepted and the contents of the argument are deemed rational and/or 
reasonable. Blair and Fleming, in two different papers addressing this problematic, 
support this formulation of linguistic argumentation. In these two papers, the possibility 
of a visual image being able to make an argument is trumped by an exclusive reliance on 
language as the sole vehicle for raising and redeeming claims to validity and the belief 
that language and image are irreconcilably mutually exclusive. “Visual communication, 
when understood in contradistinction to verbal communication, occurs without the 
mediation of words or language in the literal sense” (Blair, 1996, p. 25). This is the 
foundational error that advocates of this side of the debate commit. By placing image and 
language in stark contradistinction to each other, these scholars are not taking into 
account the position advanced by visual culture studies that argues that images always 
already contain linguistic attributes. Strictly segregating the visual and the linguistic 
naturally leads to the conclusion that the visual alone cannot make an argument. Visual 
culture studies argues for the position that these two co-dependent elements should not, 
and, indeed, cannot be split apart. Fleming commits the same error in laying the 
foundations for his article when he casts the ‘picture’ in exclusively visual terms. “I
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define ‘picture’, then, as an artifact constructed to be iconic with the external world; and
my question is, can such a thing, independent of language, be an argument?” (Fleming,
1996, p. 11). Once again, visual culture studies responds to this question with the position
that the visual is never independent of language and that both elements are present in the
visual imagetext at one and the same time. The position held by Fleming is emblematic of
the belief that argumentation is strictly confined to the realm of the linguistic and, by
definition, omits any kind of visual communication from its paradigmatic confines. He
will be quoted at length to summarize the position held by such theorists.
To sum up, argument is reasoning towards a debatable conclusion. It is a 
human act conducted in two parts (claim and support) and with awareness 
of two sides (the claim allows for and even invites opposition). By this 
definition, something which cannot be broken down into claim and 
support, and whose claim is not reliably contestable, is not an argument, 
whatever else it may be and however else it may participate in argument.
It would seem, then, that a picture can be considered an ‘argument’ only 
by stretching the meaning of that word beyond recognition. ... To be 
refutable, the picture would have to be translated into a linguistic 
statement, in which case either the visual is irrelevant (since now 
duplicated by language), or the verbal is such a reduction of the visual as 
to be an entirely new thought all together (Fleming, 1996, p. 19).
Blair adopts a similar position regarding the possibility of visual argumentation. “When
we are interested in the visual argument as a distinct and distinctive species, I take it that
we mean to emphasize the contrast between the visual and the verbal” (Blair, 1996, p.
25). The main difficulty that both of these authors find in accepting the possibility of
visual argumentation is that they do not admit that there is an always already inseparable
linguistic element in the visual image. By dissecting, segregating, and contrasting the
linguistic attributes from the visual image, an act that is, as is being argued, impossible,
the authors believe that the strict linguistic premises of argumentation cannot be
maintained and therefore come to the conclusion that “argumentation without the use of
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language is impossible (van Eemeren et al., [1984] in Fleming, 1996, p. 12). One of the
most important contributions that visual culture studies has made to the understanding of
the image is to consider it an imagetext. The linguistic elements of an image cannot be
separated or dissected from the visual elements. They are involved in an internally
related, reciprocal relationship that is impossible to split apart. One constitutes and
explicates the other in a moment of simultaneous communication. It is certainly not the
case that when the eyes are activated the ears cease to function, or vice-versa. The senses
are not based on binary code in which they are either ‘on’ or they are ‘off.’ They function
synaesthetically, mutually informing the other. The attempt to definitively segregate one
from the other is a futile attempt that not only impoverishes the study of argumentation in
general, but disavows one of the foundational concepts of visual culture studies.
Birdsell and Groarke, the editors of Argumentation and Advocacy, present, in the
introduction to the issue that Fleming and Blair’s article appears, a more complete
understanding of the imagetext when they state that,
there is no reason to assume that a visual image must conduct its 
contribution to argument in perfect isolation. Yet this assumption 
undergirds David Fleming’s examination of the visual argument and 
drives a good deal of thinking that presupposes significant, inherent, and 
universal differences separating the verbal and the visual (Birdsell and 
Groarke, 1996, p. 5).
This belief is echoed more forcefully in the past and present literature surrounding the 
visual imagetext. The ways in which the visual and the verbal co-determine the message 
of the imagetext has been argued by numerous scholars. Delicath and Deluca, for 
example, suggest that “in a ‘visual culture’ there is necessarily visual argument. More 
specifically, we argue that conditions are such that images are capable of operating as 
claims-making, reason-giving, opinion-shaping communication and therefore
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instrumental to the practice of public argument” (2003, p. 321). Both positions obviously 
need to be interrogated further, but, for the present purposes, an absolute dismissal of the 
potential of the image to argue is seen as a reductionist attempt to preserve the dogmatic 
assumptions of linguistic debate without coming to terms with the present cultural 
environment which is characterized by “an unending rainfall of images” (Calvino in 
Leech, 2003, p. 242).
Writing in the introduction to a volume he edited entitled Classic Essays on 
Photography (1980), Trachtenberg concludes that “it is evident that any developments in 
photographic criticism will require that critics take into account the communicative 
power of the photographic image, its ‘language,’ its ‘meaning,’ and the relevance of that 
meaning to our world” (1980, p. xiii). In an admittedly over-enthusiastic portrayal of the 
‘truth’ of the photograph, written right after the invention of the Daguerreotype, Edgar 
Allan Poe asserts the preeminent abilities of the visual image to convey truth more 
accurately than language. “All language must fall short of conveying any just idea of the 
truth, and this will not appear so wonderful when we reflect that the source of vision 
itself has been, in this instance, the designer” (Poe [1840] in Trachtenberg, 1980, p. 38).
These issues are complicated further by the contemporary, globalized situation in 
which the individual finds him/herself in contact with other cultures that do not share a 
common verbal language. If we may return for a moment to the provocative example 
given in figure 1 of Magritte’s Treason o f the Image', unique because it is a piece of art 
that includes a caption as an essential element in its understanding. What is interesting 
here is, that if the image is dislodged from its historical context and ‘found’ or is 
‘stumbled upon’ by an individual, as Buck-Morss and Bal argue, that has no knowledge
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of and cannot understand the French dialect, the image of the pipe would be read, quite
naturally, as a pipe. The caption, due to its reliance on the common French language,
informs only those that can read French. If the complete image, caption included, was
shown to a person that does not understand French, and he/she was asked to describe the
objective intentionality of the image, the response would be predictably accurate. The
influence that the caption has on the interpretation of an image should not be
underestimated, but the usefulness of explicit language, such as the caption, in describing
an image-event is not the only linguistic element contained within the image. “Even the
uncaptioned photograph, framed and isolated on a gallery wall, is invaded by language
when it is looked at: in memory, in association, snatches of words and images continually
intermingle and exchange one for the other; what significant elements the subject
recognizes ‘in’ the photograph are inescapably supplemented from elsewhere” (Burgin,
1982, p. 192). Buck-Morss, in an interview published in the Journal o f Visual Culture,
states this position more forcefully. “Without language in common, the global public
sphere will have to rely heavily on images” (Buck-Morss, 2002, p. 339). Buck-Morss’
point is that, in the globalized public sphere the possibility of ideas and arguments being
confused or misrepresented due to the lack of a common language will have to be
supplemented by an imagistic communication that can bridge the linguistic divide. Once
again Burgin agrees;
In some naive applications of the linguistic analogy, photographic images 
are seen as equivalent to words. An act of reflection, however, shows that 
an image is more like a complex utterance than it is like a word. A 
photograph of a man is less the equivalent of ‘man’ than it is ‘A middle- 
aged man in an overcoat, wearing a hat, walking through a park... etc.’, or 
some other such list, depending on the particular image (Burgin, 1982, p.
66).
107
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The descriptive abilities of an imagetext that are likened to a complex utterance by 
Burgin will be shown to have the ability to make and defend claims to validity when they 
are put in relation to the three worlds that Habermas identifies in his theory of 
communicative action.
The conception of an imagetext as a complex utterance will necessarily have to be 
recalled in the coming pages. For now it is sufficient to recognize that “the photograph is 
verbalized in the very moment it is perceived; better, it is only perceived verbalized 
(Barthes, 1982, p. 207). Thus, imagetexts should not, and, indeed, cannot be separated 
from the language that is inherently and always already present within them. They are, in 
this sense, visually impure. “Treating the photograph as an object-text, ‘classic’ semiotics 
showed that the notion of the ‘purely visual’ image is nothing but an Edenic fiction” 
(Burgin, 1982, p. 144). Considering the imagetext ‘impure’ and always already 
contaminated with language from the outset is necessary if the possibility of visual 
argumentation is to become a defendable position. The impure imagetext is one that is 
imbued and saturated with language. Bal asserts this position more forcefully. “The act of 
looking is profoundly ‘impure’. First, sense directed as it may be, hence, grounded in 
biology ..., looking is inherently framed, framing, interpreting, affect-laden, cognitive 
and intellectual” (2003, p. 9). Her point is that when an individual is put in relation to an 
imagetext, the visual qualities of the text are only one portion of the message that is being 
presented to the looker. “More fundamentally, vision is itself inherently synaesthetic” 
(Bal, 2003, p. 9). If the visual side of an imagetext is treated as the exclusive register of 
meaning, the analysis of the imagetext in question is inevitably degraded and 
impoverished.
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Far from the photographs illustrating the text or the words ‘explicating’ 
the images, the simultaneity between the photographs and images, and 
their appeal to the viewer’s entire body operates by means of the 
enigmatic discrepancies between these two main registers. Hence, any 
definition that attempts to distinguish visuality from, for example, 
language, misses the point of the ‘new object’ entirely (Bal, 2003, p. 10).
Poster concurs with Bal’s assessment of the need for visual culture studies to treat the
visual as only one part of the equation. He and Bal both take issue with the inclination of
some theorists to herald the present culture of digitized and networked peoples as
primarily visual. In their opinion, “(w)ith digitization, multi-media becomes the norm. To
isolate the visual in this context becomes increasingly awkward and arbitrary” (Poster,
2002, p. 69). Bal continues this line of thought when she argues that with the rapid
proliferation of information technologies, the internet being its main touchstone, the
desire to purify and/or essentialize the visual aspects of an imagetext is a gross
miscalculation of the imagetext’s potential.
(I)f anything characterizes the internet, it is the impossibility of positing its 
visuality as ‘pure’ or even primary. If the digital media stand out as typical 
in the mode of thinking that requires visual culture studies as a new 
cultural (inter)discipline, it is precisely because they cannot be considered 
visual, or just discursive either (Bal, 2003, p. 10).
The purity of the visual, to the omission of the linguistic, the tactile, or the auditory
elements of an imagetext, is something that Bal explicitly identifies as necessary in
overcoming if the hopes of visual culture studies are to become a reality. She calls the
impure imagetext a ‘synaesthetic’ one. An imagetext embodies, calls on, and references
multiple senses and abilities simultaneously. The concept of a synaesthetic imagetext is
directly linked to the impurity of the visual portion of the image. This link is one that
references multiple senses and abilities of the individual at the same time. One of the
most common examples of synaesthetics is coloured hearing. For the present purposes,
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the notion of an impure imagetext that is by definition imbued with linguistic elements 
serves as a very good example of the concept of synaesthesia as well. The visual impurity 
of the synaesthetic imagetext must be recognized if the ability to coordinate action via the 
imagetext is to be recognized.
[3.6] Concluding Remarks
As I have argued, all imagetexts should be considered visually impure from the 
very beginning. Bal, Burgin, and Barthes, to name the main advocates of this position, 
argue that by essentializing the purity of the visual aspects in an imagetext, to treat the 
visual element as untainted and uninfluenced by other sensory data, is an hermeneutic 
mistake that would lead, inevitably, to an impoverished analysis of ‘what happens when 
people look and what emerges from this act.’ Once again, the foundational mistake 
identified in the position held by Fleming and Blair is that the visual should not, and 
cannot, be considered the only piece of information that is being communicated when an 
individual is put in relation to an imagetext. As indicated, the word ‘imagetext’ itself 
identifies the interrelated nature of language and image and was introduced explicitly at 
this later stage to lend weight to the argument against essentializing the visual to the 
detriment and omission of the linguistic.
The need to conceptualize, analyze, and theorize those linguistic elements always 
already contained within the synaesthetic imagetext is absolutely key if the following 
connection to Habermas’s theory of communicative action is to be fruitful. By beginning 
the following chapter with a discussion of a specific set of imagetexts, those from the 
Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the subsequent explanation of the manner in which specific
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imagetexts have the ability to arrest the attention of the individual and coordinate the 
actions of individuals around the world will be given empirical support.
I l l
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Chapter 4: Theorizing Abu Ghraib
You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.
Bob Dylan, “Subterranean Homesick Blues”
You try to tell her what to do 
and all she does is stare at you.
Her stare is louder than your voice 
because the truth doesn’t make a noise.
- The White Stripes, “The Truth Doesn’t Make a Noise”
Only images in the mind motivate the will.
Walter Benjamin, “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of 
European Intelligentsia”
[4.1] Shifting Perspectives
The theory of communicative action is built upon the social behaviorist 
foundation constructed by George Herbert Mead in his book Mind, Self, and Society 
From the Standpoint o f  a Social Behaviorist (1967). Mead argues that in the animal 
organism, actions are initiated by instinctual reactions to the gestures of another animal. 
This conversation of gestures is a causal relationship that takes place impulsively without 
the use of symbolically mediated communication. For instance, a dog attacks another dog 
and a cause and effect sequence of action is instinctually initiated that runs its course 
until the two organisms are physically and/or sensually distanced from each other. There
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is no understanding on either animal’s part as to what one of them is communicating; 
simply instinctual reactions to the gestures of the other. “One form does not know that 
communication is taking place with the other” (Mead, 1967, p. 253). This animalistic, 
instinctual conversation of gestures is made more complex when the human organism 
develops the ability to symbolically communicate with one another.
Initially this type of communication is characterized by simplistic, single syllable 
utterances that are understandable to both parties but easily allow for miscommunication 
and confusion. Mead characterizes this stage of human communication as a symbolic 
signal language. This signal language calls out a response in the individual, much like the 
attack posture of the dog does, but it does so through the mediating capabilities of a 
symbolic reconstruction of the events in consideration. An example of the primitive 
signal language would be the call of “Fire!” The possibility of this undifferentiated, 
symbolic signal language to be misconstrued or misunderstood by a hearer, as explained 
in chapter 2, is the main impetus for the human organism to develop the more elaborate 
and more complex propositionally differentiated language in an attempt to clarify the 
desires or commands of the speaking individual. A propositionally differentiated 
language allows for the clarification of intention or meaning on the part of the speaker.
By developing the ability to symbolically communicate with others via a more complex, 
propositionally differentiated language, the human organism is able to clarify and 
elucidate what he/she means in the communicative act with an interlocutor. That is, the 
human organism is now in the position to orient his/her utterances to achieving mutual 
understanding via the coordinating effect of making and defending propositionally 
differentiated claims to validity.
113
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In order to defend these claims to validity, there has to be in place a relation to 
three corresponding worlds in which the claims to truth, rightness, and truthfulness are 
judged (Habermas, 1984, p. 99-100). Once again, Habermas employs Mead’s theory as a 
foundational structure on which he builds these three world relations. To begin with, the 
claims to truth, truthfulness, and rightness will be examined in relation to the ability of 
the visual imagetext to satisfy the hermeneutic requirements that Habermas offers 
regarding these validity claims.
Before the imagetext is able to be considered as a medium that is capable of 
coordinating action along the same lines as language, a few explanatory comments are 
required. The imagetext, as argued in chapter 3, is imbued and saturated with language 
from the very beginning. The linguistic qualities of the imagetext are an inseparable 
element of the message contained within it and/or generated by it. Much like the written 
word presented on the page and detached from the physical form of the author is able to 
raise and redeem claims to validity through a process of linguistic communication, the 
imagetext communicates an understandable message to the individual that is put in 
relation to it visually and linguistically at one and the same time. When an individual sits 
down and reads words composed by another individual, there is a communicative 
exchange between the writer and the reader. The imagetext must be considered in the 
exact same way. If it is accepted that the purity of the imagetext is irrevocably 
contaminated by language and considered visually impure due to the linguistic elements 
that are always already present within it, the communicative act that takes place in 
imagistic communication is paralleled by that which takes place when an individual sits 
down and reads the written word on a page. As Burgin argues, the image should be
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considered a complex utterance that is able to communicate an array of meanings to the 
individual that are internally related to the objective intentionality of the image. The 
commensurability of the imagetext and the three claims to validity will be examined in 
detail to provide the necessary theoretical foundation on which to build the 
complimentary theory offered here.
The claim to truth, which corresponds to the objective world as the sum total of 
existing states of affairs, finds its foundations in the ability of the child to relate to his/her 
physical and manipulable surroundings. Language is a tool that the child develops to free 
these tactile objects and/or individuals from their physical presence by symbolically 
translating that which is initially observable into a symbolic formation, language, which 
symbolically re-presents the original object or person. “The child must have at least a 
nascent ability to adopt an objectivating attitude toward perceptible and manipulable 
objects if it is to act intentionally and to understand imperative requests and statements of 
intention” (Habermas, 1987, p. 35). In this manner, “(s)eeing comes before words. The 
child looks and recognizes before it can speak” (Berger, 1972, p. 7). The visual 
foundation on which the claim to truth is established, as that which is empirically 
observable and, thus, grounded in the objective world, is an interesting connection to the 
traditional notion of photography as an ultimately true and objective presentation of 
events, people or objects. As Poe said: “All language must fall short of conveying any 
just idea of the truth, and this will not appear so wonderful when we reflect that the 
source of vision itself has been, in this instance, the designer” (Poe [1840] in 
Trachtenberg, 1980, p. 38). Barring all digital manipulation, even if a photograph is 
staged, perhaps in the studio, perhaps by the photographer intentionally changing his/her
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physical surroundings, perhaps by directing the actions of the individuals that are being 
photographed; in any of these cases, the fact that the objects or individuals depicted in the 
picture have at one time come before a camera and have been captured by the camera’s 
lens, is indisputable. Anecdotally, yet appropriate in the present context, in the French 
language, the lens in a camera is directly translated as objectif. The camera’s ability to 
faithfully reproduce the objective world is internally related to the mechanical and 
technological status of photography as a direct re-presentation of reality. As Benjamin’s 
famous essay argues, the reproducibility of the work of art in the age of mechanical 
reproduction destroys the unique aura that surrounds the original artwork, but it does not 
discredit the objective nature of the image that has been an inbuilt feature of photography 
since its invention.
Similar to the manner in which language is used by the developing child to 
mediate between the physical environment and the symbolic reconstruction of that 
environment, the photograph symbolically re-presents the objects or individuals by 
freeing them from their immediate physical confines. The image of a pipe, much like the 
word ‘pipe,’ is, quite obviously, not a physical pipe that one is able to pack and smoke, 
but a mutually understandable re-presentation of the physical object. Habermas notes that 
this is how the child develops his/her linguistic relation to the objective world as well. By 
symbolically freeing the object from the immediate, physical confines of time and space 
via a linguistically mediated symbolic representation, the individual child is able to recall 
and re-present the object in a mutually understandable fashion through the use of 
language. Redeeming the claim to objective truth is a product of the fidelity with which 
the individual is able to harmonize the symbolic, linguistic reconstruction of events to the
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physical and manipulable world of observable objects and/or events. The ability of the 
camera, and the resulting image, to represent, along the same lines as, or even more 
faithfully than, language, that which factually occurs, or has occurred, in the objective 
world, is a natural and undeniable feature of photographic communication. The fact that 
some images are manipulated or digitally altered to distort the objective world does not 
negate the fact that others are accurate symbolic representations of the objective world as 
the sum total of existing states of affairs. Much like untruthful language, both 
possibilities exist in the image world as well.
As mentioned in the chapter 2, the claim to truthfulness, which is related to the 
subjective world that the individual alone has privileged access to, can often only be 
redeemed through consistent, and thus, empirical, observable, visually verifiable, 
behaviour. Words, in the case of truthfulness, are sometimes simply not enough. In order 
for claims to sincerity to be redeemed, the observable behaviour of the individual making 
the claim must be consistent with the contents of the utterance. Habermas states that in 
the case of truthfulness, “a speaker means what he says can be made credible only in the 
consistency of what he does and not through providing grounds” (Habermas, 1984, p. 
303). If the individual’s actions are empirically consistent with the claim being made then 
the claim is redeemed. If they are not, the claim to truthfulness goes unredeemed and the 
linguistic utterance is thought to be insincere or untruthful. Once again, the 
commensurability between the visual nature of the claim to truthfulness and the inability 
on the part of the linguistic utterance in isolation to redeem said claim, reinforces the 
symbiotic relationship between the theory of communicative action and the theory of 
visual culture studies. Even if the image is not granted linguistic attributes, something
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this paper argues vehemently that it must be granted, the visual aspects in the generation 
of language, with it’s relation to the objective world, and in the verifying and redeeming 
of individual claims to sincerity or truthfulness, indicate that Habermas has not 
sufficiently considered the communicative abilities of the imagistic message. This 
oversight is due to his exclusive and exhaustive consideration of linguistic 
communication to the omission of all other forms of communication. The third claim 
considered here, that of normative rightness, is related to the socially regulated world of 
common, normative experience, and is, as Habermas had indicated, the most ambiguous 
and problematic.
Mead’s concept of ‘play’ and ‘game’ are used by Habermas in the genesis of the 
world of normatively regulated action which is related to the claim to rightness. When a 
child plays, he/she is solitarily shifting subjectivities from one perspective to the other. 
Initially, he/she plays a policeman, for example, who is in the process of arresting a 
criminal. The child then playfully shifts perspectives and places him/herself in the 
position of the criminal. The exchanging of subjectivities is characterized as taking on the 
concrete patterns of behaviour, or attitude, of the other. In the first portion of the inner- 
dialogue, the child calls out a response in him/herself that is in accord with the predicted 
concrete patterns of behaviour that the other would presumably undertake. In the above 
example, and depending on the child, the response would be either submission to the 
policeman, or, flight. Either way, the child calls out a response in him/herself through the 
act of taking the attitude of the other and responds according to the predicted reaction of 
the second perspective in the exchange. This pattern of behaviour is limited, for the time 
being, to the specific context in which the child is playing and is not generalizable across
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differing situations. This is due to the inability on the part of the developing child to 
generalize the concrete patterns of behaviour of individuals across differing members of 
the social context.
As the child continues to develop and begins playing ‘games,’ he/she is able to 
adopt the perspective of all those that are participating in the game. By taking on the 
attitude of the generalized other, the child is able to put him/herself in the position of all 
the other subjectivities involved in the game. In taking into account all the other 
participants perspectives through the process of taking on the attitude of the generalized 
other, the individual’s behaviour is modified to reflect the expectations of the generalized 
group. In this fashion, the child not only adopts the point of view of all the others 
involved in the game, but is naturally able to assess the situational context as if from 
above. By putting him/herself in the position of an outside observer that is not directly 
involved in the game, he/she is able to evaluate the position of him/herself and all of the 
others at one and the same time. Habermas terms this outside perspective that of the 
‘neuter’ or observer (Habermas, 1987, p. 35). The neuter’s position, in relation to all the 
other participants in the game, is that of the observer and not the participant. The visual 
nature of the term ‘observer’ already indicates a commensurable link between the two 
bodies of knowledge. In this fashion the child temporarily splinters his subjectivity into 
three differing points of view; that of the individual participant, that of all the other 
participants, and that of the observer or watcher that is not involved in the game. By 
taking on the perspective of the neuter and the attitude of the generalized other, the child 
modifies his/her behaviour to reflect the expectations of the group. His/Her actions are 
altered through the process of taking into account these other perspectives. By putting
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him/herself in the position of all the others involved in the game, the child projects 
him/herself into their position and is able to temporarily and metaphorically embody their 
perspective. In taking into account all of the other perspectives of those involved in the 
situational context, the individual modifies his/her actions or utterances to comply to, or 
question, the normatively regulated context in which the point of view of his/her fellow 
participants, and that of the outside observer, are central. This is the foundational 
structure of the normatively regulated world of social experience that Habermas relates to 
the validity claim to rightness, and will be of extreme importance when the images from 
Abu Ghraib are considered below.
What is of utmost importance for the present discussion, is to realize that this act 
of taking on the attitude of the other, and the generalized other, is a process of putting 
oneself in the proverbial shoes of another. It is a process of fragmenting the individual 
subjectivity and temporarily adopting the perspective, or point of view, of another 
subjectivity. In this fashion, the individual looks at, and assesses, the situation with 
another’s eyes. His/Her behaviour takes into account the perspective of the generalized 
other and is modified to reflect the predicted response of the now splintered subjectivity. 
The commensurability with which this process takes place is naturally and internally 
related to the act of looking at an image. The vicarious nature of looking at an image, of 
putting oneself in another’s position, of doubling the subjectivity to temporarily adopt the 
other’s perspective, is an act that takes place virtually unnoticed when an individual is put 
in relation to an image. The widespread popularity of travel photography, and of 
pornography, are exemplary illustrations of this act of temporarily fragmenting the 
subjectivity and vicariously taking on the perspective of another. These genres of
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photography prompt the looker to double his/her subjectivity and temporarily adopt the 
perspective of the individual(s) within the frame of the picture. The act of shifting from 
the subjectivity of the individual behind the camera, to that which is being photographed, 
on the part of the outside observer or neuter, is hermeneutically compatible with the 
process that Habermas describes in the generation of the normative world of socially 
regulated action in which linguistic claims to rightness are judged. The visual dimension 
of taking on the attitude of the generalized other is not directly addressed by Habermas in 
his linguistically biased treatment of Mead, and, his theory of communicative action in 
general. When an individual looks at an image of another, he/she vicariously projects 
him/herself into the others position and cognitively or emotively reacts to the events 
depicted in the image as he/she would expect the other to.
To summarize, what is being argued is that language is just as much of a symbolic 
abstraction, or re-presentation, of objective truth as the visual image. Language is in fact 
one further step away from the objective truth than imagetexts because it does not contain 
any direct relation to that reality which it references. Language is the traditional and 
naturalized medium for making claims to validity which are related to the objective 
world, the normatively regulated world, and the subjective world, but it is not the 
privileged and isolated medium, as Habermas argues, for making such claims. The 
imagetext, which combines the objective nature of the medium with the linguistic 
elements always already contained within it, is able to make such claims to validity on 
equal footing to that of language. It does so by enriching and complimenting the 
linguistic message with a visual referent that can objectively parallel that which the 
linguistic portion describes. By providing the symbolically recreated, linguistic
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explanation of certain events with a visually verifiable representation of those events, the 
validity claims are strengthened and redeemed, or, otherwise, proven to be inaccurate and 
go unredeemed.
[4.2] Understanding the Image
The major theoretical obstacle that must be overcome if the theory of visual 
culture studies is to enrich and compliment the theory of communicative action surfaces 
at the level of reaching a mutual understanding between interlocutors. First of all, the 
imagetext must be granted linguistic attributes. If language is paradigmatically excluded 
from the image then achieving mutual understanding is impossible. In order to achieve 
understanding, the participants must recognize the conditions in which the utterance is 
made to be acceptable. “We understand a speech act when we know what makes it 
acceptable” (Habermas, 1984, p. 297). If the interlocutors comprehend under which 
circumstances the utterance is acceptable, then a mutual understanding is achieved 
regarding the contents of the utterance. The fact that imagetexts may be interpreted 
differently by a plethora of lookers/interlocutors; that understanding the contents of the 
imagetext may differ between and across individuals, poses few problems for the 
application of the theory of communicative action to the imagetext if the theoretical 
interpretation of what happens and what emerges when an individual is put in relation to 
an imagetext is accurate.
If individuals disagree about the message that an imagetext is sending, this 
disagreement is between the individuals in question and not between the imagetext and 
the individual. The disagreement in interpretation between individuals presuppositionally 
demonstrates that there has been a preliminary, yet fallible, understanding achieved
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between the individual and the imagetext in the first place. This point is tremendously 
important to the present argument. Again, more forcefully, the difference of opinion 
between the individuals regarding an imagetext is between the individuals in question, 
not between the individual and the imagetext. If this interpretation of the preliminary 
understanding achieved between the image and the individual is not accepted the ability 
on the part of speaking individuals to take part in a contest of opinion regarding the 
image in question is impossible. In order to argue with another individual about the 
meaning of an imagetext, there has to be an understanding achieved between the 
individual and the imagetext that furnishes these arguments with the background 
knowledge required to conduct the constative, linguistic debate. Buck-Morss’ concept of 
the objective intentionality of the imagetext succinctly demonstrates this point. She states 
that, an “image takes a film off the face of the world and shows it as meaningful (this is 
what I am describing as objective intentionality), that this apparent meaning may be 
separate from what the world may be in reality, or what we, with our own prejudices may 
insist is its significance” (Buck-Morss, 2004, min. 25). The objective intentionality of the 
imagetext is simply a request to be looked at and understood as a film that shows 
something in the world as meaningful. The possibility that the interpretation of the 
objective intentionality of the image is inconsistent with reality or, with another’s 
interpretation, does not preclude the fact that there is a mutual understanding achieved, 
first and foremost, between the individual and the communicating imagetext in question. 
What one person finds meaningful in an imagetext may differ dramatically from what 
another deems meaningful but this does not disavow or negate the achieved 
understanding between individual and imagetext. Berger’s assertion that “(s)eeing comes
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before words. The child looks and recognizes before it can speak” (1972, p. 7) is 
especially appropriate if, in order to recognize something, the child must first objectively 
understand what it is to begin with. Disagreement and exhaustive debate regarding the 
interpretation of an utterance is a presuppositional requirement for the linguistic theory of 
communicative action, and, consistently by extension, for the argument being developed 
here involving the imagetext.
[4.3] Shooting Pictures, Not Guns
The history of war photography is a long and richly textured one1. When a 
government sends their troops to fight a war, often in a foreign country, the natural 
inclination to pack a camera in the same bag as a rifle is commonplace. The nomenclature 
even indicates that the two activities, that of making war and taking pictures, are naturally 
and internally related to one another. The trigger finger that shoots an enemy and the 
trigger finger that shoots an image is a naturalized link between war and photography. 
“War making and picture-taking are congruent activities” (Sontag, 2003, p. 66). The main 
problem that the early war photographers faced, and which has put into question the 
authenticity of many of the early war photographs, was a technological one. The 
apparatus was, quite simply, too large and cumbersome to efficiently carry into the 
battlefield. As the technology developed, the camera became smaller, simpler to use, and 
more portable. So too did the celluloid on which the image was captured. These 
technological advances, coincidentally, came to fruition at the same time as the United 
States government made the decision to go to war in Vietnam. For the first time in
1 For an excellent historical record o f the links between war and photography see: Susan D. Moeller, 
Shooting War (New York: Basic Books, 1989) and Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain o f Others (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003)
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history, the camera was small enough, light enough, and easy enough to use that it could
be carried into battle by soldiers and photojoumalists alike. It is obvious with the advent
of digital photography that these capabilities are furthered by the compact and simplistic
process of capturing digital images. The people of the United States, and of the developed
world in general, were able to watch the war in Vietnam unfold in front of their eyes from
the comfortable and safe confines of their homes. The impact on public opinion that the
stream of images caused was an unforeseen byproduct of the ability of the camera to be
taken virtually anywhere.
It is further believed that the unprecedented freedom of the press to roam 
the combat zone at will, to publish or air images with little outside 
interference, and the status of Vietnam as the first ‘living room war’ 
contributed to that erosion (of public opinion). For the first time, it is 
argued, members of the American public saw for themselves ... what it 
was that really happened when we sent young men into battle (Dauber,
2001, p. 658).
In the conflict in Vietnam, the government was caught off-guard by the impact of the 
images that poured out of Southeast Asia. The constant flow of images that came from 
Vietnam is generally accepted as one of the main contributors to the backlash of public 
opinion that led to the eventual withdrawal of troops. In allowing the print journalists and 
photojournalists unprecedented access to the battlefield and hence the realties of armed 
conflict, the government of the United States’ war effort was flanked by the reaction, 
elicited by the photographs, of their own people. These bitter lessons were learnt and 
were certainly not forgotten by the subsequent administrations. One of the key insights 
that came from the Vietnam War was that the United States “cannot successfully go to 
war without the full support of the American people” (Dauber, 2001, p. 658). In order to 
wage a ‘successful’ war, one that is supported by the civilian public as much as the
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military apparatus, strict control of the images that furnish the background knowledge 
that informs public opinion is a necessary requirement. Although this lesson may seem to 
be a product of the generation of individuals that grew up in the Vietnam era, an era when 
the camera was first made available to the general public, this lesson is not as 
contemporary as one might believe. Near to the end of World War I, General Pershing, 
the Commander in charge of officially granting journalists access to the troops and the 
battlefield, sent a telegram dated June 19,1918 to Washington stating that photographers 
“WILL AGREE TO PAY ALL EXPENSES AND SUBMIT ALL WORK TO 
CENSORSHIP” (Pershing quoted in Moeller, 1989, p. 112). The desire on the part of the 
United States’ government to control the images of war that the public is allowed to see 
has just as long a history as photography itself.
During the Gulf War of 1991, President H. W. Bush, who “was angered when 
television networks showed him giving a news briefing on a split screen with caskets 
arriving,” (Milbank, 2004,113) banned all images that showed the remains of any 
American that had been killed in battle. This ban was reinstated by his son, the current 
President, after a period of relaxed restrictions during the Clinton administration, to once 
again ban any images of returning coffins draped in American flags at the handling centre 
for deceased soldiers at Andrews Air Force base in Dover, Delaware. The directive from 
the U.S. Military read: “There will be no arrival ceremonies for, or media coverage of, 
deceased military personnel returning to or departing from Ramstein [Germany] airbase 
or Dover [Del.] base, to include interim stops” (quoted in Milbank, 2004,13). When the 
images of flag draped coffins did eventually appear in the media, via a website 
(www.thememoryhole.org) that gained access to them through a surprisingly successful
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appeal to the government under the Freedom of Information Act, the woman responsible 
for taking the images, Tammi Silico, was swiftly dismissed from her position. These are 
simplistic examples of the manner in which individuals are motivated into performing 
certain actions, in this case the banning of taking pictures and the firing of an employee, 
by the release of an imagetext. Ironically, Silico explains that her motivation for taking 
the pictures was to comfort the parents of the deceased with the knowledge that their 
children’s remains were being respected, and certainly not to negatively comment on the 
war effort. “Silico told the Seattle Times she was sorry to lose her job and merely wanted 
families of fallen soldiers to know of the care demonstrated by crews taking their loved 
ones home” (Harper, 2004, 12). This misinterpretation of intention on the part of the
photographer should not be swiftly dismissed, as it is a very good example of the 
objective intentionality of the image that Buck-Morss identifies. The intentionality of 
these images is objective, not subjective. They communicate the mutually understood 
message between imagetext and viewer that these are dead American soldiers that have 
been killed in battle and their remains are respectfully being returned to their country and 
their families. Once again, it is important to make the vital distinction that the 
misunderstanding is between speaking individuals and not between the imagetext and the 
individuals. As Sontag notes, “The photographer’s intentions do not determine the 
meaning of a photograph” (2003, p. 39). The current Bush administration’s policy of 
banning photos has been harshly, and rightly, criticized for trying to sanitize the effects of 
war by censoring the images of the returning dead, thus limiting the inclusion of certain 
points of view from the public consciousness.
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The focus on images of war during April 2004 was intensified with the public
release of photographs depicting acts of torture committed by American soldiers against
detainees at the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq. The Pentagon once again attempted
to control the dissemination of these pictures by the media outlets that had gained access
to them. CBS’s program 60 Minutes II, the first to publicly air the images on April 28th of
2004, delayed the broadcast of the images for at least one week at the behest of the
Pentagon which was still reeling in trying to cope with the public outrage caused by the
images of deceased soldiers returning to Andrews Air Force base in Dover.
Predictably, the grisly images that surfaced from Abu Ghraib2 were not the first
evidence that acts of torture were occurring in American detention facilities in Iraq.
Pulitzer Prize winning investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, who also broke the story of
the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam, knew of the torture long before the images surfaced; as
did the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which routinely visits detention
facilities the world over, in accordance with provisions set out in the Geneva
Conventions, to ensure that detainees are being handled in a humane fashion. The oddly
secretive and counterproductive policy of the ICRC to keep their reports confidential and
available only to those that are being investigated obviously did not help in the
dissemination of the story.
Indeed, it seems they (the pictures) were necessary to get our leaders to 
acknowledge that they had a problem on their hands. After all, the 
conclusions of reports compiled by the International Red Cross, and other 
reports by journalists and protests by humanitarian organizations about the 
atrocious punishments inflicted on ‘detainees’ and ‘suspected terrorists’ in 
prisons run by the American military, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, 
have been circulating for more than a year. It seems doubtful that such 
reports were read by President Bush or Vice President Dick Cheney or
2 The images o f torture, sexual humiliation, and state inflicted terror will not be included here. See: 
http://www.antiwar.com/news/?articleid=2444 or http://www.thememorvhole.org/war/iraqis tortured/
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Condoleezza Rice or Rumsfeld. Apparently it took the photographs to get 
their attention when it became clear they could not be suppressed; it was 
the photographs that made all of this ‘real’ to Bush and his associates 
(Sontag, 2004, Section 4, *[f 3).
The U.S. military obviously had previous knowledge of the abuses as well and,
heuristically, even encouraged them as an appropriate and highly effective method for
extracting valuable information from the prisoners. One of the main reasons, it is argued
here, that the instances of torture or abuse did not come to light before the pictures were
released is because of the fact that they were strictly linguistic descriptions of events that
took place in a faraway, war torn country where atrocious things happen every hour of
every day. With only the descriptive abilities of language at the disposal of the ICRC and
the various other humanitarian organizations the information was simply ignored, lost in
the shuffle, or, worse, not even read by those in power, as Sontag theorizes. But the
pictures, the symbolic portrayal of individuals being sexually humiliated or physically
and mentally tortured, while the perpetrators stand proudly by with a cigarette dangling
from their lips or with their thumbs up, are simply un-ignorable.
One factor may have been recent history: there had been many previous 
complaints of prisoner abuse from organizations like Human Rights 
Watch and the International Red Cross, and the Pentagon had weathered 
them with ease. Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee that 
he had not been provided with the details of alleged abuses until late 
March, when he read the specific charges. ‘You read it, as I say, it’s one 
thing. You see the photographs and it’s just unbelievable’ (Hersh, 2004a, T|
47).
The photographs will not go away because of their infinite reproducibility and cannot be 
shuffled or hidden under a stack of other reports. They command attention and implore 
action. They have become synonymous with the ‘war effort’ and have come to symbolize
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the disdain that the Bush administration has for prisoner rights and international law in 
general.
Again, the objective intentionality of the imagetexts in question comes to bear on 
the present discussion. In the Arab world and among people of the Muslim faith in 
particular, sex in general is something that is tremendously private and individuals go to 
great lengths to keep it that way. For instance, the sexes are strictly segregated with 
women being forced into wearing a veil in the presence of men. Any kind of homosexual 
activity is ultimately taboo and, when it does occur, is kept as private as possible. The 
stigma surrounding the sexes, and sex in general, was seen by the U.S. forces as a 
weakness of the Muslim population that could be exploited. By photographing the 
various acts of public sexual behaviour, of which there is no need to describe here, the 
U.S. military thought that they could create a clandestine force of informants that “would 
do anything -  including spying on their associates -  to avoid dissemination of the 
shameful photos to family and friends. The government consultant said, ‘I was told that 
the purpose of the photographs was to create an army of informants, people you could 
insert back into the population.’” (Hersh, 2004a, f  36). The naive assumption that the 
digital files, which are easily emailed, burned onto a CD, and instantly transferred around 
the world, would not make their way into the hands of the public or the press was a 
shortsighted and ignorant expectation on the part of the U.S. military. The objective 
intentionality of a promiscuous and free-floating imagetext is distanced and severed from 
the desires of the image-making photographer(s). The meaning is objective and not 
subjective. The fact that torture has occurred at the hands of the American military is 
indisputable. The pictures prove it and the original intention for which the pictures were
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taken is of no significance once they have been allowed to freely roam the globe in 
decentred patterns of circulation.
There can be no doubt that if these images of torture and humiliation did not 
surface, the ability of the Pentagon to once again ‘weather’ the strictly linguistic 
accusations and move on to more ‘significant’ matters would have been judiciously 
exercised. But the images did surface, and what they initiated was a sequence of action 
that led to the court-martialing of some soldiers, the demotion in rank of others, the 
dishonourable discharge of others, the imprisonment of still others, and, most 
significantly, a wholesale, global reexamination of U.S. detention policies, particularly, 
and most recently, at the main American ‘terrorist’ detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba. Interestingly, the most recent linguistic accusations of abuse and torture that 
surfaced from Guantanamo, via a Newsweek article that claimed that the Qur’an had 
been desecrated by soldiers in an attempt to extract information from the detainees, were 
retracted with great embarrassment because there was no ‘proof of the desecration. One 
can only wonder what would have taken place if there were photographic evidence of 
these accusations. This story is still developing and there may yet be pictorial evidence of 
such abuses that surfaces.
[4.4] A Picture is Worth More than a Thousand Words
The sequence of action that the imagetexts from Abu Ghraib initiated needs to be 
theoretically examined in light of the theory of communicative action and the theory of 
visual culture studies. With the ample verbal and linguistic warnings and condemnations 
of the detention policies of the U.S. government made available by the ICRC and various
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other humanitarian organizations long before the images surfaced, the question remains 
as to why the photographs were far more effective in coordinating the actions of the U.S. 
government and bringing to justice those that are, arguably, responsible for the atrocities 
committed at Abu Ghraib. The responsibility for the acts of torture has been linked, by 
Hersh most emphatically in his book Chain o f Command: the Road from 9/11 to Abu 
Ghraib, to the upper echelons of the Bush Administration. The fact that they have used 
foot soldiers as scapegoats, responsible for policies that can be linked to the elite core of 
the administration is not surprising, but, also, does not minimize the effect of the 
photographs or the application of the theory being offered here.
When the images from Abu Ghraib are considered as examples of visual culture 
studies, and in light of the theory offered by Habermas, there is a procedural and 
pragmatic process to the hermeneutic investigation that must satisfy the strict 
requirements that form the core of his theory of communicative action. First and 
foremost, the message offered by the imagetexts must be seen to include a linguistic 
element. This linguistic portion of the imagetext does not exist in seclusion or segregation 
from the visual but alongside and commensurable to it. They form two portions to the 
whole that is the imagetext. As argued in chapter 3, the image is saturated and 
inextricably imbued with language from the very beginning. The two elements are co­
determinant in the objective meaning produced by the imagetext. Second, the images 
must present a mutually understandable message to the viewer. This is accomplished via 
Buck-Morss’ concept of the objective intentionality of the imagetext, in which the 
meaning ascribed to the imagetext is objective not subjective and the capacity to generate 
meaning is equally important. There is an understanding achieved between the imagetext
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and the viewer of the imagetext that makes the meaning of the imagetext comprehensible
to each and every person that is put in relation to it. When these understandings differ, the
chiasmus in achieving the understanding is between individuals, who can work out their
differing understandings linguistically via a contest of opinion and the force of the better
argument, and not between the individual and the imagetext. Third, in order to reach this
understanding, the imagetext must make claims to validity that the interlocutor/viewer is
able to take a yes/no position on in relation the three worlds described in chapter 2. If it
can be shown that the imagetext satisfies these three requirements, then the
commensurability between the theory of communicative action and visual culture studies
is given theoretical substantiation.
As explained above, when the claim to truth that an imagetext makes is put in
relation to the objective world and judged as true or false, the photograph has the unique
ability to portray the truth in visually irrefutable terms. A very telling, yet lengthy, quote
from Sontag will be presented in an attempt to unite the analogous features of the claim
to truth and the claim to truthfulness that an imagetext makes simultaneously. The claim
to normative rightness that an imagetext is capable of making presents a peculiar set of
problems that will be addressed shortly. For the time being, the claim to truth and
truthfulness will be addressed in relation to the potential of the imagetext to raise and
redeem these claims to validity.
Photographs have the advantage of uniting two contradictory features.
Their credentials of objectivity were inbuilt. Yet they always had, 
necessarily, a point of view. They were a record of the real -  
incontrovertible, as no verbal account, however impartial, could be -  since 
a machine was doing the recording. And they bore witness to the real -  
since a person had been there to take them. ... This sleight of hand allows 
photographs to be both objective record and personal testimony, both a 
faithful copy or transcription of an actual moment of reality and an
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interpretation of that reality -  a feat literature has long aspired to, but 
could never attain in this literal sense (2003, p. 26)
Thus, the claim to truth that the imagetext makes linguistically and visually in relation to
the objective world is a tremendously strong one. In our present example, even if the
perpetrators of the torturous acts were unknown and the victims unidentifiable, the fact
that these actions took place is irrefutably true. The claim to truth, which is evaluated in
relation to the objective world, is particularly strong when the linguistic elements of an
imagetext are supported, as it were, from the back by the visual elements that concretize
and ground the events in consideration in the objective world. It is extremely difficult to
take a ‘no’ position on the claim to truth that an imagetext makes when its credentials to
objectivity are inbuilt, as Sontag argues.
The claim to truthfulness or sincerity, which is related to the subjective world that
the individual alone has privileged access to, is represented by the subjective point of
view of the individual behind the camera that is taking the picture. In this fashion, as
Sontag demonstrates, the claim to truth and the claim to sincerity or truthfulness occur at
one and the same time when an imagetext is put in relation to the looker. The linguistic
claim to truth that the objective intentionality of the images from Abu Ghraib makes
could be extrapolated from the imagetexts as follows. “The individuals portrayed in these
pictures have been subject to physical torture, sexual humiliation, and mental distress.” In
considering this linguistic description of the events in question, alongside the visual,
evidentiary qualities, it would be very difficult for an individual to take a ‘no’ position on
the quasi-constative claims being made.
When assessed from the subjective point of view, the claim to sincerity that can
be extrapolated from the imagetexts could adequately be translated as follows: “I have
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witnessed acts of torture and abuse that were carried out against detainees in a prison.” In 
considering this linguistic extrapolation of the visual depiction of the events described, it 
would be tremendously difficult to take a ‘no’ position on the claim to sincerity or 
truthfulness being made. Thus, the claims to truth and truthfulness or sincerity that an 
imagetext makes, claims that are related to the objective world and the subjective world 
respectfully, are easily redeemed when the visual side of the image-text equation is 
considered in light of its evidentiary qualities. The linguistic elements, that form half of 
the overall message the imagetext is sending, are redeemed by the other half of the 
imagetext which visually redeems them by presenting the internally related claim to truth. 
The subjective claim to sincerity is redeemed through the reciprocal relationship between 
the subjectivity of the individual that creates the imagetext and the fact that that specific 
individual had to be present in order to make the visual-linguistic claim to sincerity. Once 
again, the major theoretical contribution that visual culture studies has made is the 
realization that imagetexts and their linguistic counterparts should not, and by definition 
cannot, be separated from one another. The imagetext is considered as a whole, that 
communicates a message to the individual that is put in relation to it linguistically and 
visually at one and the same time; two pieces that are internally and irrevocably 
intertwined with each other. The ability to redeem the linguistic portion or side of the 
claim to validity is accomplished, in the case of truth and truthfulness, by the visual 
portion of the message. The claim to rightness which is related to the social world of 
normatively regulated behaviour is a different being all together.
The foundation of the social world of normatively regulated behaviour offers a 
particularly appropriate entrance into the consideration of the imagetexts of prisoner
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torture committed at Abu Ghraib. According to the foundations provided by Mead for
Habermas’s theory, as the child develops the linguistic ability to symbolically re-present
his/her physical world through a signal language, and then, more proficiently, through a
propositionally differentiated language, that allows him/her to clarify his/her intentions or
desires to his/her fellow interlocutors, he/she temporarily takes on the attitude of another
individual. In taking on this other point of view the individual modifies or changes the
linguistic utterance being contemplated by taking into account the perspective of the
generalized other that observes the interaction as if from above. The child, in other
words, calls out a response in him/herself that would predictably be called out in the other
and modifies his/her utterance to take into consideration the point of view of the
generalized other. Habermas goes to great lengths to clarify the fact that pre-established
social norms or mores do not deserve to be recognized and respected simply because they
are in place and are acceptable to some individuals. To quote Habermas:
It is not sufficient, therefore, for one person to test whether he can will the 
adoption of a contested norm after considering the consequences and side 
effects that would occur if all persons followed that norm or whether every 
other person in an identical position could will the adoption of such a 
norm. In both cases the process of judging is relative to the vantage point 
and perspective of some and not all concerned (Habermas, 2001, p. 65).
The social norms must be subject to the same contest of opinion that all other validity
claims are subject to. This is his main improvement to Mead’s theory. Habermas takes
issue with Mead because he does not call into question the validity of social mores. He
simply accepts them as valid because they traditionally exist and are recognizable to
individuals across a specific social context.
Only when the power of tradition is broken to the extent that the 
legitimacy of existing orders can be viewed in light of hypothetical 
alternatives do the members of a group dependent on cooperation -  that is,
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on common efforts to attain collective goals -  ask themselves whether the 
norms in question regulate the choices of members in such a way that 
every one of them can see his interests protected (1987, p. 40).
Habermas believes that if a social norm is to be valid and legitimate to all those that are, 
or could possibly be, effected by it, it must be examined from all possible points of view 
and more rationally evaluated according to the force of the better argument.
In taking the attitude of the other, the developing child instinctually takes on the 
role of another subjectivity. He/She plays the role of a merchant, for instance, and then 
shifts subjectivities, calling out a response in him/herself that he/she calls out in the other, 
and purchases a product from him/herself. This doubling of the subjectivity is further 
extended by the developing child as he/she is able to take on the attitude of more and 
more individuals at the same time. This development is described in chapter 2 as the shift 
from ‘play’ to ‘game.’ By taking on the attitude of all those involved in the ‘game,’ the 
developing child further fragments his/her subjectivity so that he/she is able to call out, 
and react to, multiple responses from the perspectives of all those that are participating in 
the ‘game.’ There is a symbiotic relationship that develops so that the child participating 
in the game is able to react according to the expectations of all the other participants in 
the game, and they, reciprocally, react according to the expectations that are placed on 
them by all the others. By taking on the attitude of the generalized other, the child calls 
out a response in him/herself that predicts the response of the social community. His/Her 
reaction to specific stimuli in the game reflect the expectations that are placed on him/her 
by the other participants through the role of an outside observer or neuter. Thus, the child 
that participates in a game modifies his/her actions to reflect the normative expectations 
or socially regulated mores of the group. This is the foundational structure on which the
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social world of normatively regulated action is constructed. By calling out a response in
him/herself that would predictably be the response of the community, and by putting
him/herself, first, in the position of the other, second, in the position of all the others, and
third in the position of an uninvolved observer, the child learns to predict the possible
objections that another individual might raise and, in turn, learns what is appropriate or
acceptable behaviour for specific social contexts. The child may accept or reject these
expectations through which his/her personal identity is formed, but, that is not the point.
In anticipating from alter a negative answer to his own speech act, and 
raising against himself an objection that alter might raise, ego understands 
what it means to make a criticizable validity claim. As soon, then, as ego 
masters the orientation to validity claims, he can repeat the internalization 
of discursive relations once more. Now alter already encounters him with 
the expectation that ego is not assuming the communicative role of the 
first person only in a naive manner, but will expand if necessary, to the 
role of a proponent in argumentation. If ego makes this attitude of alter his 
own, that is to say, if he views himself through the eyes of an arguing 
opponent and considers how he will answer to his critique, he gains a 
reflective relation to himself (Habermas, 1987, p. 74).
The most important feature of the above description of the social world of normatively
regulated behaviour is the presuppositional requirement on the part of the individual to
take into account the perspective of the other, and the generalized other, by doubling
him/herself, temporarily projecting his/her subjectivity into that of the other and the
generalized other simultaneously, predicting their response to his speech act, and
modifying said speech act to reflect the anticipated reaction of the other.
This process of taking into account the perspective of the other and the
generalized other is an activity that occurs, not only in language, but, in consideration of
the imagetext as well. When an individual, that is a participant and a product of a culture
which is inundated by imagistic communication, is put in relation to an imagetext, he/she
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fragments or doubles his/her subjectivity to temporarily inhabit the subjectivity of the
individual, if there is one, who is portrayed in the imagetext, as in taking the role of the
other, and also further fragments his/her subjectivity to occupy the position of an
onlooking observer, or the generalized other. The individual that is looking at the
imagetext more often than not did not take the picture. There had to be another
individual, or technology, physically present at the exact moment that the picture was
taken in order to lift it off the face of the world in the first place. When the objective
intentionality of an imagetext is evaluated as a film lifted off the face of the world and
shown as meaningful, as Buck-Morss argues, detached from the specific historical and
social context in which it originated, the perspective of the neutral observer is projected
from the looker’s eyes. In this fashion, the individual that is put in relation to an
imagetext temporarily fragments his/her subjectivity to occupy the position of the
individuals depicted in the imagetext, if there are in fact people depicted in the imagetext,
by taking on the role of the other. Furthermore, by taking into account the various
perspectives that guide his/her behaviour, the individual reacts to the imagetexts
according to the mores of the world of socially regulated normative behaviour that he/she
inhabits. Mead explains this as a process of taking the attitude of the generalized other.
The self-conscious individual, then, takes or assumes the organized social 
attitudes of the given social group or community ... to which he belongs, 
toward the social problems of various kinds which confront that group or 
community at any given time, and which arise in connection with the 
correspondingly different social projects or organized co-operative 
enterprises in which that group or community as such is engaged; and as 
an individual participant in these social projects or co-operative 
enterprises, he governs his own conduct accordingly (Mead, 1967, p. 155).
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This explanation is especially true when the images from Abu Ghraib are considered in 
relation to the reaction on the part of the American people and the global population at 
large.
The images that were leaked from Abu Ghraib were taken by American soldiers 
that felt the unexplainable and sadistic need to document their torturous actions. “The 
events are in part designed to be photographed. The grin is a grin for the camera. There 
would be something missing if, after stacking the naked men, you couldn’t take a picture 
of them” (Sontag, 2004, Section 3, ^ 1). The imagetexts will be analyzed, first, from the 
perspective and broken normative context of the soldiers themselves and then, more 
influentially, from the perspective of the American and global population in general.
[4.5] Abu Ghraib;  A Broken Social Context
If the above description of Mead’s and Habermas’s theory of putting oneself in 
the other’s shoes and modifying ones behaviour to reflect and to take into account the 
response that is called out in another, which constructs the mores of the social world by 
temporarily taking on the perspective of the other and the generalized other, is accepted, 
the obvious question remains as to how it is possible that individuals were able to commit 
such atrocious acts. This is the point at which the monstrosities of war emerge on a 
psycho-social level. The social world of normatively regulated behaviour differs from 
context to context. In the social context of armed conflict, the normative rules of civilian 
society are forgotten or replaced by different social codes that reflect the context in which 
the soldiers find themselves. Soldiers are trained to treat the enemy as they would no one 
else. Their purpose is to win the war and in order to do that the enemy must be destroyed.
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This is the social context in which war is waged. The mission on both sides of the conflict
is to kill and destroy the other. With this objective in mind, it is somewhat ironic that
there have been developed rules of engagement in which the most unlawful of acts, that
of physical destruction and murder, are regulated. The Geneva Conventions essentially
describe the parameters of war and the lengths that a government can go to in order to
win a war. The third Geneva Convention deals specifically with the treatment of
prisoners of war (POW’s) and describes in minute detail the manner in which they should
be treated. In essence, the Geneva Conventions attempt to normatively regulate the
actions of individuals and governments in the most abnormal of social contexts
imaginable. They set the limits for what is allowed in combat and what isn’t. Torturing
prisoners of war, for instance, is emphatically forbidden. When the Bush administration
redefined those inmates held at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay as ‘foreign
combatants’ and ‘terrorist insurgents’ they side-stepped the Geneva Conventions
regarding POWs. While not officially condoning the use of torture as a sanctioned
method of interrogation they linguistically redefined the parameters around the socially
regulated world of armed conflict and implicitly allowed those detainees to be treated, not
as prisoners of war who would be granted rights according to international law, but as
something beyond the purview of international law. That torture occurred in this kind
broken of social context should come as no surprise to anyone with the slightest
knowledge of the nature of war. Referring to acts of torture committed in similar broken
contexts by the Nazi Regime and Saddam Hussein, Sontag notes that
Americans, too, have done them and do them when they are told, or made 
to feel that those over whom they have absolute power deserve to be 
humiliated, tormented. They do them when they are led to believe that the 
people they are torturing belong to an inferior race or religion. For the
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meaning of these pictures is not just that these acts were performed, but 
that their perpetrators had no sense that there was anything wrong in what 
the pictures show (2004, Section 3, f  2).
The sense that nothing was wrong in what the pictures depict is a product of the social
world of normatively regulated behaviour in which war is waged. It is an extremely
abnormal social world in which even the most abhorrent of actions can be made to seem
normal and, indeed, praiseworthy. The reaction of the soldiers to their own photos, which
were passed around through email and CD like trophies, and the reaction of the American
and global population at large, differs as much as the social worlds in which these groups
of people live and operate. In the case of the soldiers, they did not adopt the perspective
of the other, because the inmates were made to be ‘naturally’ inferior to them, deemed
sub-human, and the perspective of the generalized other was not an issue since their
social context, that would normally check their behaviour against pre-established norms,
implicitly condoned, or at the very least ignored, the treatment of the prisoners. One of
the most shocking things about the photos is that there are heinous and brutal acts
occurring right in front of people that appear to be having a conversation around a water
cooler and not witnessing something that would outrage and shame the population of
their country, and the world at large.
When the photos of prisoner torture made their way into the mainstream media,
their impact was felt instantly. The linguistic description of the acts of torture depicted in
the images had been available for months before the photos were released. In a report
published by the ICRC3 in February 2004, leaked to the media with little attention shortly
thereafter, at least two and a half months before the pictures were leaked, and a month
3 This report was last retrieved on June 24, 2005 from: http://crvntome.org/icrc-report.htm
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after an internal report, known as the Taguba Report4, marked as “Secret -  No Foreign 
Dissemination” was made available to the U.S. military and the Bush administration, not 
to mention the numerous warnings from human rights organizations around the world, 
the details of the torturous activities that took place inside the walls of Abu Ghraib were 
linguistically described and made available to the Bush Administration and the various 
media outlets with little or no attention paid to them. But when the pictures were finally 
published, a major political meltdown occurred.
The differences between the linguistic and the imagistic accounts are in no way 
dissimilar in detail. The linguistic warnings by the ICRC and the humanitarian 
organizations describe in gory specifics, although in very formal nomenclature, that 
which is visually understandable in the images. The issue of pivotal importance in the 
present discussion concerns the actions that were coordinated by the images and the non­
action on the part of the U.S. administration and the world to the linguistic descriptions. 
By enriching Habermasian theory with the theory of visual culture, the reasons for the 
discrepancy are clear.
“Photos are exigencies: a rhetorical exigence is a moment that demands a 
response, calls forth a response” (Dauber, 2001, p. 677). When the photos of torture were 
released into the civilian social context, which knows only of the horrors of war in a 
tremendously limited, often censored, fashion, their effects, on a global scale, were 
morally toxic. The natural predisposition to double oneself and call out a response in 
him/herself that is called out in the other, to project that self into the perspective of the 
subject of the photos, the tortured, to further fragment the subjectivity to occupy the 
observer perspective was more than the American public could handle. This is not the
4 This report was last retrieved on June 24, 2005 from: http://www.agonist.org/annex/taguba.htm
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way that they expected ‘American’ soldiers to behave. Especially with all the rhetoric of 
the Bush administration promoting the American ideals of ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ for the 
Iraqi people, these imagetexts demonstrably and emphatically contradicted those 
normatively accepted, American, ideals. When the objective intentionality of the 
imagetext is considered alongside the natural ability of the individual to project 
him/herself into the place of those that were being tortured, and call out a response in 
him/herself that the message calls out in another, the incommensurability between the 
meaningfulness of the image lifted off the face of the world and the normative 
expectations of the American population, made the imagetexts unbelievably potent in 
their effects. In taking on the attitude of the other, the American public put themselves in 
the shoes of those that were being tortured and shuddered in disbelief as the actions of 
their soldiers, soldiers that were in Iraq to spread freedom, democracy, liberty, and 
justice, were in absolute opposition to the normative expectations of the public that saw 
the images. In taking the attitude of the generalized other, or the uninvolved, observing 
neuter, the public that was put in relation to the images, was, for the first time, confronted 
with the brutalities of the ‘just’ war that was being waged in their name. The American 
public, and the global public at large, were shown a film that was lifted off the face of the 
world and, in the majority of instances, were disgusted by the objective intentionality of 
that which was depicted therein. The nationality or religious beliefs of those depicted in 
the images did not matter. The message of these imagetexts was diametrically opposed to 
the normative expectations of these differing publics who evaluated them according to 
the social world of normatively regulated action in which they all live and move in. In 
this way, the imagetext invites the individual, regardless of nationality or religious belief,
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to temporarily adopt the perspective, to take on the role, of the other depicted within it
and evaluate that which is taking place within the imagetext according to the normatively
regulated responses of the group. Hersh refers to the reaction to the images on the part of
an Israeli man that demonstrates this point brilliantly.
I’ll tell you what an Israeli told me. And the Israelis as you know — a 
very tough, hard-nosed Israeli told me at one point, about all this —  he 
said, “You know, we hate the Arabs.” This is a guy who spent his career in 
the intelligence service and, you know, his hands are bloody. He said, “We 
hate the Arabs, and the Arabs hate us, and before 1948, we’ve been killing 
Arabs, and they’ve been killing us. But I have to tell you something”, he 
said. “We know somewhere down the line, we’re going to have to live 
with these people, much as we can’t stand them, and they’re going to have 
to be our neighbors. And if we had done in our prisons to the Arabs what 
you have done to the Arabs in your prisons, we couldn’t live that way.”
(Hersh, 2004c, min. 1:14:25)
The point is that, what was taking place inside of Abu Ghraib at the hands of the
American soldiers, abhorred even the staunchest, life long enemies of the Arab people.
The response that the individual calls out in him/herself, much like the reaction of
the Israeli man described above, is a reflection of that which is called out in the other
members of the social context. Mead uses the concept of ‘property’ to describe this
process.
If we say ‘This is my property, I shall control it,’ that affirmation calls out 
a certain set of responses which must be the same in any community in 
which property exists. It involves an organized attitude with reference to 
property which is common to all members of the community. ... Those 
attitudes (as organized sets of responses) must be there on the part of all, 
so that when one says such a thing he calls out in himself the response of 
the others. (Mead, 1967, p. 161).
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In a similar manner, the Geneva Conventions5 are used as a general rulebook for 
normatively regulating acts of war. In essence, they describe the manner in which lawful 
war, if there is such a thing, must be conducted in order to maintain the respectful dignity 
of all those parties involved. This is an ‘organized attitude’ that sets the parameters for 
treating the civilian population and the enemy soldiers of other countries as you would 
expect your people and soldiers to be treated by the enemy. In this fashion, the Geneva 
Conventions are a codified version of taking the attitude of the other and modifying the 
behaviour of governments to reflect the attitude of the generalized other. The 
transgression of these socially accepted guidelines, evidenced by the imagetexts from 
Abu Ghraib, is against international law and violates the achieved agreement, struck by 
hundreds of governments the world over. The power to coordinate action that the 
imagetexts from Abu Ghraib demonstrate is, first and foremost, the product of the 
attempt to rectify the transgression of a socially accepted, normatively regulated, code of 
conduct. By judging the objective intentionality of the imagetext against the 
internationally accepted Geneva Conventions, the collective consciousness of the 
American public which defines itself through the concepts of truth, justice, liberty, 
democracy, and an unwavering respect for others, their well-being, self-respect, and 
dignity; these imagetexts were able to incite mass condemnation of the American military 
penal system as no linguistic description had the ability to accomplish. If this example of 
the imagistic coordination of action is limited to this specific case, the hypotheses and 
hopes of this thesis are vindicated. The need to further examine and research what it is 
about other influential imagetexts and their ability to coordinate the actions of individuals
5 All 159 articles o f The Geneva Conventions and their appendices can be found in their entirety at: 
http://www. genevaconventions.org/ Special attention should be paid to Convention III which deals 
specifically with the treatment o f Prisoners of War.
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as effectively as language is evident when the example of the images leaked from Abu 
Ghraib are taken into consideration.
[4.6] Heading in the Right Direction
The case study of the actions coordinated by the imagetexts from Abu Ghraib 
does provide an appropriate, and as yet inadequately investigated, theoretical foundation 
for the consideration of various other imagetexts and their ability to coordinate the 
actions of individuals the world over much in the same manner as Habermas’s 
linguistically biased theory. One future application of the theory offered here could be to 
apply its findings to the imagetexts that were released upon the world in the aftermath of 
the December 26th, 2004 tsunami which killed hundreds of thousands of people in the 
South-Eastern hemisphere. The process of taking the attitude of the other and modifying 
ones behaviour to take into account the perspective of the generalized other is once again 
made possible when imagetexts from the tsunami are considered. By projecting oneself 
into the social context of those peoples that were devastated by the tsunami and allowing 
oneself to look through their eyes, via the mediating function of the objective 
intentionality of the imagetext, the global population was thrust into action. This response 
is put in stark contradistinction to the global response to the genocide taking place in 
Darfur, or that which took place in Rwanda, where the response was, regrettably, non­
existent. When the situations are compared, the obvious question is related to the reaction 
on the part of the global population in dealing with such catastrophic events. It is 
suggested here, that the global response to the tsunami differed in speed and scale from 
Darfur or Rwanda due to the presence of the camera and the resulting imagetexts in a 
heavily populated tourist destination and the absence of the camera in such ‘under-
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developed’ nations that elicit little or no tourism, and, hence, have little photographic 
images of their destruction. The fact that there were imagistic recording devices in the 
hands of those tourists that were vacationing in Thailand, for instance, facilitated and 
demanded that the message be distributed to the global population in a manner that could 
never be duplicated by language alone.
A brief Canadian example of the reaction that the images from the tsunami 
solicited will be used to end this chapter of the thesis. Kroum Pindoff, the founder of 
Music World Incorporated, is a Macedonian that came to Canada with little to no 
material wealth and built up an empire that now spans the country. When the tsunami hit 
and the images inevitably began to flow, he had trouble sleeping at night. “Pindoff openly 
began sobbing in describing how the shocking images from the tsunami disaster in 
Southeast Asia moved them to donate $5 million to the Canadian Red Cross today”
(Rush, 2005, If 2). The ability of the imagetext to coordinate the actions of individuals, 
organizations, and institutions the world over is an oversight on the part of the 
linguistically biased Habermasian theory that this thesis clarifies and fills in.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
[5.1] Rounding Out the Picture
In The Theory o f  Communicative Action, Habermas offers a pragmatic account of 
the manner in which individuals are linguistically motivated to perform certain actions 
free of strategic aims and instrumental means. He sees in the human organism the more 
rational potential of achieving agreement, understanding and cooperation through the 
communicative use of language. One of the main strengths of Habermas’s theory is that 
he identifies the basic, elemental linguistic structures and practices that permit this more 
rational form of action coordination to occur. On its own, this is a gargantuan task that is 
accomplished with a tremendous amount of intellectual precision. It is, though, as was 
mentioned throughout the body of this thesis, not without its oversights. By restricting his 
theory to the linguistic domain exclusively, Habermas overlooks the contemporary era in 
which the communicating individual is now living and moving. This oversight may be 
attributed to the fact that The Theory o f Communicative Action was written long before 
the identifiable features of the present age were able to be accurately observed and 
satisfactorily articulated. Nonetheless, his theory insufficiently explores the effects that 
the ‘pictorial turn’ has had on the individual and culture at large. This thesis compliments 
and enriches Habermasian theory by taking into account imagistic communication and 
the manner in which it is able to more rationally coordinate action along parallel lines as 
the linguistically biased theory offered by Habermas.
Visual culture studies interrogates previously taken for granted assumptions 
regarding the value and effects of certain historical imagetexts and acknowledges the
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effects of the production and consumption of contemporary imagetexts as well. In this 
fashion, it is critical by design and provides an appropriate theoretical foundation upon 
which the hypotheses of this thesis are constructed. This embryonic field of research is an 
attempt to open the eyes of an ageing academy. It is an unsettling field of research for 
some scholars because it critically questions the conclusions of years of intense 
intellectual labour and problematizes previously canonized knowledge bases. Visual 
culture studies looks at the socio-cultural world with fresh eyes. It recasts and 
reformulates the debates surrounding the act of looking into contemporary terms by 
acknowledging the past efforts of scholars, but not taking these efforts as gospel truths 
that deserve recognition simply because of their long history. The socio-cultural world is 
visibly changing at a frenetic pace. The technologies that enable the individual to create 
and disseminate visual imagetexts the world over, near instantaneously, are developing at 
such rapid speeds that our world is becoming more and more visually saturated every 
moment. Visual culture studies acknowledges this paradigm shift and is in the beginning 
stages of attempting to theorize the impact of this new reality on the individual and, by 
extension, on culture in general.
The debates have been intensely heated. Art historians dutifully defend their 
specialized and richly textured knowledge base from the probingly critical eyes of those 
in the academy that do not believe they have adequately or sufficiently analyzed the 
larger, ever-evolving picture. Whereas art history limits its investigation to an established 
and heavily guarded canon of objects, visual culture studies acknowledges the potential 
merits of the plethora of imagetexts that do not fall within those preordained boundaries. 
The fact that there are an immeasurable number of imagetexts that are not granted
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admission into this canon is indisputable. Visual culture studies takes as its point of 
departure the task of attempting to analyze all those imagetexts that may and, more 
importantly, may not be granted admission into the hallowed canon of art history. As was 
discussed, one of the main concerns of art historians is the deskilling of the academy. 
They argue that if a potentially infinite array of imagetexts is deemed to be suitable for 
academic investigation, scholars will cast their intellectual net too broadly. This will end 
up devaluing the amount of legitimate and serious research, leading to a deskilling of the 
academy.
At this point, it was necessary to call upon Habermasian theory to settle this 
heated debate. The fear of a ‘deskilling’ of the academy was laid to rest when 
Habermas’s principle of discourse ethics was considered in light of visual culture studies 
and art history. The principle of Discourse Ethics (D) states that “Only those norms can 
claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their 
capacity as participants in a practical discourse’'’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 66). One of the 
underlying principles of this concept is that in order for everyone that is (or could be) 
affected by the decision to grant their approval they must be allowed to participate in the 
dialogue. The potential for everyone that is, or could possibly be, affected by the 
achieved decisions, to voice his/her opinion is of absolute importance if the decisions in 
question are to be more rational than the de facto accepted knowledge base. For example, 
in art history, if the individual’s eye does not conform to the traditional ‘good eye’ 
perspective, or, if the individual decides to research an imagetext that is not included in 
the canon, his/her opinion is not granted any serious consideration, and, thus, not 
included as a participant in the discourse. If visual culture studies’ concept of the critical,
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‘curious eye’ is supplemented for art history’s elitist ‘good eye,’ the aims of Habermasian 
and visual cultural theory to reach more and more rational agreements between 
communicating individuals, by excluding no point of view that could potentially improve 
said decisions, are at least given the opportunity to be realized. Ironically, in this act of 
excluding certain points of view, territorial art historians impoverish the academy in 
general and are, ultimately, guilty of the deskilling that they so ardently and vocally strive 
to avoid.
[5.2] Habermas and Visual Culture Studies Reconciled
Of utmost importance to the arguments made above is the realization that 
imagetexts, as the nomenclature suggests, are inherently imbued and overrun with 
language from the very beginning. An image should never be construed as purely or 
essentially visual. The purity of the imagetext is always already irrevocably contaminated 
by language. This realization is the first major contribution that visual culture studies has 
made to the understanding of the now synaesthetic imagetext. It also furnishes this thesis 
with its core theoretical foundation. When the imagetext is granted linguistic attributes, 
there is a theoretical door that opens making it possible to subject the imagetext to the 
stringent theoretical requirements of Habermas’s linguistically biased theory. This is the 
first, foundational step to the argument developed throughout the body of this thesis.
Once this theoretical threshold has been crossed, the imagetext is finally able to be 
scrutinized in light of the theory of communicative action offered by Habermas.
Language is developed, according to Habermas via Mead, in an attempt to clarify 
and elucidate the intentions or desires of communicating individuals. As explained in 
Chapter 2, language progresses from an instinctual conversation of gestures, to a
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simplistic signal language, and, finally, to a more complex, propositionally differentiated, 
language. In this final step, the individual learns what it means to aim his/her actions at 
achieving an understanding between him/her and his/her fellow interlocutor(s). At this 
point it is necessary to once again revisit the understanding that is achieved between the 
individual and the communicating imagetext. Buck-Morss’ concept of the objective 
intentionality of an imagetext was key to this realization. She drew very clear parallels 
between the present age of imagistic overload and the surrealist art of Bumiel and Dali.
In their film, Un Chien Andalou, the imagetexts appear to the viewer as objective 
records that are full of meaning but void of any identifiable subjective intent. The 
imagetexts transmit an objective message but do not impose a preferred, subjective 
reading upon the viewer. In this fashion, the imagetexts are catalysts that generate 
meaning as well as communicate an objective message. They prompt the viewer to look 
further into the image and decide for him/herself what is significant within the imagetext. 
This illogical stream of imagetexts is directly linked to the contemporary era where an 
infinite array of imagetexts are ‘found’ by the individual without really looking for them. 
Much like Buniiel and Dali’s surrealistic film, in the present there is no logic to the 
appearance or the sequence of the imagetexts.
The possibility that individuals may disagree about the objective intentionality of 
the imagetext is testament to the understanding that is achieved in the first place between 
individual and imagetext. The fact that this understanding may differ between and across 
individuals proves there has been achieved an understanding between the individual and 
the imagetext. In order for individuals to disagree about the message of an imagetext, 
there has to have been an understanding reached between each individual and the
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imagetext to begin with. The differences in understanding are, then, between speaking 
individuals and, most importantly, not between the individual and the communicating 
imagetext.
Habermas argues that understanding is achieved by testing the utterance against 
three types of validity claims that are accepted or rejected according to their congruence 
with three corresponding world relations. The claim to truth is judged in relation to the 
objective world. The claim to normative rightness is judged in relation to the social 
world. The claim to truthfulness or sincerity is judged in relation to the subjective world. 
As was shown in chapter 4, the ability of the linguistically imbued imagetext to raise a 
claim to truth, which corresponds to the objective world, is one of the most powerful 
features of imagistic communication attributed to the fact that a machine does the 
recording. The claim to truthfulness or sincerity is internally related to the claim to truth 
via the point of view of an individual that had to have been physically present to record 
the events in consideration. As Sontag notes: “This sleight of hand allows photographs to 
be both objective record and personal testimony, both a faithful copy or transcription of 
an actual moment of reality and an interpretation of that reality” (2003, p.26). The fact 
that there are now in place thousands of ‘unmanned’ recording devices in subway 
stations, street corners, banks, campuses, libraries, restaurants, etc. the world over, points 
to yet another intriguing possibility for further research. The terrorist bombings of July 
2005 in London England, in which images collected from unmanned cameras were used 
to apprehend the suspects, are exemplary of the manner in which imagetexts are able to 
exert a tremendous influence on the actions of individuals and governments the world 
over. This is, unfortunately, neither the time nor the place to explore these complex
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issues. They are mentioned here to acknowledge the potential impact of this foundational 
theory on further research.
As argued, the claim to normative rightness is, in the context of the imagetext, 
unique. The work of G. H. Mead proved to be an invaluable resource, for both Habermas 
and myself, in dealing with the claim to normative rightness. Through the act of 
temporarily adopting the attitude of the other, the generalized other, and the outside, 
neutral observer, the individual learns to predict the responses and objections of another 
individual and/or the group at large. Through this prediction, he/she anticipates the 
possible objections that his/her interlocutor may raise and modifies his/her utterance to 
contend with these objections. Through the act of temporarily adopting another’s 
perspective, and of examining the utterance from the generalized other’s point of view, 
the individual temporarily doubles his/hers subjectivity. In this act of doubling, the 
individual projects him/herself into the subjectivity of the other and reacts to the 
normative, situational context as if he/she was, for a brief moment, the other. It is by 
taking into account the perspective of the other and modifying ones behaviour to 
acknowledge this perspective that the social world of normatively regulated action is 
constructed. The act of adopting another’s perspective is precisely what happens when an 
individual looks at an imagetext. He/She temporarily projects him/herself into the 
situational context of the imagetext and reacts to that which is depicted therein as the 
subject would presumably react. This act of doubling oneself explains why the 
imagetexts from Abu Ghraib were so potent in their effects.
When taking the attitude of the other, the generalized other, and the outside 
observer were examined this became even clearer. First, by temporarily adopting the
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perspective of the other, the individual assesses the situation as if he/she were in the 
position of the detainees. The claims to normative rightness that the imagetexts make 
obviously go unredeemed when the perspective of the prisoners is temporarily adopted. 
Second, by taking on the attitude of the generalized other, the individual evaluates that 
which is depicted within the imagetext according to the social world of normatively 
regulated action in which he/she lives and moves. The United States, for instance, defines 
itself through concepts such as freedom, liberty, democracy, and tolerance for others. In 
light of these normatively regulated touchstones, the actions of the soldiers were seen as 
being diametrically opposed to the social context in which the American public regards 
itself. The explanation offered above, as to how these soldiers were able to commit such 
deplorable acts, credits the brutalities and bestial nature of war, and the manner in which 
the social world of normatively regulated action, which normally checks the individual’s 
behaviour against the predicted response of the group, is mutilated by this violent 
context. Third, by adopting the perspective of the outside observer or neuter, a 
perspective that is by definition free of any national or religious affiliation, the public that 
viewed these imagetexts temporarily adopted the position of an uninvolved onlooker and 
evaluated them, once again, according to a neutral standard in which every human being 
expects to be treated. In all three cases, the complex utterances that are the correlates to 
the visual, evidentiary message of the imagetexts lifted off the face of Abu Ghraib, failed 
to redeem the claims to normative rightness that were made by them and, most 
importantly and emphatically, action was coordinated by these imagetexts, and not by the 
linguistic warnings that preceded them, to right the heinous wrongs that were evidenced 
by them.
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[5.3] Looking Forward, To the Future
The actions that were coordinated by the imagetexts that surfaced from Abu 
Ghraib are but one example of possibility of the imagistic coordination of action. In 
concentrating on the elemental unit of this type of communication, the still photograph, a 
theoretical foundation was constructed that forms the required foundation to further 
explore these issues via consideration of the various imagetexts available. It must be 
noted in closing that the omission of advertising images, moving images, digitally altered 
images, and artistic images of all sorts in the body of this thesis should not be read as a 
limitation or short coming to the theory offered here. The still image was specifically 
chosen because it is the simple, basic component to the majority of all imagistic 
communication. By analyzing and theorizing this foundational unit it is hoped that the 
conclusions offered here are a springboard to the furthering of the much needed research 
regarding what exactly happens when we look, what emerges from this act, and how our 
actions are coordinated by it.
157
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Bibliography of Works Cited:
Abram, David (1996). The Spell o f the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More- 
Than-Human World. New York: Vintage Books.
Alpers, Svetlana; Apter, Emily; Armstrong, Carol; Buck-Morss, Susan; Conley, Tom; 
Crary, Jonathan; Crow, Thomas; Gunning, Tom; Holly, Michael Ann; Jay, 
Martin; Kaufman, Thomas Dacosta; Kolbowski, Silvia; Lavin, Sylvia; Melville, 
Stephen; Molesworth, Helen; Moxey, Keith; Rodowick, D. N.; Waite, Geoff; 
Wood, Christopher (1996). “Visual Culture Questionnaire” In October, Vol. 77 
(Summer 1996), Boston: MIT Press, pp. 25-70
Bal, Mieke (2003). “Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture” In Journal o f 
Visual Culture, Vol. 2 (1), pp. 5-32.
Barthes, Roland (1981). Camera Lucida. New York: Hill and Wang
Barthes, Roland (1982). “The Photographic Message”. In Sontag, Susan (ed.) A Barthes 
Reader, New York: Hill and Wang, pp. 194-217.
Bazin, Andre (1980). “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” In Classic Essays on 
Phototgraphy. Ed. Alan Trachtenberg. New Haven, Connecticut: Leete’s Island 
Books, pp. 237- 244.
Benjamin, Walter (1927). “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia” 
in Selected Writings Vol. 2, Boston: Harvard University Press
Benjamin, Walter (1980). “A Short History of Photography” In Classic Essays on
Phototgraphy. Ed. Alan Trachtenberg. New Haven, Connecticut: Leete’s Island 
Books, pp. 199-216.
Benjamin, Walter (1992). “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” In 
Mast, Gerald; Cohen Marshall & Braudy, Leo (eds.) Film Theory and Criticism 
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 665-681.
Berger, John (1972). Ways o f Seeing. London, England: Penguin Books.
Berger, John (1980). About Looking. New York: Random House.
Birdsell, David S. & Groarke, Leo (1996). “Toward A Theory of Visual Argument” In 
Argumentation and Advocacy 33 (Summer 1996), River Falls, Wisconsin: 
American Forensics Association, pp. 1-10.
Blair, J. Anthony (1996). “The Possibility and Actuality of Visual Arguments” In
158
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Argumentation and Advocacy 33 (Summer 1996), River Falls, Wisconsin: 
American Forensics Association, pp. 23-39.
Bordwell, David & Thompson, Kristin (1993). Film Art: an introduction (Vol. 4) New 
York: McGraw Hill.
Bryson, Norman; Holly, Michael Ann & Moxey, Keith (Eds.). (1994). Visual Culture. 
Hanover, New England: Wesleyan University Press.
Bryson, Norman (2003). “Visual culture and the dearth of images” In Journal o f Visual 
Culture Vol. 2 (2), London, England: Sage Publications, pp. 229-232.
Buck-Morss, Susan (2002). “Globalization, cosmopolitanism, politics, and the citizen” In 
Journal o f Visual Culture Vol. 1 (3), London, England: Sage Publications, pp. 
325-340.
Buck-Morss, Susan (2004). Visual Studies & The Global Imagination. Lecture delivered 
at the Tate Modem Gallery, London, England, June 3, 2004. Retrieved last on 
September 1, 2005 from http://www.tate.org.uk/onlineevents/archive/susan buck- 
morss/default.htm
Buniiel, Louis & Dali, Salvador (1929). Un Chien Andalou.
Burgin, Victor (Ed.) (1982). Thinking Photography. London: Macmillan Press.
Burroughs, William & Van Sant, Gus (1985). “Millions of Images” found on The Elvis o f 
Letters. 12" vinyl with music by Gus Van Sant. Portland, Oregon: T.K. Records.
Dauber, Cori E. (2001). “The Shots Seen ‘Round the World: The Impact of the Images of 
Mogadishu on American Military Operations” In Rhetoric and Public Affairs,
Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 653-687
Delicath, John W. & Deluca, Kevin M. (2003). “Image Events, the Public Sphere, and 
Argumentative Practice: The Case of Radical Environmental Groups” In 
Argumentation Vol. 17, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 315-333.
Dylan, Bob (1965). “Subterranean Homesick Blues” found on Bringing It All Back 
Home. Columbia Records.
Finnegan, Cara A. (2001). “The Naturalistic Enthymeme and Visual Argument:
Photographic Representation in the ‘Skull Controversy’” In Argumentation and 
Advocacy 37 (Winter 2001), River Falls, Wisconsin: American Forensics 
Association, pp. 133-149.
Fleming, David (1996). “Can Pictures Be Arguments?” In Argumentation and Advocacy
159
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33 (Summer 1996), River Falls, Wisconsin: American Forensics Association, pp. 
11- 22 .
Habermas, Jurgen (1984, 1987). The Theory o f Communicative Action (Vol. 1 &2). Trans, 
by Thomas McCarthy, Boston, Beacon Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (2001). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans, by 
Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Harper, Tim. (2004, April 23). “U.S. sanitizes stain of death.” The Toronto Star. 
Retrieved June 27, 2005, from:
http://www.thestar.eom/N AS App/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Lavout/Ar 
ticle Typel&c^Article&cidM 082671811803&call pageid=968332188854&col= 
968350060724
Hersh, Seymour (2004a). “The Gray Zone” in The New Yorker Magazine. Retrieved 
June 27, 2005 from: http://www.newvorker.com/fact/content/7040524fa fact
Hersh, Seymour (2004b). “Untitled Interview” Interview conducted at the Graduate 
School of Journalism at the University of Southern California, Berkeley on 
October 8, 2004. Interview Streaming from:
http://www.berkeley.edU/news/media/releases/2004/10/l 1 hersh. shtml
Hersh, Seymour (2004c). “Keynote Address” at The American Civil Liberties Union 
Annual Membership Meeting. Address delivered July 8, 2004. Stable URL last 
retrieved June 27, 2005 from:
http://www.pastpeak.com/archives/2004/Q7/post 1 .htm
Jay, Martin (2002a). “That visual turn: the advent of visual culture.” In Journal o f Visual 
Culture, Vol. 1 (1), London: Sage Publications, pp. 87-92.
Jay, Martin (2002b). “Cultural Relativism and the Visual Turn” In Journal o f Visual 
Culture, Vol. 1 (3), London: Sage Publications, pp. 267-278.
Langsdorf, Lenore (1996). “Image And Emotion: Analyzing Visual Thinking” In 
Argumentation and Advocacy 33 (Summer 1996), River Falls, Wisconsin: 
American Forensics Association, pp. 46-52.
Leech, Peter (2003). “Visual culture and the ideology of the sublime” In Journal o f  
Visual Culture, Vol. 2 (2), London, England: Sage Publications, pp. 242-246.
Mead, George Herbert (1967). Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint o f a Social 
Behaviourist. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1973). Consciousness and the Acquisition o f Language. Trans, 
by Hugh J. Silverman, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
160
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Milbank, Dana. (2003, October 21). “Curtains Ordered for Media Coverage of Returning 
Coffins” The Washington Post. Retrieved June 27, 2005, from: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=artlcle&contentId=A55816-2003 Oct20&notFound=true
Mirzoeff, Nichoals (2002). “The Multiple Viewpoint: Diaspora and Visual Culture” In 
The Visual Culture Reader. Ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff. New York: Routledge Press, 
pp. 204-214.
Mitchell, W.J.T. (1994). Picture Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mitchell, W.J.T. (2003). “The obscure object of visual culture” In Journal o f Visual 
Culture, Vol. 2 (2), London, England: Sage Publications, pp.249-252.
Moeller, Susan D. (1989). Shooting War. New York: Basic Books Publishing.
Morris, Martin (2004). “Jurgen Habermas (1929-)” in Contemporary Critical Theorists, 
Jon Simmons (ed.), Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press.
O’Keefe, D. J. (1982). “The Concepts of Argument and Arguing” In J.R. Cox & C.A. 
Willard (eds.) Advances in Argumentation and Research, Carbondale, Illinois: 
Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 3-23.
Poe, Edgar Allan (1840). “The Daguerrotype” In Classic Essays on Phototgraphy (1980). 
Ed. Alan Trachtenberg. New Haven, Connecticut: Leete’s Island Books, pp. 37- 
38.
Poster, Mark (2002). “Visual Studies as Media Studies” In Journal o f  Visual Culture,
Vol. 1 (1), London: Sage Publications, pp. 67-70.
Rogoff, Irit (2002). “Studying Visual Culture” In The Visual Culture Reader. Ed. 
Nicholas Mirzoeff. New York: Routledge Press, pp. 24-36
Rush, Cutis, (2005, January 10). “Couple gives $5M to Red Cross” The Toronto Star. 
Retrieved June 27, 2005 from: http://www.thestar.com
Shelley, Cameron (1996). “Rhetorical and Demonstrative Modes of Visual Argument: 
Looking At Images of Human Evolution” In Argumentation and Advocacy 32 
(Fall 1996), River Falls, Wisconsin: American Forensics Association, pp. 53-68.
Shohat, Ella & Stam, Robert (2002). “Narrativizing Visual Culture: Towards a
Polycentric Aesthetics” In The Visual Culture Reader. Ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff. 
New York: Routledge Press, pp. 37-59.
Sontag, Susan (2003). Regarding the Pain o f Others. New York: Farrar, Straus and
161
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Giroux.
Sontag, Susan (2004). “Regarding the Torture of Others” in The New Yorker Magazine. 
Retrieved June 27, 2005 from: http://www.truthout.org/cgi- 
bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/9/4592
Trachtenberg, Alan (1980). Classic Essays on Photography. New Haven, Connecticut: 
Leete’s Island Books.
White Stripes (2002). “The Truth Doesn’t Make a Noise” found on De Stijl. Sympathy 
For The Record Industry.
162
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA AUCTORIS
Brian A. Brown was born in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan on the 31st of March, 1977. His 
childhood enabled him to call Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Windsor, 
Ontario, and Calgary, Alberta, all home for a period of time. Having spent some time 
living in England, Scotland and Greece, Brian returned to Windsor to complete his B.A. 
in Communication Studies. Upon completion, he applied and was accepted into the 
Masters program in Communication and Social Justice at the University of Windsor. He 
is currently expecting to graduate in the Fall of 2005 from the aforementioned Masters 
program and is hoping to begin his PhD studies in the very near future.
163
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
